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THE KAZAKHS

A Background Study for Psychological Warfare

by

Lawrence Krader and Ivor Wayne

November 1955

The George Washington University
HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE
operating under contract with
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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A BACKGROUND STUDY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

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Lawrence Krader and Ivar Wayne

Task KAZPO
A research project conducted by
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BRIEF

The Kazakhs, one of the major Turkic peoples in the USSR, live in a strategic area 101
in the heart of Soviet Central Asia. There are evidences of deep and continuing conflict 177
between their way of life and the policies imposed upon them by the Soviet Communists.
This study was intended to describe those sources of conflict and to indicate their impli- 181
cations for psychological warfare. A secondary objective of the study was to determine
how well the vulnerabilities of a people inaccessible to direct methods of research can
be assessed.

The traditional Kazakh way of life is pastoral nomadism; they abhor the settled 648
farming life. Their customs and values reflect this independent heritage, and the Soviet [181]
drive during the 1930's to collectivize the nomads met with resistance. Between 1926
and 1939, the Kazakhs suffered a net population loss of almost one million—nearly one- [161]
fourth of their number in 1926. This loss was the result of starvation and disease, mass
arrests and liquidations, flight across the border, and migration to neighboring Turkic
peoples and to the urban and industrial areas of Siberia, all factors indirectly attributable [167]
to the imposition of Soviet control.

The organization of Kazakh society according to kin groups has been an important [602]
factor in contact with the Soviets. It has eased Kazakh transition to collective life, since
most collective farms comprise single groups of blood relatives, but at the same time the
closeness of the family ties has frequently led to the charge of nepotism by the Soviets.

The nativistic revival of Kazakh interest in their traditional heroes and customs [668]
was encouraged by the Soviets as a wartime morale measure. This revival—at once polit-
ical, religious, and cultural in nature—became so strong that the Soviets considered it a
threat and have attempted to suppress it. The importance of blood ties to the Kazakhs
heightened their resentment of Soviet condemnation of their national heroes, whom they
regard also as their ancestors. The Kazakhs' veneration of their past history and culture [771]
is fostered by their native religion, a blend of ancestor worship and shamanism. This folk
religion is not formally organized. Administratively, the Soviets treat the Kazakhs as
Moslems, although it is difficult to say how much Islam has influenced the rural Kazakhs.

The Kazakhs appear to be making only a minimal contribution to important republic
activities which the Soviets are trying to encourage—industry and transport, Party and
government. One explanation may be that the Kazakhs are not given equal opportunities;
there is some evidence that the Slavs regard them as inferiors. Another reason is that
the Kazakhs are not coming forward for training and advancement. Apparently they prefer
to keep apart from the Slavic population of the republic; this conclusion is supported by
the low rate of intermarriage between the two peoples. The Kazakhs appear to be opposed [154]
to many aspects of Sovietization, but at present their resistance is largely passive.

The local press proved to be a most useful source of information in the present
study. The reports of local reactions and activities in relation to the official Party line 127
provided many indications of strengths and weaknesses, trouble spots and failures. In
addition to this source, research methods from many disciplines were combined to utilize
all available data and information.

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THE KAZAKHS
A BACKGROUND STUDY
FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

PART I
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

[P. 1]

INTRODUCTION[1]

Kazakhstan, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, extends from the KN 131
Caspian Sea to the Sino-Soviet frontier of Sinkiang, including within its [134]
borders an environment ranging from arid deserts to fertile mountain
valleys. It covers an area of more than one million square miles—about
four times that of Texas. It is the second largest unit in the Soviet
Union, immediately following the Russian republic. KN

Size is not the only impressive feature of Kazakhstan. Budgetwise 652
the republic ranks third among the 16 republics of the USSR, after
Russia and Ukraine, and ahead of several considerably more populous
administrative units. Its importance for Soviet production was enhanced KN
by the industrial developments of World War II. The mining and industrial 316
concentrations of Karaganda and of the eastern part of Kazakhstan
lie about midway between the western boundaries of the Soviet satellite KN
empire and the Siberian shores of the Pacific. Postwar planning clearly 311
reflects the Soviet estimate of the potentialities of the area's natural
resources in the effort to create in Central Asia a "freedom-loving
peoples' arsenal for peace." KN 33

The Soviet Central Asian basin is separated from the non-Soviet
world by high mountain chains and deserts. The Turkic peoples of the KN
USSR, who number about 15 million and thus form the largest non-Slavic 563
minority in the Soviet Union, have lived in and traveled about this area
for centuries. The Kazakhs and the other Turkic groups share many K 101
similarities in language and in culture. They also experience in common
a conflict between their traditional way of life and the policies K
imposed upon them by the Central Communist regime, a conflict as 698
acute as that experienced by any of the other minority peoples.

The present study of the Kazakh way of life was undertaken in an K
endeavor to determine the nature and source of these conflicts, and to 121
examine the problems created thereby for Moscow. In addition, the
report sets forth information gathered concerning the communication
patterns and facilities of the republic insofar as these are relevant to
the possible needs of psychological warfare.

This section summarizes those aspects of the deep-seated differences
between the Soviet and native Kazakh cultures which can most

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[1] Part I was written by Thomas Gladwin, Human Resources Research Office, and Lawrence Krader, Bureau of Social Science Research. K 114

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121 reasonably be expected to persist over time and which indicate probable vulnerabilities to psychological warfare.

COMMUNICATIONS

Because psychological warfare depends ultimately upon the ability to communicate, the existing patterns and facilities for communication have been given considerable attention in the report. These data are concerned not only with radio communications, literacy rates, and similar factors of importance in communicating from a distance, but also with motion pictures and book publishing, which are important during consolidation operations. Such scanty data as are available are given on the distribution of ethnic groups in the republic as a whole and within cities, a matter of importance in helping to define the limits of informal or word-of-mouth communication. Even more scanty, but highly important, are the few available indications of the direction and amount of uncontrolled flow of Turkic peoples back and forth between the USSR and Afghanistan, Iran, and other countries.

COLLECTIVIZATION

181 Among the many characteristics of Kazakh culture which have stood
in the way of successful adaptation to Soviet policy, their centuries-old
221 dedication to a life of pastoral nomadism has consistently created the
most acute problems—problems which became disastrous for the
Kazakhs during the collectivization drive of the 1930's. For generations
[233] the Kazakhs had led their flocks of sheep and goats in a yearly round
between winter and summer grazing areas, traveling in bands whose
[621] members were united by bonds of kinship and led by the senior men.
Like so many nomads they were proud of their way of life and viewed
agriculture and the sedentary life it implies as both unmanly and degrad-
[462] ing. The small amount of farming which was occasionally done was per-
[560] formed by women, who have always occupied a subordinate position in
Kazakh society, and by slaves and the poor.
[567] The determination of the Soviet regime to settle the Kazakhs, along
with the other peoples of the USSR, on collective farms met with resist-
648 ance and cost hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs their livelihood and
177 their lives. The net loss in Kazakh population in the period 1926-1939
amounted to almost one million; if one takes into account the normal
[161] increase otherwise to be expected during this time (based on figures for
the USSR as a whole) the figure is closer to one and a half million.

Some compromises were made during the later phases of collectivization, but the basic conflict remains and manifests itself in a number of different ways. The Kazakhs are among those affected by a plan for massive cultural change which the Soviets believe will eventually create a society uniformly organized in accordance with "socialist reality." Thus far, however, cultural change in Kazakhstan has failed in many ways to proceed according to plan.

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"FAMILY RELATIONS"

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The organization of Kazakh society by kin groups, bound together by strong ties of blood relationship into disciplined and cooperative units, has both interfered with Soviet planning and increased the extent of Kazakh suffering. The resistance of one person involves all his relatives in the ensuing punishment. At the same time these large family groupings do not fit into the Soviet conception of social and economic organization. The Soviets have, in fact, an explicit policy against "family relations." This phrase has two meanings, one literal, the other figurative. Literally it means nepotism, the use of his position by a man in power to obtain a good post for a relative. Figuratively, it denotes personal relationships on the job, relationships which the Soviet regime feels may permit one person to cover up the failings of another, and which may even become conspiratorial.

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In Kazakh society all action and decision take place within the framework of very literal "family relations," and this pattern inevitably is carried over into Soviet-sponsored activities. The bulk of the membership of a collective farm in Kazakhstan today is likely to comprise a single group of blood relatives, its leaders the older men of the group. This is particularly true of those areas in which herding remains important. The retention of kin group solidarity, where it has been permitted, has had two important effects. It has eased the adjustment of the Kazakhs to collectivization, while at the same time making possible maximum cooperation between collective farm members in covering up violations of Soviet directives and policy.

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The problem becomes even more acute when Kazakhs are drawn into industry and into the Party and government. They naturally try to surround themselves with their relatives. Paradoxically, Soviet policy has often tended to foster this tendency; political affiliation, like everything else among the Kazakhs, tends to be a family matter, and a willingness to cooperate with the Communists is confined to certain—usually a very few—families in a given locality. Yet, political (Communist) reliability is necessary for admission into governmental, Party, and technical fields. Hence if Kazakhs are to be utilized at all in these activities, the chances are good that many of them will be related, whether through deliberate nepotism or not. And with this go all the hazards the Soviets see in "family relations."

SOVIET ADMINISTRATION

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In general, the Kazakhs participate only to a restricted degree in higher-level activities, particularly those which the Soviets feel are vital for the building and consolidating of the USSR—industry, transport, the Party, and government. There appear to be two reasons for this. The first is that the Slavs do not extend to the Kazakhs equal opportunity for training and advancement. Experiences reported by Turkic soldiers captured from mixed units in World War II suggest that they are generally looked upon as inferiors. Furthermore, in a society in which political

K 648 reliability is essential for advancement, the Slavs are understandably hesitant to place the Kazakhs in positions of responsibility and trust, whether this involves "family relations" or not. The second reason is K that the Kazakhs simply are not coming forward to be trained and pro- [562] moted. This is seen especially in the virtual absence of Kazakh women in positions of any responsibility. Here Kazakh and Communist values [181] are completely opposite. In theory, if not in practice, Soviet women are considered the equals of men, whereas the Kazakhs, in both theory and actuality, keep their women in a very subordinate status. But it is also apparent that the men themselves are not becoming any more involved than they have to in the activities most emphasized by the Soviets, and K where they can they are holding onto their old values and traditional way [154] of life, meeting the Soviet demands with essentially passive resistance.

It must be presumed that Kazakh participation in Soviet affairs will K increase over time under the continuing pressure exerted. Neverthe- [177] less, the Sovietization of the Kazakhs remains sufficiently unsatisfactory, after nearly 40 years of effort expended in this direction, to provide KN assurance that the process is far from complete.

665 The nonparticipation of Kazakhs in Soviet developments presents a serious dilemma not only for the regime as a whole but also for the local Communist Party. The primary function of the Party in the Soviet system is to inspire or coerce the people to ever greater efforts toward the goals specified by the regime. Although the Party "carries a big stick," and is supported in this by the entire apparatus of the State, including the secret police, it is obvious that coercion alone is not sufficient to maintain a consistently high rate of output in the daily activities of any people. For this reason the Party uses the carrot as well as the stick, and the various devices used to stimulate production and increase enthusiasm for Soviet objectives are, with the majority of USSR citizens, quite effective. Whatever their real feelings toward the regime and its policies, these citizens see no alternative to living within the framework KN of Soviet society and making their way in accordance with its standards.

The Kazakhs, on the other hand, feel they do have an alternative— 665 their old way of life and its deeply entrenched values, which are still very 563 much alive. This is not the road to riches, but few of them have ever had reason to hope for riches. As a result the Kazakhs generally put forth K only the minimum necessary effort. Not only do they have little interest [154] in industry and transport, but their output is consistently below expectations in agriculture and even in herding, their traditional occupation.

Thus the Party, under constant pressure from Moscow to increase output, finds itself equipped with techniques for encouraging production which are not adapted to dealing with a people who do not view their integration into Soviet society as inevitable. There remain only force and coercion, but these cannot be applied steadily enough to be effective with an entire people. When force was tried during the collectivization drive of the 1930's, the result was a net loss in production from which the economy of Kazakhstan has never fully recovered. Actually, the purges of which the western world is aware tend to be directed more toward the overwhelmingly Slavic membership of the Party, caught on the horns of its dilemma, than toward the Kazakhs who are the cause of the difficulty.

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The fact that positions of responsibility are filled by Slavs means that they are almost the only ones in Kazakhstan to be seen enjoying the material rewards so conspicuously granted to members of the Soviet elites. Regardless of whose fault this may be, it must at times breed resentment among the Kazakhs. Similarly, the preponderance of Slavs in higher governmental, Party, executive, and judicial positions means that the Kazakhs are almost never governed, judged, or defended by their fellows. It must often happen that Kazakhs who feel they are the victims of injustice identify this as discrimination.

NATIONALITY POLICY

KN 563

Soviet policy toward the minority nationalities within the USSR has also created a long-standing dilemma in the case of the Kazakhs—a dilemma which appears to provide an important vulnerability for psychological warfare exploitation. This policy strives to create national political units which are "socialist in content, national in form." This means in effect that the political structure and economy of the various national groups are organized along standard Soviet lines and their energies are directed toward Soviet objectives, but the symbols of nationality (particularly the local languages) are retained to grant a sense of continuity with past traditions. The devising and implementing of this policy was the earliest responsibility assumed by Stalin under Lenin's guidance. It has had varying degrees of success in different areas, but in the balance has proved to be a very useful tool of Soviet administration.

K 186 668

The Kazakhs, however, are a people still too deeply attached to their old life and its traditions and values to accept mere lip service to their national heritage. Every time an effort has been made to raise Kazakh morale and productivity by permitting public attention to national heroes and literature, the result has been an enthusiasm the Soviets have viewed as threatening. This was particularly true when, during World War II, national patriotism was extensively exploited throughout the USSR to inspire the people to defend their homeland. Among the Kazakhs this developed into a cult glorifying their native heroes and culture, a phenomenon which had also appeared during the 1920's and had grown until it became such a threat that it was ruthlessly suppressed by the Soviets. After the war Kazakh nationalism, left unsuppressed, continued to grow in strength until finally in the 1950's a purge was required to check its growing force.

K 121

It seems certain that these sentiments will lie for a long time close beneath the surface, available for mobilization through psychological warfare, regardless of the turns Soviet nationality policy might take in the event of another war. For this reason, considerable attention has been devoted in this report to Kazakh history, including its national heroes, and to Kazakh cultural values and traditions.

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One method which the Soviets employ to make the minority republics "national in form" is the utilization wherever possible of native Communists to fill positions in the local Party and government. As might be expected, in the Kazakh SSR there is a chronic shortage of

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Kazakhs who are tried-and-true Communists. Moscow, however, repeatedly criticizes the local Party for the small proportion of natives in positions of administrative responsibility. One result of this pressure is that the Party is forced to accept into its own ranks and those of government and industry marginally reliable persons who, if put to the test, would very possibly prove more loyal to their Kazakh nationality than to their Soviet citizenship. These marginal people—Kazakh and Communist at the same time—deserve particular attention as targets for psychological warfare, because of their psychological vulnerability and also their crucial position as mediators between two cultures.
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[121]

RELIGION

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The religion of the Kazakhs provides the Soviets with yet another problem of policy, at both the local and the Moscow level. Totalitarian governments in general seem to view religion as a threat which must be either neutralized or made captive to serve their own ends. The Communists are no exception. In the Soviet Union they have developed an approach to each of the major organized religions, which has proved more or less successful in attaining these ends.

Most of the Turkic peoples of Soviet Central Asia are thoroughgoing and conservative Moslems. Toward them the Soviets have adopted the familiar procedures of installing puppet leaders and attacking those aspects of the religion which they view as potentially dangerous. But their established techniques and procedures fail to fit the Kazakh pattern. The Moslem religion has had some influence on the Kazakhs, but the aspects of Islam which they have adopted are largely superficial in nature; they still believe in what is essentially a folk religion, a blend of ancestor worship and shamanism. During the Tsarist era this fact was apparently never clearly recognized. One assumes that the Communists know better, but their knowledge evidently has not equipped them to deal adequately with the unusual religious blend of Kazakh beliefs and practices. Also, because Kazakh religion is largely local in nature, it has no strong "commanding heights" of organization which can be subverted in order to deliver believers to Communist control.
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[991]

As a result of this dilemma, most Kazakhs have been singularly free of attack on religious grounds. Actually, since the Soviets are forced for lack of a better designation to treat the Kazakhs administratively as Moslems, they are in effect in the paradoxical position of encouraging rather than discouraging the Islamic aspect of Kazakh religion. However, although continuing contact with Uzbeks in Southern Kazakhstan has increased the strength of the Moslem religion among some Kazakhs, the old folk religion has retained much of its strength and integrity, and it promises to remain for many years another bulwark of the traditional Kazakh way of life.
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This summary has stressed those aspects of Kazakh culture and recent history most likely to be of pertinent use in planning divisive psychological warfare intended to deflect Kazakh energies away from the objectives of the Soviet regime. The manner of future psychological

warfare exploitation of Kazakh vulnerabilities must depend upon an evaluation of conditions current at the time. However, it seems fairly certain that these vulnerabilities will center primarily about resistance to collectivization, Kazakh loyalties to their own nationality and culture, the strength of Kazakh ties to their kinsmen, and the persistence of their folk religion. 121

RESEARCH METHOD

The Kazakhs were selected as the subjects for this study because the great loss in Kazakh population in the 1930's suggested serious difficulties between them and the Soviets, and also because Kazakhstan is one of the more inaccessible and little known areas of the Soviet Union. Consequently, particular attention has been given to the analysis of demographic data in an attempt to define more exactly the extent and the causes of the population loss. At the same time, every effort has been made to develop techniques for exploiting all possible sources of information in order to provide a methodology applicable to the study of other inaccessible areas. 127

The report relies heavily on the use of local Kazakhstan newspapers, in addition to normally available sources of information. The local materials of the region have been systematically searched, and the analysis of their contents has permitted the composition of a picture of Kazakh life which could be constructed by no other means. Use of local sources of information was first regarded as only one of several research techniques; in the course of the project it developed into a systematic and productive methodology to depict the fabric of life of a region to which we have no direct access—a methodology not limited in its usefulness to the study of Kazakhstan. These day-to-day problems of life under the Soviets are not revealed in the more general sources of information emanating from the USSR, such as the Moscow press and radio. The local press, on the contrary, supplies detailed data on the relations between the ethnic minorities and the central regime in Moscow; it provides a gauge of the strengths and weaknesses of the economy, and points to trouble spots in the political structure, in education, and in cultural affairs.

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PART II
DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH

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Chapter 1

THE SETTING: GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY[1]

KN 131 133

The steppes of Asia form a region in which extremes abound. The steppes themselves are a tremendous sweep of climatically and geographically continuous terrain, broken only by the upthrust of mountain chains in the center—the Altai, the Tian-Shan, and the Pamirs. This mountain complex, one of the highest in the world, divides the eastern steppe from the western. The eastern steppe, which lies between Manchuria and the mountain ranges, comprises western Manchuria, both Inner and Outer Mongolia, northeastern Tibet, and most of Sinkiang. In terms of elevation it is "high steppe," lying mostly between a mile and two miles' altitude (1,500 to 3,000 meters). The western steppe, stretching from the Caspian in the west to the Altai-Pamir chain in the east, is "low steppe," lying for great stretches at or below sea level. Whereas the eastern steppe is populated mostly by Mongols, the western is inhabited predominantly by Turkic peoples.

K 101 181

The Kazakhs take their place among the Turkic peoples of the western or low steppe. They are by tradition (i.e., past occupation and present orientation and preference) a nation of herders. Although today not all of them live the life of pastoral nomadism, the Kazakhs still constitute the single largest traditional herding group in the world.

GEOGRAPHY OF KAZAKHSTAN

KN 131 [101]

The Soviet republic that is named for the Kazakhs, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic or Kazakhstan, occupies the central and northern parts of the region formerly known as Turkestan (including Russian and Western Turkestan) or Central Asia (see Figure 1). It includes a large portion of the low steppe and covers an area of more than a million square miles (2,744,300 sq. km.).

KN 133 131

The western boundary of Kazakhstan is formed by the Caspian Sea and the marshy lowlands which stretch along the lower Volga between

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[1] The non-Russian sources utilized in this study are listed in the annotated bibliography at the end of this report. References to works in this list are designated by the parenthetical inclusion of the bibliography number of the work. Other references are to Russian-language sources; a selected bibliography of such sources is available upon request from the Human Resources Research Office. The methodology used in the study is discussed in Appendix A.

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ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS OF KAZAKH S S R


Boundary of Kazakh S S R
Boundary of Administrative Regions (oblasts)
Regional Capital
RUSSIAN SFSR
North Kazakhstan
Petropavlovsk
Kokchetav
Kokchetav
Kustanay
Kustanay
Pavlodar
Pavlodar
Akmolinsk
Akmolinsk
Uralsk
West Kazakhstan
Aktyubinsk
Aktyubinsk
Semipalatinsk
East Kazakhstan
Ust-Kamenogorsk
Karaganda
Karaganda
Semipalatinsk
KAZAKH SSR
Guryev
Balkhash
Lake
Taldy-Kurgan
Taldy-Kurgan
Aral Sea
Kzyl-Orda
Kzyl-Orda
Alma-Ata
Alma-Ata
Dzhambul
Dzhambul
Guryev
CASPIAN SEA
UZBEK SSR
South Kazakhstan
Chimkent
KIRGIZ SSR
CHINA

Figure 1

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Kazakhstan RQ1

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak

Kazakhstan RQ1

the Caspian and the southern Ural mountains. This region of rich, grassy steppe comprises some of the best grazing land in the world. It is watered by three large rivers flowing into the Caspian Sea: the Volga in the west, the Ural in the center, and the Emba in the east.[1] A number of lakes, both fresh and salty, are part of the water system. 133 131

The northern perimeter of Kazakhstan lies in the transition zone where the steppe verges into the Siberian black-earth region (north of 52° N and eastward along the Irtysh River). This is good farming country, where typical European produce is grown by Russian and Ukrainian peasants. [563]

The northeastern regions of Kazakhstan, where one also finds Russians and Ukrainians concentrated, are dominated by the Altai Mountains. This vast chain, reaching into the heart of Mongolia, is rich in mineral resources. The old and famous Ridders lead works (now Leninogorsk) are here, gold is mined in the Kalbinsk Mountains to the south, and there is wolframite in the nearby Uba River district. [135]

The eastern border of Kazakhstan is formed by a series of high ranges lying between the Altai and the Tian-Shan, which are traversed by a few passes. Three of these passes, all of them east-west oriented, were important trade and invasion routes. The first is cut by the Irtysh River, which flows from the high steppe into the Siberian plain. Farther south along the Sino-Soviet frontier, the Chuguchak pass serves the important Ayaguz-Chuguchak road. The third pass lies between the Ala-Tau and Tian-Shan systems; it is cut by the Ili River which flows northwest into Lake Balkhash. This mountain complex divides Sinkiang and China from Kazakhstan and Russia. The political boundary was frequently breached, or shifted in response to momentary balances of forces, in the struggles between Russia, China, and England in the 19th century, but the border is mainly a natural one, defined by the crest-lines of the interposing mountain ranges. [487] [439] [648]

Both the eastern and western boundaries of Kazakhstan, falling as they do along natural geographic divisions, are relatively stable. By contrast, the southern frontier is an arbitrary line drawn between Kazakhstan and the other Turkestan republics. These republics are, from east to west: Kirgizia, Uzbekistan,[2] and Turkmenistan. This boundary line, which cuts through a rich region of fertile valleys and oases, has caused the Soviets many problems, and it has been changed from time to time, according to fluctuations in Soviet policy.

Surrounding the fertile valleys and oases in the southern districts and reaching into the central parts of the republic are deserts and steppe deserts (i.e., regions which are not as arid as deserts but are drier than steppes). Scattered through the steppe are pockets of true desert of varicolored sands, the Red Sand and the Black Sand. The northernmost desert—Bet-Pak-Dala, the Hungry Steppe—pierces into the central region between Lake Balkhash and the Aral Sea. Farther north, between 47° N and 50° N, the climate and topography ameliorate 133 134

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[1] See Figure 3 in Chapter 8.

[2] Including the Karakalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which was transferred from Kazakhstan in 1931. See discussion on pages 17 and 26.

133 to the extent of forming true, life-supporting steppe, which in turn gives
134 way to the farming black-earths in the northern edge of the republic.

The lakes of Kazakhstan—which include some of the greatest inland
133 seas in the world—are mainly salt; the largest are the Caspian, Aral,
135 and Balkhash. The northern Caspian littoral area, at the mouths of the
Ural and Emba rivers, is not far behind Baku in oil production. There
has been a lowering of the level of the Caspian Sea, a process most
evident in its shallow parts in the north and east. Many towns which
[361] were hitherto ports are now several miles inland, and a crisis in transportation
has been created. The rich mineral salt deposits around
Kara-Bogaz have been likewise affected.

Exploration and exploitation of the mineral wealth of Kazakhstan
135 gives that republic a high place in the economy of the Soviet Union.
[652] This natural wealth accounts for its budgetary position—third among all
the republics of the Soviet Union, behind Russia and the Ukraine but
ahead of Belo-Russia, the Baltic countries, Uzbekistan, and others. In
oil Kazakhstan ranks third, behind only Baku and the North Caucasus.

The coal deposits are concentrated in the Karaganda basin, in the
east-central part of Kazakhstan, with minor deposits on the Mangyshlak
peninsula on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, at Dzhezkazgan and
Baykonur in the center of the republic, and at Lenger, near Tashkent,
where lignite resources are tapped. Kazakhstan is poor in iron, and
early economic plans called for the combination of its coal with the Urals
ferrous developments at Magnitogorsk to form a vast coordinated enterprise.
However, the distance and cost of transportation either way, of
[327] coal or of iron is great; there are now minor smelters at Temir-Tau
near Karaganda which use some of the coal locally, although the bulk is
still shipped to the Urals.

There is a good deal of nonferrous metallurgy, partly carried forward
328 from prerevolutionary days, partly developed in the Soviet era.
The lead mines at Leninogorsk (Ridders), in the Altai Mountains, were
[648] initially developed by British capital prior to World War I. Other prerevolutionary
developments in nonferrous metals were scattered throughout
the region, in the steppe north of the Aral Sea—at Belousovka,
Zyryanovsk, Uspenskiy, Dzhetygara, and so forth. The very scattering
of these mines means that the Soviet Union had an excellent basis of
geological exploration and surveying on which to build. They have
added lead mines in the vicinity of Chimkent, in the extreme south, and
copper mines in the Balkhash-Kounradskiy area, north of Lake Balkhash.
[464] Karaganda coal was developed with forced labor under the NKVD in the
1930's. The Chimkent lead mines were developed in the same way;
Kirov, the commissar of Leningrad, assassinated in 1934, was responsible
for having Leningrad workers rounded up and shipped to the mines
in the midst of a desert in Central Asia.

HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

563 The Slavic, Kazakh, and other Turkic groups in Kazakhstan are by
361 no means smoothly blended together. Rather there appear to be little

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KN 563 361

pockets of various ethnic groups scattered about the republic and even localized in sections within cities. The most important reasons for this uneven ethnic distribution are, first, the extensive utilization of Slavs in mining and other industries requiring skilled labor, and second, the establishment of political and administrative divisions with little regard for ethnic relationships.

KN [135]

The distribution of mining towns (coal, oil, lead, copper, zinc, manganese, tin, wolframite, and chromite) creates small groups of Russians and Ukrainians among the native Turks throughout Central Asia. Some of these Slavic centers antedate the revolution; some have been created by forced labor, by deportations, and by resettlement policies during World War II. During the 1940's, miners and factory workers were transported from Moscow, Baku, and the Don basin to Kazakhstan. (During the same period, the lands of the Slavic Cossacks along the Ural River were confiscated and the settlements dispersed; this was the only important countertrend to Slavic immigration.) Russians, Ukrainians, and other Slavic groups predominate in the black-earth farming in the north, in truck farming generally, in the extractive industries, and in urban commercial and light industries.

K [101]

Turkic Uzbeks predominate near the southern border, in the cotton-growing regions contiguous to their own republic. As a result, the Kazakhs have been hemmed in by Slavic black-earth farmers in the north, Uzbek irrigation farmers in the south, and Slavic laborers in the urban and mining centers developing in the Caspian region (oil), around Karaganda and Chimkent (coal), and around Balkhash and in the Altai Mountains (minerals). The native Kazakhs have been gradually squeezed into the arid center of their republic, in an arc to the west, north, and east of the Aral Sea.

K [131]

There is no free intermingling of nationalities on the land. Peoples tend to stay within regions determined by their economic specialization and traditional occupation, a tendency already described for the principal populations, the Kazakhs, Russians, and Uzbeks. The smaller populations of the republic present the same pattern. The rural Tadzhiks in Kazakhstan are gathered into one district in the region of Dzhambul, in the south. The Uigurs and Dungans live only in the eastern part of the Ili River valley. Turkmens are found only in the west and south.

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The rural segregation of nationalities presumably is true of the cities also. Although no clear proof exists on the matter, available data suggest that ghettoes have formed in the cities, where groups live in their own separate centers of communication and social interaction. The Slavic and Turkic elements keep themselves apart. This conclusion is supported by the extremely low rate of intermarriage between the two peoples.

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The establishment by the Soviets of political and administrative boundaries has led to a number of incongruities. During the 1920's, Russian leaders officially advocated following ethnic boundaries, but this policy was enforced only half-heartedly. By the end of the twenties, the Soviets had decided to reconstruct the political divisions of Central Asia which had existed prior to the Revolution (although the previous policy of following ethnic boundaries was never fully retracted). Thus

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
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it happened that thus the Karakalpaks were first assigned to Kazakhstan, because by origin and by language they are similar to the Kazakhs; later they were transferred to the Uzbek republic, because the boundary between the Uzbek and Kazakh republics had been re-established along the old line which had separated Tsarist Russia from the home of the Karakalpaks.

K [10]

The relationship of the Kazakh and Kirgiz peoples offers an even more confusing example of the complex problems which the Soviets have encountered in their attempts to combine into political units various ethnic and economic groups. The Kazakh republic at one time bore the name Kirgiz, and included approximately what is at present the Kazakh and Kirgiz republics. In the 19th century, the pastoral nomads who occupied the steppe between the Caspian Sea and the Tian-Shan Mountains were divided into two groups, the nomads of the low steppe and the nomads of the mountain pastures. Early 19th century explorers called the first group the Kirgiz-Kazakh or the Kirgiz-Kaisak; the mountain nomads were known as the Kara-Kirgiz (Black Kirgiz), or alternatively, the Dikokamenny Kirgiz (Wild-Mountain Kirgiz), or Burut. In that period, persons who today would be called Kazakh, such as the native historian and ethnographer Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov, identified themselves as Kirgiz, ignoring the distinction between Kirgiz-Kazakh and Kara-Kirgiz.

K [565]

Toward the end of the 19th century, experts in matters concerning the Central Asian Turks pointed out that the two social groupings could be distinguished from one another in a number of ways. They differed not only in habitat but also in social organization and social class structure. The Kara-Kirgiz (the modern Kirgiz) had little if any concept of a nobility differentiated from the commoners by purity of descent. Their leaders, called manap, were for the most part local persons who had risen by right of wealth, strong following, and personal qualities to positions of authority in their respective communities. There was little sign of a general organization of these manaps. The Kazakhs on the other hand had a nobility sharply differentiated by right of birth from the commoners, with a strong feeling of interrelationship, mutual support, and hierarchy within the aristocracy. The Kirgiz-Kazakhs, moreover, were divided into three hordes, whereas the Kara-Kirgiz fell outside this structure and had another horde entirely their own.

The Soviet regime in its infancy sought to override the difference between the Kazakh-Kirgiz and the Kara-Kirgiz; linguistically there was little to distinguish between them, and the same may be said of dress, mode of living, and religion. The two groups therefore were combined into one republic.[1] The difficulties in administering as one unit peoples accustomed to different systems of social and political authority, however much else they had in common, must have persuaded the Soviet regime to abandon the early aim of forming political divisions of maximum size. Moreover, Soviet plans for the economic exploitation of the Kazakh and the Kirgiz republics were different.

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[1] In general, the early Soviet attitude was against particularisms; Transcaucasia, for example, was first established as a republic, then broken up into three republics.

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Preliminary geological surveys had indicated the riches of Kazakhstan in nonferrous metals and liquid and solid fuels, as well as in pastoral products. The Kirgiz republic offered an entirely different economic perspective. Similarly, from the standpoint of ethnic composition, Kazakhstan had a far greater and more diversified minority pattern, the most important of which was the Russian and Ukrainian. These and similar considerations must have impelled the Soviets to separate the two peoples. With the separation of the two political units, the native populations came to be known by the respective names of the republics, the people in Kazakhstan as Kazakhs and those in Kirgizia as Kirgiz. K [101]

At the time of the 1926 census so few Kazakhs were enumerated in Kirgizia and so few Kirgiz in Kazakhstan—a few thousand in either case—that it seems obvious what must have happened. KN [162] The division into two republics had taken place a few months before the census. An arbitrary decision must have been made to list all Kirgiz-Kazakhs and Kara-Kirgiz in Kazakhstan as Kazakhs, and all those in Kirgizia as Kirgiz. Those who fell outside this division amounted to two-tenths of one per cent of the total population.

As suggested above, the Soviets have had some idea of determining political boundaries according to economic factors. The valley of the Syr-Darya is split between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. By consideration of ethnic composition (the area is heavily Uzbek), and for historical and geographical reasons, the entire area should be in Uzbekistan. KN [248] The triangle between the cities of Tashkent, Dzhambul, and Turkestan is a cotton-growing region; two-thirds of it is in Kazakhstan, despite the fact that cotton is an Uzbek specialty. KN [316] On the other hand, the coal mining districts of Chimkent and Lenger, also within this triangle, are outside the pattern set down for Uzbekistan. Apparently Kazakhstan is regarded as a center of mining and extractive industries; hence the cotton area was broken up.

As a result of these various factors, many Uzbeks have been deposited in Kazakhstan, and in 1939 more than 300,000 Kazakhs, or 10 per cent of their total number, were living on Uzbek soil. K [101] [162] These are Kazakhs who live immediately over the border—not scattered pockets which could be assigned only with difficulty to Kazakh administration. In 1939, because of these and related losses in the north, one-sixth of all Kazakhs in the USSR lived outside Kazakhstan, with the result that they became a minority in their own republic. The process has continued, and today the Kazakhs constitute little more than a third of the population of their native republic. Soon the name Kazakhstan will be an anachronism. K [648]

This situation is only in part due to a policy of dividing in order to rule; it is also intended to inundate the Kazakhs with ethnically more reliable elements in order to rule the better.

REGIONAL HISTORY AND SOCIO-CULTURAL SETTING

K KN 175

Central Asia has experienced many waves of invasion over the three thousand years of its history. Early invaders were Scythians, ancestors

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of the modern Iranians, who conquered nameless aborigines five hundred years before the present era. The Scythians were later overwhelmed by Huns coming from the east, who were followed by Greeks under Alexander the Great, Persians (Parthians, Sogdians, Bactrians), Mongolian hordes (Hephthalites), Avars, Arabs, Turks, and Turko-Mongols again in successive onslaughts, and finally by Russians in the 19th century.

The predominant life pattern of these peoples is nomadic pastoralism. The classic habitat of nomadism is the Asiatic steppe, and the classic practitioners are the Turks and Mongols. In the course of the past thousand years, many herders have gone over to farming as a more efficient form of land utilization wherever climate and soil factors have permitted it. Farming enables more people to get a living out of less land than does herding. The fertile valleys and oases of Central Asia, coupled with the example of earlier Asiatic peoples, have encouraged many of the Turks to make this transition. Indeed, the history of Asia can be interpreted as a history of the relations between herders and farmers, each of whom needs and trades for the products of the other; conquests and wars result from the breakdown of this traditional symbiotic relationship.

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The various peoples of the region have archaic forms of social organization. However ancient and extensive their states and empires, it is the tie of blood which unites a people. Theoretically, all Kazakhs are descended in the male line from a common ancestor, as are the Uzbeks and the Mongols. The societies and nations of the region are composed of an intricate web of relationships which are partly blood ties and partly political ties. The fact of descent from the ancestor of all Kazakhs determines a man's "Kazakhhood"; the fact that all Kazakhs once formed a single nation likewise determines his membership in Kazakh society.

The modern era of relative chaos on the steppes of Asia began with the death of Tamerlane and the collapse of his empire early in the 15th century. He ruled over the last of the great empires which had drawn their strength from nomadic warriors and had dominated Central Asia for so many centuries. His death marked the end of this long period of political integration; instead of one great and inclusive Turkic nation on the steppe, there began the age of particularisms which continued down to the Russian conquest in the 19th century. Parallel processes were at work in Europe at this time, but, unlike Europe, the local patriotisms and local loyalties on the steppe had no fixed territories, boundaries, or capital cities.

All the great cities of Central Asia lie outside the steppe in the surrounding fertile valleys. These cities—Samarkand, Bukhara, Tashkent, Kashgar—were once world-famous for their splendor, and their mention still leaves a ring of ancient glory. They were centers of learning, of administration, of trade and caravan entrepots, of bazaars, of arts and handicrafts. During the chaotic period from the 15th to the 19th centuries they failed to achieve domination over the steppe, nor did the herdsmen of the steppe win power over them. Thus the period between the recession of the great nomadic empires and the Russian conquest and engulfment was a time of intermittent wars and uneasy peace. These troubled

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times and relations existedas much between nomad and nomad, between city and city, as between nomad and town.

During this period a number of problems of intergroup and international relations arose which impose their stamp on the peoples of Central Asia to this day. As previously noted, the political unity of the Turks in Central Asia was gone by the 15th and 16th centuries. Many of the Turkic bands infiltrated farming zones, and groups began to settle down and take up agriculture. This process had actually begun earlier, in the eighth and ninth centuries. As the Turks moved from the eastern steppe to the western, into the valleys and oases of Turkestan, they adopted the practice of irrigation farming, subjecting or displacing the Iranian peoples already settled in the region. The succession of empires from the 12th to the 15th centuries, under Genghis Khan and his successors down to Tamerlane, disrupted the pattern of infiltration. With the collapse of these empires, many new Turkic communities were left stranded and had to seek their own adjustment to the circumstances.

From the 15th century on, the Turks gradually separated into two great economic wings, the agricultural and the stock-raising, the settled and the nomadic. This split was permanent and rarely to be bridged. Indeed, before and during the period of the great empires, from time immemorial down to the 15th century, traditional trade patterns had developed between herders and farmers, giving pastoral products (such as hides, wool, milk, and felt) and animals (as food, draft, and transport) in exchange for grain, textiles (cotton and silk), metalwork, and other products of farm and bazaar. But after the collapse of the empires the pattern fell apart, and through the 16th to 19th centuries the nomads raided and enslaved the settlements as often as they traded. The nomads took produce and slaves from neighboring Iranian communities, from Russian communities, and to a lesser extent from Turkic farming communities.

With the end of the era of political integration under the empires and the ensuing economic cleavage between herder and farmer, there came a split between the religion of the herder and that of the farmer. Farmer and city-dweller alike are thorough Moslems. They have been so for more than a thousand years—and so great were the centers of Islam that many aspects of modern mathematics, geography, astronomy, and physics rest on the achievements of thinkers in these great cities of Central Asia. By contrast, the religion of the nomad on the steppe is an amalgam of many cults—shamanism, fire worship, ancestor worship, bits of Islamic demon lore, devil lore, and spirit lore. The nomads have been only superficially influenced by the Koran and the institutions of Islam.

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However, considerations other than a common political system, economic interest, or religious cause serve to weld a people together. Among the steppe nomads, a common tradition and ties of blood-relationship have evoked a vague expression of Turkdom. This common tradition is usually transmitted by word of mouth from generation to generation; it comprises the recitation of the ancestral line, together with the great and noble deeds of the ancestors. Tales of battles and empires won or lost are recounted. They are not fiction, for they are

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
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KN 173 believed. These people do not make a distinction between truth and fiction in such matters.

K 173 602 The preservation of the genealogy likewise establishes a basis for intergroup relationships. In time of need, one Turkic group may call upon another for aid, and may even be adopted into the stronger group. For instance, over many centuries the Uzbeks had gradually drifted apart from the Kazakhs. The Uzbeks are farmers, the Kazakhs herders. K [648] The Uzbeks are genuinely Islamic, the Kazakhs only superficially so. Yet within the Uzbek domain one group traced its ancestry back over 800 years to the Kereit, a people mentioned in the chronicles of Genghis Khan. By the 19th century this people had become personified as one man—the founding ancestor Kerei. Among the Kazakhs there existed a group which also called itself Kereit and which traced descent from this ancestor. Eight hundred years after the traditional founding of the line, the Kazakh Kereit joined the Uzbek Kereit as "kinsmen," although a small group did later rejoin the Kazakhs. This episode is recounted by a Kazakh who became a Russian scholar in the 19th century—Valikhanov, a nobleman of high intellectual endowments. How much of the story is romanticized fiction, and how much is fact, is hard to say but that is beside the point. The Kazakhs and the Uzbeks believe it is true and act accordingly.

These principles—which underlie fact—are of signal importance in understanding many experiences recorded in the Soviet period. They K KN [166] make it possible to comprehend why a youth in a Kazakh village in 1950 can recite his ancestry back over many generations. They explain in part (but only in part) how Turks can shift group affiliations, a tendency which makes the interpretation of Soviet census data something of a problem. Such shifting makes for a certain fluidity in the population picture in Central Asia and is one response to excessive rigidity and pressure from Moscow. This fluidity below in response to rigidity from above creates a situation of tension, and is at the same time an expression of that tension. This tense, strained situation will receive much attention in the pages which follow.

THE KAZAKHS

K 175 648 During the 16th century the Kazakhs gradually occupied the steppe between the Altai Mountains in the east and the Ural River in the west, north of the Bet-Pak-Dala (Hungry Steppe) and the Aral Sea. In the same century, Russians and Cossacks entered the farming regions directly north of the Kazakh steppe. To the south, along the Syr-Darya River to the Aral Sea, lay the farming country of the Uzbeks. The Kazakhs of this period were roughly grouped into three clan confederations or hordes: the Great Horde, whose territory traditionally has been in the eastern Kazakh steppe, from the Aral Sea to Balkhash and the southern Altai chain; the Middle Horde, who occupied the central and northern steppe, north of the Aral Sea as far as the black-earth region of southern Siberia, and east to the Altai chain; and the Little Horde, whose territory extended west of the Aral Sea to the Ural River and the northeastern part of the Caspian Sea.

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These Kazakhs were united briefly at the end of the 17th century by the great Khan Tauke (or Tiavka), a leader equally gifted as political integrator and as law-giver. With his death, however, they broke up again into the three hordes.

Cossack lines were established to the north and thrust into the steppes from the northwest during the 18th century. The Russian conquest of Central Asia took place in the 19th century, although Russian penetration had begun in the 18th. The principal patterns—as in the history of many other colonizations—were force, persuasion, and good luck. The Russians were able to play one group against another, for example, Kalmuks against Kazakhs; when native Slavs rebelled under Pugachev, Moscow played Turk against Cossack and Kalmuk against Cossack.

There were several important defections from the side of the Turks to the Russians. A famous Khan of the 1740's, Abul Khair, asked Russian aid in the incessant wars of Turk against Turk on the steppe. Early in the 19th century another Kazakh leader, Khan Bukei, a descendant of Abul Khair, led 1,500 Kazakh families of the Little Horde across the Ural River onto Russian territory, seeking refuge from the steppe wars. By 1805 his horde had grown to 5,000 tents or families, and by 1845 to 30,000. At this point a new horde, the Inner or Bukei Horde, was formed.

How he was able to do this, how it happened that enough room for 30,000 nomadic families could be found between the Ural River and the Volga, is part of the long story of the lasting dissensions and resentments on the steppe. At the beginning of the 17th century the Kalmuks had moved from the eastern steppe (Chinese Dzungaria) to the Volga, and pastured their herds on the steppes between the Ural River and the Volga, north to the Don River and the vicinity of present-day Stalingrad, south to the western shores of the Caspian Sea. In 1771, thousands of them fled across Turkestan back to China, decimated as they moved by their Turkish enemies, the Bashkirs, Kazakhs, and Kirgiz. Those Kalmuks who remained lived west of the Volga, and the steppe to the east as far as the Ural River was left free. This part of the steppe was left as a vacuum because Tsarist policy established a military line of Cossack settlements* along the Ural River down to the Caspian, which prevented movement into the steppe. In 1800, Khan Bukei petitioned Moscow for permission to occupy this steppe and Moscow, to gain an ally in the steppe, granted the petition, thus conforming to the old political adage of divide and rule. The new horde was called the Inner Horde, because it lay within the Cossack lines, or the Bukei Horde, after its founder.

The only constant pattern in the history of the steppe nomadic culture has been that of instability. With no over-all political order, it was inevitable that Russian "protection" should be sought by particular factions while others held aloof.

During the 19th century the Kazakhs engaged the Russians in a number of sporadic wars and rebellions. The leaders of these movements have been variously depicted as great liberators or as feudal lords who, jealous of their domains, refused to let the Russians in.

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*Dispersed after the Revolution.

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One of the earliest rebels against the Russians was Batyr Srym,[1] a member of the lesser Kazakh aristocracy of the Little Horde, that part of Kazakhdom closest to European Russia. Srym led a series of rebellions against the Russians, interspersed with some campaigning on their behalf, in the latter part of the 18th century. In 1776 he was one of the Kazakh leaders who supported Pugachev, a Russian Cossack who had led the Cossacks in a rebellion supported by some of the native populations, against Catherine II. After the Pugachev rebellion was suppressed, Batyr Srym maintained friendly relations with the Russians until 1783, when a series of border incidents between Cossacks and Kazakhs broke out. Srym was captured by Cossacks and was released only when Nurali, khan of the Little Horde, paid ransom for him. Later, however, Srym's popularity appeared dangerous to Nurali, and both he and the Russians campaigned against Srym. In 1785 the Russian authorities sought to deal directly with Srym and the lesser Kazakh nobles rather than with their khan, who had little authority over them. The Russians now had the Kazakhs split. On Nurali's death his followers elected one of his sons to succeed him, Batyr Srym and his nobles elected another. The Russians succeeded in gaining control of the office of khan, which led Srym to seek the abolition of the institution of the khanate. In this he failed. The proposed reform was too radical, and the Russians successfully opposed it. They cut Srym from his fellow nobles, whom they now gathered under a leader of their own choosing, the Sultan Aichubek. Srym fled to the Khanate of Khiva, far to the south, in 1797. There he died in a raid in 1802.

Between 1820 and 1850 a series of campaigns were conducted against the Russians by such Kazakh leaders as Nurmuhammed, Isatai Taimanov, and Kenesary Kasymov. All were defeated, and there was little organized resistance among the Kazakhs in the latter part of the century. Among these men, who still survive in the folk memory as popular heroes, the most important was Kenesary. [179]

Kenesary Kasymov, born in the same year in which Srym died, was a member of the highest Kazakh nobility, a royal sultan of the Middle Horde. Continuing the policy so successful among the Little Horde, the Russians sought to take away the sovereign power from the hereditary ruling family and transform the sultanship into a matter of Russian election; they also withdrew two of the most fertile pasture lands of the Middle Horde, the Ishim and Tobol valleys. Kenesary asked support from the ruler of Tashkent, who answered by killing his emissaries. Thus, by the 1830's, the Middle Horde was caught in a squeeze between the Russians to the north and the Tashkent *begs* (chiefs) to the south. Defeated to the south, Kenesary fought a guerilla campaign against the Russians to the north. He was elected khan by leaders of the Middle Horde and certain elements of the Little Horde as well, and during the early 1840's he gained many followers among the Little Horde. The Russians, unable to defeat him, erected a line of fortifications deep into the steppe along the Turgay and Irgiz rivers. Kenesary thus was pressed from the north and west as well as from the south. Turning

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[1] Batyr is a title signifying lesser noble rank.

175 648 east, he gained support among many elements of the Great Horde, the easternmost of the Kazakh divisions. He sought the support of China, which was promised him, and the allegiance of the Kirgiz, which they refused. His strategy was to use the Kirgiz mountain pastures as his base of operations against the Russians. He campaigned against the Kirgiz and was at first successful, but in the spring of 1847 he fell into a trap, was defeated by the Kirgiz, taken prisoner, and executed.

During much of Russian rule Kazakhstan was a place of exile. Banished there were such outstanding individuals as Taras Shevchenko, the national poet of the Ukraine, and Dostoevsky, great Russian novelist.

In the economic sphere, outside capital was brought in during this period by traders and bankers of Tatar and Russian origin. In an isolated case, a British mining development was undertaken at Ridders in northeast Kazakhstan. Religious dissidents came to settle and farm the north and northeast portions of the region. In general, however, the commercial and cultural ties between Kazakhstan and Russia were not deep.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1900

175 648 668 The Kazakhs were sensitive to political developments in Russia, however. During the revolution of 1905 the Kazakhs had a distant echo of the events in European Russia. During World War I they engaged in a rebellion of their own, a year before the Russian Revolution of 1917. In this revolt the Kazakhs objected to military conscription and to confiscation of their property, which was presumably taken over for war purposes but in fact often ended up in private, non-military hands. There is some indication that Russian private interests "provoked" the revolt in order to confiscate Kazakh land and herds.

At the time of the 1917 Revolution, the Kazakhs already had a year's experience of revolt behind them. In opposition to and under the influence of Russian contact, the Kazakhs underwent their own political evolution; that is, they evolved a political expression of their nationalist consciousness. It took the form of the Alash-Orda party. This was not really a party, for it lacked a formal organization and a platform or explicit political philosophy; it was vague in its aims and in its external relationships to other parties and nations. Its leaders were Kazakh intellectuals who later disbanded, some joining the Bolsheviks, some fleeing to Turkey.

175 648 During the civil war, from 1918 to 1922, the White generals Kolchak and Dutov were faced by the Red Army commander, Frunze, who appealed to the workers in Turkestan to support him. In April 1919 the Central Committee of the Party issued a decree calling for a founding Congress of Kirgiz Soviets in Orenburg (now Chkalov, in the southern Urals). In July of that year, a Revolutionary Committee for the Administration of the Kirgiz Districts was established. (At that time, the area including the present Kazakh and Kirgiz republics was administered as one unit, which bore the name Kirgiz.)

By the end of 1919, Kolchak was defeated. With the destruction of Kolchak's southern army in the fall of 1919, direct contact between

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Central Asia and Soviet Russia was established, and in March 1920 the last remnants of the White Army were driven out of Kazakhstan.

A Communist Party organization was quickly formed in the newly won territories. The Central Committee of the Party set up a Province Bureau, in which were united all party organizations, at Aktyubinsk in May 1920, and in October a founding Congress of the Kirgiz (Kazakh) Soviets was held in Orenburg, then the regional capital.

Kazakh participation in the Revolution and civil war was minimal. Their political energy was poured into local Turkic movements rather than into the Bolshevik party. They took little initiative in aligning with the Russian Revolution, and played only a small part in Frunze's campaigns, despite his appeals; their partisan activity in the civil war is skipped over in contemporary accounts. Certainly no Kazakh appears in the leadership of the Bolshevik movement in the early period. Years later, in a search for an honor roll of revolutionary Kazakh leaders, a certain Amangeldy was singled out, and collective farms and administrative districts were named in his honor. It appears, however, that at the time of the Revolution he had acquired little fame.

FORMATION OF POLITICAL DIVISIONS IN THE SOVIET PERIOD

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The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic was formed in 1918; in 1922 it federated with the Belo-Russian, Ukrainian, and Transcaucasian soviet socialist republics to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In 1925, the Transcaucasian SSR was divided into the three present republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, and two autonomous republics, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, were raised to the status of union republics.

Prior to 1917 Russian Turkestan was divided into three political units, the province of Turkestan and two vassal states of Russia, the Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara. The Revolution and the civil war changed the social structure of Turkestan and with it the administrative picture. The Red Army dissolved the principality of Khiva in 1919; the Emirate of Bukhara was invaded in 1920 and the Emir driven out. In 1920 the Kazakhs, Kirgiz, and Karakalpaks were organized into the Kirgiz Autonomous SSR. In 1924 Kazakhstan was made an autonomous republic and separated from the Kirgiz ASSR; both republics, however, were still part of the RSFSR and were administered from Moscow. The Karakalpak Autonomous Region was attached to the Kazakh ASSR until 1931, when it was assigned to the Uzbek SSR. With the adoption of the Stalin Constitution in 1936, Kazakhstan was separated from the RSFSR and made a union republic, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, its present status.

THE CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT

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There is a steady flow of people across the Central Asian borders of the Soviet Union. It would of course be a mistake to regard the

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Soviet border as a sieve; it is not, and at present movement out of Soviet Central Asia to the surrounding countries is difficult. But it is not impossible. Archeologists in northern Iran have reported the presence of individuals who were obviously natives of Central Asia but plainly not of local origin. It was explained to one of the archeologists that these newcomers were on a pilgrimage to Mecca.

In recent years articles have referred to a flow in the opposite direction. The Ismaelian sect of Islam has had a strong and faithful following among the tribes of the Pamir Mountains for many centuries. Collectors of tribute in postwar years have appeared in southern Tadzhikistan to collect the age-old due, and this practice has been the subject of complaint in the local newspapers.

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On a broader scale, there have been flights from the Soviet Union into all the surrounding countries. During the 1930's, over 30,000 Kazakhs appeared in Outer Mongolia, a region in which few Kazakhs previously had lived. There they remain to this day. Untold numbers of Kazakhs fled across to Sinkiang; some made a second trek, from Sinkiang to Kashmir, when the agents of Mao Tse-tung appeared in the Chinese province.

Thousands have migrated from the Soviet Union to Afghanistan, their number increasing steadily from the 1920's through the 1940's. The Afghan government at first announced a protective policy toward these migrants, but this policy was never put into practice and recently it has been officially revoked. As a result the people suffer as much outside the Soviet Union as they had within; there is much unrest, and many return to the USSR. Suffering and unrest are evident in Iran as well, although the flow has not been as noticeable there; strangers lose themselves more easily in Iran than in Afghanistan.

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Here is a vast field for fruitful work. These migrant peoples are potential sources of information; they are channels of communication into and out of the Soviet Union. Extensive interviewing and survey work among these groups could reap rich rewards.

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Chapter 2

A DEMOGRAPHIC SKETCH[1]

161 It is the history of the population trends of the Kazakhs which singles this people out for study among all the peoples of Central Asia. Comparison of the two censuses which the Soviets have published, in 1926 and in 1939, shows that the Kazakhs suffered severe population losses between those years. Longer-term trends show that they constitute an ever-decreasing proportion of the people living in their native land. These population factors are of immediate interest in the study of the Kazakhs, but in addition it is obvious that the history of a people is closely related to the fate of its numbers, their growth and decline, and the possible causes one can find for these trends.

KAZAKHS PRIOR TO 1917

The Kazakh population figures indicate great oscillations over the past century; great increases are followed by sharp dips. Close study of these demographic trends should reveal many clear reflections of Kazakh internal developments and relations with other peoples—their neighbors and conquerors.

The first estimates of the numerical strength of the Kazakhs [648] appeared shortly after the Russian penetration into Turkestan early in the 19th century. At that time the Russians had not yet conquered all the Kazakhs; many peoples of Central Asia, including part of the Kazakhs, were still either semi-independent, living in the khanates of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand, or else under Chinese rule. Early Russian travelers, explorers, commercial agents, and intelligence agents began to bring back information about the Kazakhs, including population estimates.

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[1] Space for reporting the study of Kazakh demography is limited. In the *few* pages of this report devoted to this rich topic only a few of the many data and analyses available can be introduced. During the past few years, Dr. Frank Lorimer has directed the study of Kazakh demography by Miss Faye Goldware and Mr. John Grauman (89). The reports on Kazakh demography prepared by and under Dr. Lorimer are available at the Bureau of Social Science Research and at the Bureau of the Census. The contents of this chapter have drawn heavily upon the work of these persons, and for fuller treatment and documentation of the topic the reader is directed to their writings. Responsibility for the conclusions drawn and for the formulations in this chapter rests, of course, only with those who have contributed to this report.

Most of these early estimates were phrased in terms of number of Kazakh households. Assuming an average of five persons per household, one can derive such figures as the following for the number of Kazakhs in the Russian empire in the 19th century: 1,950,000 in 1824, 2,000,000 in 1832, and 2,200,000 in 1871. The 1897 Census, which included all but a few thousand Kazakhs resident in China, gave the Kazakh population as 3,800,000. This was the only 19th century estimate with any claim to accuracy. 161

These estimates indicate a general consistency to the population trends of the 19th century. The increase occurred despite a series of wars of liberation, rebellions, and other evidences of unrest; this was the era of the Kazakh wars and uprisings against the Russians. [668]

The rapid increase which started in the last three decades of the 19th century continued into the beginning of the 20th. In 1911 the number of Kazakhs living within the Russian empire was estimated at 4,400,000, an increase of 13.6 per cent in 14 years.

From the beginning of the 19th century, then, when the earliest extensive Russian investigation of Central Asia took place, to the eve of World War I the Kazakh population approximately doubled. The rate of increase appears to have been low at the beginning of the period, rising toward the end.

KAZAKHS IN THE 1926 CENSUS

According to the 1926 Census of the Soviet Union,[1] there were 3,970,000 Kazakhs in the USSR. Of these, some 3,700,000 lived in Kazakhstan (comprising 57% of the population of the republic) and 270,000 outside the republic.

The absolute drop from 1911 to 1926 was thus 430,000, or nearly 10 per cent of the Kazakh population. This loss reflects the political conditions of the time. The relatively peaceful period prior to World War I, which had permitted the increase from 1897 to 1911, was followed by a Kazakh uprising in 1916, then by the Russian Revolution and civil war. In the years after the civil war, 1922-1926, improved conditions allowed the Kazakhs to recover to a point slightly exceeding their 1897 number but still considerably below the population estimate of 1911. [668]

In 1926 the great majority of the Kazakhs still maintained their traditional economy of herding. Seventy per cent of all economically active Kazakhs were reported as herders, 27 per cent as agriculturalists (largely mixed farming, i.e., with some herding mixed in), and less than 3 per cent in all other economic activities (such as industrial and white-collar work). 162

Of the 783,000 Kazakh households in Kazakhstan, 205,000 or 26 per cent were permanently settled. While this figure was based only on Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, it agrees with the total farming percentage. Agriculture is a sedentary way of life; approximately the same proportion of total Kazakhs were reported as occupied in agriculture as were reported as sedentary in Kazakhstan. [361]

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[1] *TSUNKHU, Perepis' SSSR* (Census of the USSR), 1926 *et seq.*

595 Traditionally, the Kazakh was permitted to have more than one wife.
However, very few men were able to afford the expense involved, because
[583] marriage required large payments by the family of the groom to the fam-
ily of the bride. For those who could afford it, the possession of many
[554] wives meant an increase in prestige and status. Sometimes a man took
another wife because he had not had any sons by the first wife. But in
general, even though plural wives were permitted, such marriages were
few in number. In 1926, only 104.5 women were reported as married
[162] per 100 married men, exclusive of widows and divorcees. In Tsarist
times the number was not much larger. At present polygamy is forbid-
[648] den by law. Nevertheless, it is stubbornly maintained by the Kazakhs,
and cases are constantly being reported and denounced in the Soviet
press. It is still a matter of status and prestige; the bulk of the polyg-
[554] amous marriages reported today involve men of high position in Soviet
life, such as Kazakhs who are presidents of collective farms.

The Kazakh herds are composed of sheep, goats, cattle, horses, and
233 camels, usually in that numerical order. Herds cannot be maintained
221 through the entire year in one place, because the grass on the steppes
is not rich enough to support them. They must move from month to
month and from season to season. However, there are too many herds-
men and not enough steppeland to permit indiscriminate wandering. The
usual pattern is for a nomadic camp to set up winter quarters where
many smaller herding groups come together for religious and economic
purposes. Here they store their hay through the winter to feed the live-
stock, and put up windbreaks against the winter storms. In the early
spring they disperse into smaller herding groups of a few families each,
and proceed over traditionally fixed grazing routes to the summer camp
which they occupy until early fall. Nomadism is a fixed annual round of
movement, not a haphazard one.

166 The 1926 census reported that 5.6 per cent of the Kazakh males had
established residence outside the district in which they had been born.
The comparable figure for women was 20 per cent. The explanation for
591 this difference lies in the marriage customs, under which a Kazakh
woman traditionally moves to her husband's family residence. It is
almost unheard of for a man to move to the home of his wife's kin or
for both to move together to a new residence. Most of the marriages
involved a woman's moving only a short distance to her husband's fam-
ily. But at least a fifth of the women had to move away from their native
[584] districts; this usually meant that the marriage had been arranged for
them at some distance from their birthplaces.

No significant changes in Kazakh life had taken place by the time
the first Soviet census was taken in 1926. The first few years of Soviet-
177 ization had left the Kazakhs more or less untouched. Their economic
648 life, their family life, and the traditional organization of their society
had changed only externally. They had come under the unified rule of
Moscow instead of continuing their own loose social groupings, but
Moscow had not yet begun the transformation of Kazakh life, nor had the
Kazakhs yet faced the problems involved in accommodating to or resist-
ing Soviet influence.

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THE PERIOD 1926-1939

At the end of the 1920's the Soviets decided to collectivize the nomads of Central Asia, by which they meant causing them to settle down in collective farms. The first Five-Year Plan envisaged settling 383,000 of these nomadic households by 1933. By 1930, 50,000 nomadic Kazakh households were so immobilized, but 567,000 out of 829,000 households, or 67 per cent, were still nomadic. During the following year, 95,000 more households were transferred from nomadism to farming and other sedentary occupations. In 1932 an intensive drive was started to collectivize the nomadic herdsmen as well, but without compulsory sedentarization; collectivization no longer meant settling down.

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Apparently, many of those nomads who had been sedentarized in the first Five-Year Plan did not remain on the farms. Kazakhs traditionally abhorred farming. They regarded it as woman's work, as work of the poor and of those who could not make a success of herding. For a man to become a farmer meant loss of status, loss of manhood and virility. The Sarts, for example, a farming and trading people of Central Asia composed of former herdsmen, were despised by the nomads. Only half of those households which had been announced as collectivized remained so. In 1934, it was announced that only 76,000 households of the 145,000 noted above had been permanently settled in 1932. Between 1933 and 1935 slightly under 200,000 households were added to this roll, making a total of about one quarter of a million households which had been sedentarized. In addition, there was some movement of nomad households across the border into other republics or into China. In 1935 there were 158,000 fully nomadic Kazakh households, as compared with 567,000 five years earlier.

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The total number of those employed in Kazakhstan in 1931 was 495,100, of whom 125,100 were in agriculture. By 1935 the total figure had risen to 585,700, and the agricultural component to 165,800. The total figure rose to about 700,000 in 1937 and to 820,000 in 1940.

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There were 16,184 persons employed in industry in Kazakhstan in 1927, of whom 20.8 per cent were Kazakhs. In 1933, the number of industrial workers had risen to 56,484; of these, 23,784, or 42.1 per cent, were Kazakhs. At the end of 1934, the total was 71,627, of whom 29,022 or 40.5 per cent were Kazakhs.

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The total population of Kazakhs was reported in 1926 as 3,968,289; in 1939 their number was given as 3,098,764. They had thus lost in absolute terms about 900,000 people between the two censuses, or approximately 22 per cent of their number in 1926. In the same period, the population of the entire USSR had increased by 15.9 per cent. It has been argued that under normal conditions the Kazakh rate of increase would have been higher than the average for the USSR as a whole. (The populations of the neighboring republics of Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, for instance, which are composed of ethnic groups similar to the Kazakhs, have increased at a rate much higher than that of the entire USSR.) At any rate, if the Kazakhs had increased only at the USSR average rate, they would have numbered about 4,500,000 in 1939. Thus their real loss

161 may be estimated at approximately 1,400,000, if one adds to the actual loss of 900,000 the expected natural increase of 500,000.

648 A number of arguments have been advanced to account for both the actual and the estimated losses. Each has a certain merit, and no single one of them should be pursued at the expense of all the others.

[167] The Soviet explanation is that people from Kazakhstan moved away to the new industrial enterprises of the southern Urals and southern Siberia and to the neighboring Central Asia republics, the Uzbek, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Kirgiz SSR's. This interpretation has not been accompanied by any data. The figures quoted here have been the totals of those listed as Kazakhs in the USSR censuses regardless of place of residence. Therefore, the Soviet statement must mean not only that hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs migrated from Kazakhstan to other parts of the USSR, but also that they gave up their Kazakh nationality in doing so.

[197] This may be part of the story but it cannot be the whole. It is known that the Russians looked with favor on the Russification of native populations and their absorption into the Russian ethnic group, regardless of their forebears. German and Austrian prisoners of war who were sent to Kazakhstan report that many Kazakhs, identifiable by their physiognomy, by their personal and family names, and by their own account of 161 their past, were nevertheless designated Russian in their official papers. But certainly 900,000 of them did not become Russian.

648 During the course of collectivization many Kazakhs were liquidated [479] by the GPU, primarily during the period between the two censuses. Those liquidated were people who resisted collectivization, but they [565] were listed as remnants of the former nobility and wealthy people of Kazakhstan. This class was known as the feudal bays. About 700 bay families per year were liquidated, that is turned over to the GPU, during the three-year period 1928-1930. In 1931 it was announced that 23,000 households of bays were to be liquidated. This made an announced total of 25,000 households subject to GPU measures. If all these people were actually liquidated (that is, left to starve or otherwise badly treated), then some 125,000 Kazakhs were eliminated by these means. This is the largest figure for population losses that can be assigned to police measures on the basis of published data.

[233] [162] It has been stated that between 1930 and 1935, at the height of the drive for collectivization, the number of Kazakh households engaged in the traditional herding occupation dropped from 567,000 to 158,000. Many of these households went into agriculture and some into industry [167] in Kazakhstan, but others moved across the border, either into neighboring republics or out of the Soviet realm into bordering China. During the 1920's and the first part of the 1930's considerable cross-border movement was still permitted into China and back, according to age-old nomadic patterns. The border was closed in the mid-1930's, and possibly some Kazakhs remained outside the USSR by choice; for example, there is a colony of approximately 30,000 Kazakhs in Outer Mongolia. However, to assign numbers to the population loss in Soviet Kazakhstan through this cross-border movement is a hopeless task.

Again, no reliable estimate has been given for the number of Kazakhs who might have gone over to the neighboring republics within the Soviet Union.

the Soviet Union. Traditionally, peoples of Central Asia were able to 648
leave their native pastures when times were bad and claim hospitality [67]
among other more fortunate Turkic groups. Instances have been
reported in the 19th and 20th centuries of groups of Kazakhs whose [731]
herds had been depleted through drought or plague doing this; some even
joined Uzbek groups, on the basis of descent from a common ancestor.
Such an argument would hold only for the Uzbeks, the Kirgiz, and the
Karakalpaks. It is not applicable to the Tadzhiks, and certainly not to the
Russians. According to a long-established cultural pattern, Kazakhs
who leave herding for farming join another group, such as Sart, for
example, or Karakalpak, according to the area in which they have settled.

The general consideration of shifts in ethnic identification raises 648
the problem of the smaller peoples of Central Asia. Aside from the
many millions of Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Kirgiz, there are various small
groups, none of which number more than fifty-odd thousand. These
smaller groups, who together number about one quarter of a million
people, have suffered the same fate of cultural levelling, absorption,
and elimination of cultural differences that has taken place throughout
the Soviet world from the Caucasus to the Bering Sea. The cost of
administering many small peoples is too great a luxury for the USSR to
afford; the Soviets have ceased to regard these peoples as independent
entities, and have awarded the highest honors to those ethnologists who
have justified the formation of ever larger groups of peoples.

In 1926 more than 200,000 Kazakhs lived within the 1939 boundaries 648
of Uzbekistan, exclusive of the Karakalpak ASSR, and 86,000 Kazakhs 167
were living in what is today Karakalpakia. The Karakalpaks are a people
closely related to the Kazakhs; they are in the main Kazakhs who a few [171]
centuries ago settled down to farming. They still maintain strong ethnic
ties to the Kazakhs, and linguistically are barely distinguishable from [197]
them. The Karakalpaks increased from 146,000 to 186,000 between 1926
and 1939, an increase of 27 per cent and the highest gain of all the
Central Asiatic peoples during that period. Part of this gain may have
been due to the decision of Kazakhs to declare themselves Karakalpaks,
or the decision of the census authorities to list the Kazakhs as
Karakalpaks. The latter alternative is implausible, because it would
have the Soviets contributing further to a population picture of the
Kazakhs which was already unfavorable. Marxist theory rejects the
capitalistic Malthusian concept, and extreme population losses are
embarrassing for the Communists to explain.

From 1929 to 1933 the total livestock in Kazakhstan dropped from 731
nearly 40,000,000 to 5,000,000 head. This was a disastrous blow to the
nomads. The number of sheep and goats dropped by about 90 per cent.
More than two-thirds of the horses and three-quarters of the cattle died
in those years; between 1930 and 1933 more than 90 per cent of the
camels died. Without these animals, the nomads cannot live. The
farmer can store his grain, but the nomad can store food only on the
hoof. When a head of stock dies on the steppes either it is eaten or it
rots. The nomad's staple is milk, which he cannot store. These losses 161
in livestock give some idea of the starvation conditions which prevailed
during 1930-1933. Hundreds of thousands of nomads must either have

161 died or changed their way of life. This fact lies behind the great drop in the number of Kazakh nomadic households, from 567,000 in 1930 to one-fourth that amount, 158,000, in 1935.

It will be recalled that between 1926 and 1939 the Kazakh population suffered an absolute loss of 900,000, and a projected loss of 1,400,000, figured on the 15.9 average rate of increase for the entire Soviet Union. The major factors which contributed to this decline may now be summarized:

[165] (1) Starvation through loss of herds during the period of the first great collectivization drive, 1929-1933.
(2) The poor conditions of life and the prevalence of famine and disease during the early period of collectivization.
(3) Mass arrests and liquidations of resisters to collectivization ("enemies of the people").
[167] (4) Border crossings by Kazakhs into Sinkiang and Mongolia.
(5) Kazakh migration to the neighboring Turkic peoples, primarily the Karakalpaks and the Uzbeks.
[197] (6) Russification of Kazakhs who moved to the new urban developments of southern Siberia.

The population losses in any single category cannot be estimated with accuracy; one can only list those factors contributing to population loss with comments about their relative significance. The major factor was undoubtedly starvation through loss of herds and through the conditions attending collectivization. The flight across the borders into countries outside the USSR is a dramatic factor, but not one which accounts [167] for large numbers. There are no signs of a great increase in the population of Sinkiang, for example, in the early 1930's. The total population of Sinkiang is small, and an influx of hundreds of thousands of people could not have passed unnoticed, especially since there were western observers in the area at the time.

The movement of Kazakhs into the cities of southern Siberia, presumably in the Urals and the Kuzbass, is the official Russian explanation. This explanation cannot be the whole story but must be accepted as a part of the truth. That is, Kazakhs who are urbanized, speak Russian [197] habitually, and work in Russian factories seek a Russian nationality listing. They have been encouraged to do so at certain periods of Soviet [369] history, primarily in the 1930's.

The factor of GPU arrests and liquidation, together with attendant [165] factors such as starvation among those who were not themselves liquidated but whose herds were, may account for a maximum of 125,000 Kazakhs. The last major factor is the flight of Kazakhs to other neigh- [167] boring nationalities. A minor factor related to this last is the low rate of increase among those Kazakhs resident in areas outside Kazakhstan.

KAZAKH POPULATION IN 1939

161 131 A total of 3,100,000 Kazakhs was listed for the USSR as a whole in the 1939 census. Approximately 84 per cent were resident in Kazakhstan, nearly 10 per cent lived in Uzbekistan and Karakalpakia, and the rest

8:Krader & Wayne   E-4 (no date) 1955   RQ2 Kazak RQ2

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were settled in other neighboring republics. In 1926 the Kazakhs had numbered just slightly less than 4,000,000, of whom 93 per cent lived within the 1926 boundaries of Kazakhstan. There had been important shifts in the territory of the Kazakh republic during the interval—in some cases territory was added, in others taken away. The total area in 1926 was 2,850,000 square kilometers; in 1939 it was 2,730,000, a reduction of 4.2 per cent. Table I summarizes the 1926 and 1939 population figures.

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Table I

TOTAL AND KAZAKH POPULATION OF KAZAKHSTAN, 1926 AND 1939

Year	Total Population of KSSR	Number of Kazakhs in KSSR	Kazakh Per Cent of Total Population
1926	6,503,000	3,710,000	57
1926 (1939 boundaries)	6,074,000	3,468,000	57
1939	6,146,000	2,640,000	43

KN [162]

In 1926, Kazakhs constituted a majority of the population of Kazakhstan (57%); by 1939, they had shrunk to 43 per cent. This change in the ratio of Kazakhs to non-Kazakhs is due in part to the decrease in number of Kazakhs, and in part to the migration of Russians into the republic. In 1926 there were about 2,500,000 non-Kazakhs within the 1939 boundaries of Kazakhstan. The number of such persons had increased by 1939 to approximately 3,550,000. Natural increase could have caused only part of this growth; migration of peoples into the republic must have been responsible for most of it. This influx must also have exceeded the movement of non-Kazakhs to the new industrial developments in southern Siberia.

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This migration into Kazakhstan consisted largely of urban and industrial workers. Kirov, one of Stalin's aides in the early 1930's, initiated the policy of resettling thousands of Russians from the Leningrad region to build the industrial area around Karaganda. A second wave of migration took place during World War II, when again many people from the factories of Leningrad and Moscow and the mines of the Don basin were moved to Kazakhstan.

According to Soviet sources, Kazakhs and Russians (exclusive of Ukrainians and Belo-Russians) made up 80 per cent of the population of Kazakhstan in 1939. If 43 per cent is the correct figure for the Kazakh proportion of the total population at that time, then the Russians constituted approximately 37 per cent of the whole, or about 2,275,000, and the Kazakhs numbered about 2,650,000.

KN 162

The urban population more than tripled between the two censuses, growing from 519,000 to 1,706,000, from 8.5 to 28 per cent of the whole. Slightly more than 800,000 were located in the seven major cities of the republic, those with populations greater than 50,000 in 1939. This increase by 3.3 times exceeded the average rate of urban increase for

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
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the USSR as a whole. Yet the total population of Kazakhstan remained virtually static, increasing by only 72,000 from 1926 to 1939 within the 1939 boundaries, an increase of 1.2 per cent. The rural population, however, decreased by more than a million, from 5,550,000 to 4,440,000. This comparison of rural and urban population figures summarizes the chief economic trends of the period: the loss of farmers and herdsmen through starvation, liquidation, and migration and the growth of the cities through the influx of industrial workers.

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DEVELOPMENTS IN KAZAKHSTAN TO 1954

It is difficult to make accurate estimates of Soviet population since the 1939 census, but methods have been devised for making estimates. Through figures for school registrations and for numbers of voters and voting districts, one can derive some idea of postwar Kazakh population trends (Table 2).

Table 2

ESTIMATED RECENT TRENDS IN THE POPULATION OF KAZAKHSTAN[a]

Year	Population Estimate	Per Cent Increase Over Previous Estimate
1948 (January)	6,560,000	6.7[b]
1950 (December)	6,800,000	3.8
1954 (March)	7,200,000	5.9

[a] Estimated through voting district analysis.
[b] Per cent increase over the 1939 figure of 6,150,000.

The 1939-1948 period showed an over-all population increase in Kazakhstan of 6.7 per cent. Since this period included the war years, losses due to the war were apparently compensated for by natural increase and migration into the republic. Possibly by 1948 some of those who had moved into Kazakhstan during the war had returned to their former homes. One example of this was the film industry, which established itself almost completely in Alma-Ata during the war, but which had returned to Moscow and Leningrad by 1948.

KN [546]

The total estimated increase in population from 1939 to 1954 amounted to approximately one million. Forty per cent of this increase occurred in the nine-year period from 1939 to 1948, and 60 per cent of it in the remaining six years. The higher rate of increase during the more recent years is plausible, because of the elimination of the losses due to the war and to the movement out of the republic in the years 1946-1947. There is evidence of continued migration into Kazakhstan to the present day, in addition to natural increase, but it would be difficult to assign relative weights to these two factors.

KN [161]

If the preceding estimates of the total population of Kazakhstan are correct, and if the percentage of Kazakhs in the population remained at the estimate for 1939 (43%), then the number of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan

KN 162 K 161

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2' Kazak RQ2

Kazakhstan RQ1

during the postwar period may be estimated as follows: 2,800,000 in 1948, 2,900,000 in 1950, and 3,100,000 in 1954. However, there is good reason to believe that this ratio of 43 per cent no longer holds true. Heavy Slavic migration into the republic since 1939 has probably increased the proportion of non-Kazakhs, even though the Kazakhs may have had a higher birth rate. Secondly, if the Kazakhs constituted 43 per cent of the 1954 population, they must necessarily have increased by more than 20 per cent of their 1939 number. This seems unlikely, in view of the losses and the probable reduction in birth rate during the war. It seems most probable, then, that the proportion of Kazakhs has decreased to a ratio somewhat below 40 per cent of the total population of Kazakhstan. KN 162 K 161 KN [167]

WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF KAZAKHS

According to a Soviet estimate in 1939 there were about 400,000 Kazakhs outside the USSR, who together with the 3,100,000 resident in the Soviet Union made a total of 3,500,000. Those outside the Soviet Union lived in Sinkiang and in western Mongolia, with scattered thousands in Afghanistan, Iran, Kashmir, and Turkey. Numerical data on these Kazakhs are even scarcer than on those within the USSR. K 161 131

Chapter 3

SOCIETY

PATTERN OF KAZAKH SOCIETY

61 The traditional social organization of the Kazakhs is founded on a series of genealogies. These genealogies, transmitted orally from father to son, are carefully traced, and mount generation by generation to the founding ancestor of the lineage. In these lineages and throughout Kazakh society, descent is traced only in the male line from a common ancestor. A number of lineages comprise a clan, all of whose members trace descent from a common ancestor. Still wider groups of Kazakhs are embraced by a common descent line into confederations of clans comprising the hordes of the Kazakhs, the Great Horde, the Middle Horde, the Little Horde, and the Inner or Bukei Horde.[1]

611 The kinship bonds of blood and descent extend only to those related on the father's side; kinship through the mother's side is carefully distinguished from it. By far the most important relationships are those with the father's kin, although a certain amount of respect is due to the mother's relatives. The social structure which will now be analyzed is that of the kin related in the paternal line.

619 614 In its purest form, the Kazakh social structure is formed of a series of concentric rings. The largest ring, which encompasses the entire Kazakh people, comprises the system of hordes, which are in turn composed of clans; the hordes are confederations of clans traditionally unified under a leader or khan. In the distant past, all Kazakhs were united in one horde, under a great khan, but this tradition is now only a weak memory which has not evoked strong feelings of Kazakh unity for many centuries. On the other hand, the hordes which emerged from the breakup of Kazakh solidarity in the 16th century continued to play a social role well into the 19th century, and the Kazakh knows his horde and clan affiliation to this day. Both clans and hordes had a firm authority pattern; each horde had a khan, and at the head of each clan ruled a chief or beg.

61 631 Kazakh clans in their turn are composed of lineages, the lineages of kin villages, and the kin villages of families. All the units of Kazakh society are territorial units; the distribution of the hordes over the steppe has already been described. Within these hordes of the past,

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[1] See Chapter 1, Regional History and Socio-cultural Setting.

each clan had a territory distinctly its own, separated by widely recognized boundaries from the territories of neighboring clans. Lineages within each clan likewise had pasture lands of their own, the land of each lineage separate from the others; villages had separate lands for their own grazing, and known routes over which they moved from pasturage to pasturage in a fixed annual round.[7] 61 631

There is thus a correlation between neighborhood and kinship; the closest neighbor of the Kazakh household head was most likely to be his brother, father, father's brother, or father's brother's son. This close relation between the two social bonds is of more than theoretical interest; it has been the basis for an ideological warfare among various Soviet camps in different periods of recent history. Another feature of Kazakh society clarifies this relationship between kinship and neighborhood. The social bond of the Kazakhs, the means whereby two individuals demonstrate their membership in the common society of Kazakhdom, is the genealogical tree. Because of Kazakh nomadism, the relationships among the different branches, whether clans or lineages or villages, are loose, occasional. If two Kazakhs meet and are unknown to each other, they trace their genealogies for each other until a common ancestor is found. This common ancestor then becomes the point of reference for the two, the means whereby they establish whether they are more or less equals, or if not, which is superior. The ancestor in common establishes a basis for mutual aid and cooperation. 602 [648]

The number of generations traced in the genealogies to a common ancestor determines the closeness of the relationship; the fewer the generations, the closer the kinship, and the closer in space are the villages, camps, and pasturages of the Kazakhs. These genealogies are the membership roll, the constitution, the charter of incorporation, and the historical record of the different groups; they are either recited [illegible], in answer to questions concerning ancestry, or they are the skeleton around which folk epics are created.[8] These folk epics, which have suffered a peculiar fate under the Soviets, are long recitations or chants concerning the deeds of the ancestors. The Soviet-era epics of Djambul are quite different; Djambul's so-called epics are songs in praise of Stalin. [631] 173 [177]

Kazakh descent lines are not all equal; a father who is the founding ancestor of all the members of a horde or clan or village may have several sons, who are ranked according to their order of birth, the eldest son having the highest rank. The descendants of the sons will then recognize among themselves a relative rank order according to which of the sons they were descended from. The father or founding ancestor of the entire line is himself a member of a still larger group with rank according to order of birth and descent.[9] 611

The division of Kazakh society into social classes is also related to the ranking of descent lines. The same ties of blood and common 565

[7] Radloff (105), 1891, pp. LI-LVI.

[8] Samoilovich, in Rudenko *et al*, 1930, pp. 306 ff. For a genealogy still preserved today, see Mukanov, 1947, pp. 1-28.

[9] Kharuzin, 1889, pp. 41-42.

565 descent which unite the Kazakhs as a people also divide them into aristocrat and commoner, noble and subject. There are three identifiable social classes, aristocrats, commoners, and slaves. [567] (The slaves are an important class in traditional Kazakh society, but are not central to the discussion here.) At some point in history, the senior descent line segregated itself from the other lines and achieved aristocratic status. The head of the senior family of the senior descent line is the Khan of all the Kazakhs—so goes the theory of Kazakh kinship and social organization.

643 622 [565] These aristocratic descent lines formed the ruling strata of the hordes, the clans, and of all Kazakhdom when they were united. From their ranks came the khans and lesser leaders (sultans, begs, and clan chiefs) by right of first-born descent. Hordes were ruled by descent lines, clans by aristocratic lineages.

The supreme ruler of the Kazakhs, when there was one, bore the title of Khan. Sultans in Central Asia are of lower rank, the equivalent of princes. The Kazakh domain, when split, divided into a number of principalities whose rulers were sultans, even though some of them dared to assign themselves the more grandiose title of khan. A sultan was rarely a sovereign or independent ruler. The begs and clan chiefs were sometimes identical, but the beg was a local leader whose region varied in scope; it might be no larger than a village or a group of villages, or it might be larger than a clan.

613 [622] Kin villages and families likewise had their individual patriarchal leaders. The lineage, however, is a different type of organization. It did not have a chief or center of patriarchal authority unless it was small enough for all its members to live in one large kin village; yet it could be so large as to be identical in size with a clan, in which case it would be ruled by a clan leader. [582] The primary function of the lineage was to serve as a marriage unit, the genealogies once again providing the basis for the practices adopted. Kazakh boys and girls could not marry if they had a common male ancestor in the seventh generation; with kinship in the eighth degree or higher marriage was permitted. The genealogy traced back to the seventh ascending male ancestor is the smallest lineage of the Kazakh. The lineage is a unit of varying scope, depending on the function involved; the lineage for marital purposes comprised seven generations, the genealogy memorized by an individual many times that.[1]

421 [619 692] Each clan had a distinctive manner of marking the ears of or branding its livestock to differentiate the stock from that of other clans. However, the clan was not the property-owning unit. The clan leader might step in and make a decision regarding a pasturage or head of cattle in dispute between two villages, for the judicial authority rested ultimately in his hands; his decisions might appear biased in his favor, but he could not permanently dispose of pasturage or stock which was not his own, even though it bore the brand or earmark of the clan he led. [622] [692] Similarly, until collectivization, the village authority rested in the hands of a village elder who served as a judge, but rarely could the judge dispose of property which was not his own.[2]

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[1] Grodekov, 1889, p. 27; Altynsarin, 1870, p. 104.

[2] [for footnote see cat. 116, f. 41 - ANALYST.]

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judge dispose of property which was not his own.[8] The unit of property 421
ownership was the family, and still is. 593

The clan was a military unit, and supplied companies of armed and
mounted men to the armies of the khans and sultans. Each clan com- 614
pany fought under its own leader, and had its own distinctive rallying
cry (in Turkic uran, from which "hurrah" is derived) which was usually 701
a repetition of the names of illustrious leaders and warriors of the
clan. These companies were used not only in wartime but in any time
of trouble; they were called to help during feuds, for example, or in [628]
fending off thieves.

The clan supplied the khan with taxes in kind (usually livestock), 614
in money, and in labor service. Taxes in money were not common,
since money itself was a rarity on the steppe, and was to be found in 651
the hands of traders and moneymen rather than among clansmen or 643
clan leaders. The taxes paid by the clan to the khan were collected by the clan leader and paid for the group as a whole. Aside from livestock, the clan paid in labor service, reckoned in terms of transport duty and communications (messenger service). And the clan supplied able-bodied men in military companies under its own leaders, as required by the khan. The last century in which this system actually worked as a normal matter was the 18th century. By then the Kazakhs had been definitely divided into three hordes, and the khans ruled over each horde separately. By the 19th century, there were only two types of khans, those who came forward to unite their people against the Russians, such as Kenesary and Taimanov, and those who were maintained by the Russians, such as Khan Bukei of the Inner Horde, and his line.[9]

It is perhaps surprising to find a society in which the members 565
are all theoretically related to each other by ties of blood, yet which is 602
riven by class distinctions and by unequal distributions of ranks and
privileges. Yet this is the case among many peoples of Central Asia, [171]
such as the Uzbeks and Kazakhs, and of Eastern Asia, such as the
Mongols. The basis of social differentiation is the ranking of descent
lines according to the order of birth of the founders. Once this differ-
entiation is established, and the society is divided into aristocrats (by
virtue of primogeniture) and commoners, more complex divisions follow.
A leader or khan is then set up as the first among the aristocrats, and [643]
he forms a court of aides, ministers, viceroys, field commanders,
priests, and so forth. The khan may ennoble a commoner as a reward
for bravery in the field, or because he is literate and hence of excep-
tional utility to the state.

Theoretically, then, all Kazakhs are related to each other by ties 602
of blood. This does not mean that they are all actually descendants of
one founding ancestor, for such a figure lies so far in the past that it
is necessarily mythical; the truth or falsity of the tradition can no
longer be shown. In addition to the myth, however, the establishment
of kinship is also achieved by another kind of fiction. Kinship may be [597]
based on adoption, whereby a son is regarded as though he were the

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[8] Valikhanov, 1904, pp. 150 ff.; Radloff (104), 1893, pp. 513-514; Ibragimov, 1878, pp. 234-237.
[9] Ivanin, 1864, pp. 2-6; Abdykalykov and Pankratova, 1943, pp. 140-241.

602 597 biological progeny, or on the fusion of two descent lines, which is more complicated. According to this process, one village or lineage or clan may leave its ancestral camps and pasturages and request admission into another. The host clan agrees, accepts the newcomers not as guests but as kinsmen, and gives them a fictional genealogy and fictional kinship relations. These relationships have both religious and social significance.[6] [169] In religious terms the fictions are needed to make the guests acceptable to the local and ancestral spirits; in social terms, these kinship relations are the social relations—or at least they were until recently, and they still exert a strong influence today. A fusion of two descent lines in this manner results from fission or cleavage within one descent line; this fission may be caused by quarrels between two leaders, or by loss of herds which may cause a kinship group to break up, leaving one segment to seek admission into another group.

[567] Fictional kinship extends also to slaves. A certain amount of slavery existed for debt or for punishment of criminals, but most of the slaves, who were never a numerous group, were captives taken in feuds and wars.[7] Such captives did not remain slaves long, as a rule; they were either put to death, or freed and accepted into the civil life of Kazakh society. If freed, they were given a fictional kinship status which soon became blurred over and indistinguishable from the rest of the society.

000 These are in broad outline the traditional patterns of Kazakh society. They must be borne in mind in order to understand many of the ideological and doctrinary battles between Moscow and the Kazakhs, especially Kazakh leaders.

FAMILY AND VILLAGE LIFE

596 The Kazakh family is by nature an extended family, composed of a man, his wife or wives, his sons and their wives and children, and his unmarried daughters. If the family is rich, it may also have further kin, both married and unmarried, who are poor and maintain themselves by working for the rich. The rich family may also contain servants [592] who are not directly related at all, and finally slaves. The typical households, however, consist only of close kin.[8]

The authority in the family is patriarchal, resting ultimately in the hands of the father or the eldest of several brothers.[9] The authority passes from father to eldest son, or if there is no son, to the eldest surviving male of the immediate family, such as a brother or nephew. The authority of the patriarch is extensive—over women and children it is all but absolute—but it is subject to certain limitations. If it is noticed that a father is squandering his patrimony in idleness or frivolous undertakings, the village elders may remonstrate with him, and

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[6] Rudenko *et al*, 1930, pp. 59-60; Valikhanov, 1904, pp. 291-292.
[7] Levshin (85), 1840, p. 330.
[8] Kharuzin, 1889, pp. 107-108; Izraztsov, 1897, pp. 1-2.
[9] Valikhanov, 1904, p. 286.

may even place the authority in the hands of an adult son, if he has one, 596
or a brother. Recourse to such action may be taken only rarely, but it
is nevertheless a recognized delimitation of paternal powers. The parental
authority over the son serves as the model for all authority patterns [642]
in Kazakh society, such as those involving the village elder, the clan
leader, the beg, and the khan.[7]

In the past the parental authority was limited in another sense; the 622
family was part of a village which camped and pastured its herds in
common. The leaders of the village decided when and where to camp, [621]
when to change camp, when to break up the winter concentration of
herds and families and move to the more dispersed spring and summer [596]
pastures.[8] A family head disobeyed these decisions at his risk. It was
to his interest to follow them, since he gained many things thereby:
fellowship, social position, protection from dangers by weight of numbers,
assistance in time of need. The village in turn was subordinate
to the clan authority if there was one. In case of raids, feuds, or other [614]
breaches of the peace, a village leader would appeal to the clan chief
for aid. In a dispute between villages, a village elder would appeal to
his clan chief for a judgment in his favor.

The village elder was the judge of his community, and decided all 692
cases, usually with the support of the other senior men of the village. [622]
Appeals from their decisions were rare, defiance of their decisions
even rarer. Behind the judgment of the village leader and the other [626]
elders lay the force of social solidarity, the weight of the entire village;
defiance meant ejection and flight. Defiance of father by the son had [593]
similar consequences. The ultimate authority rested with the khan, if
there was one, and if he cared to use his power, for he backed his authority [643]
with an army and the right of punishment by death or imprisonment,
in addition to the force of his position.

The Kazakh household could include several wives if the position 595
and wealth of the master allowed it. In one community studied, the
Adai lineage on Mangyshlak peninsula, half the men had only one wife
and half had two. In general, very few families contained more than
two wives, although there is in theory no upper limit on the number of
wives (exclusive of concubines) that a man can have. The ideal number [565]
of wives in princely families was considered to be five or nine—in
contrast to the ideal number of wives for Moslems which the Koran [171]
gives as four. The family and marriage patterns of the Kazakhs are
among the traits which give a pronouncedly non-Islamic coloring to
their society.[9]

A youth was given his own tent and appurtenances when he came of 882
age; traditionally he was soon to be married, and in fact a substantial 582
number were married by the time they were 20 years old. Even as
late as 1926, 222 out of every 1,000 males were married by that age,
and in former years the rate was higher. The tent was not identical 592
with the household unit. A young married couple with children did not

[7] Izraztsov, 1897, pp. 5, 11.
[8] Radloff (104), 1893, p. 513; Rudenko *et al*, 1930, pp. 4-8.
[9] Karutz (73), 1910, p. 42.

592 live as an independent unit, even though they had their own tent; the
group was still part of the husband's father's household.[1]

Extensive studies done in the early 1920's by Rudenko describe the
621 family life among Kazakhs of the Middle Horde. In one aul or nomadic
[119] village, there were 13 tents in a line. Five of the 13 "belonged" to the
head of the aul, and of these three contained women; that is, three were
[560] tents of married persons, for women received tents only on marriage.
Rich auls were small, with few families; poor auls were large, with
[554] many families joining in their poverty. One such poor aul contained
60 families; Samoilovich describes a richer grouping of 505 tents in
100 auls of three to eight tents each.[2]

[592] Very little information is available on the size of households or the
extended family. Samoilovich gave 2,408 as the number of individuals
162 living in the 505 tents, or 4.76 per tent.[3] Equating tents with married
couples, but also allowing for bachelors and childless couples in some
tents, one can infer a high fertility in this particular community. This
account is one of the very few detailed demographic pictures of a small
community of Kazakhs living in the traditional fashion. It is difficult to
generalize from such a description, but one gets a sense of the direction
such figures are likely to take.

In Turkic nomad communities there are generally fewer women
than men; a ratio of 900 females to 1,000 males exists among Kazakhs.
The Kirgiz and the Yakut of Northern Siberia present a similar picture.
[582] Among these people, however, men tend to marry late in life, while
social norms dictate that women marry early. This is shown by the
fact that, in 1926, 41 out of every 1,000 Kazakh males reached the age
of 40 unmarried, while only three out of every 1,000 women were still
single at 40. More than 75 per cent of the women married by the age
of 20; Kazakh men reached that percentage only in the age group 30-34.
Hence there is actually a surplus of women seeking marriage, and this
[595] allows for a certain amount of polygamy, since a woman will marry a
man who already has a wife rather than remain unmarried.

As noted before, the extended family is patriarchal in character;
593 authority is vested in the senior male of the household. All decisions
[562] rest with him, and rarely can appeal be made beyond his word. The
entire society centers around the father-son axis, the central point of
the marriage life and family happiness is the bearing of a son. The son
is the assurance that the line will be continued; on a larger scale, this
pattern of descent in the paternal line is the web that holds the society
[181] together. This is an extreme case of a father-son oriented society.
Few of the factors which tend to modify strict patriarchal control in
other societies can be seen here. The Chinese and the Japanese have
a patrilineal family system, but in these societies, although the father
[171] is the center of authority, the mother is the center of a different circle
of emotion, one of love and warmth, and the family life involves
both circles.

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[1] USSR Census 1926, vol. 54.
[2] Rudenko *et al*, 1930, p. 311.
[3] Samoilovich, in Rudenko *et al*, 1930.

593 562 [814] [181] [538]

Not so the Kazakhs. Among the Kazakhs and related societies, the role of maternal affection is simply not to be found, in the ethnographies or in the native literature. There are autobiographies of Kazakhs, among them that of the novelist Sabit Mukanov, and biographies of Kazakhs by Kazakhs. Nowhere does the theme of a mother's love for her son, nor of the son's affection for his mother, appear. These autobiographies and novels are products of the Soviet era, but there is nothing in the Soviet pattern which rules out the theme of mother love. Similarly, in collections of poems and songs of both the Soviet and the prerevolutionary eras, the idea of mother love rarely appears. These poems and songs celebrate the deeds of past heroes, or the love of a youth for a girl; girl's songs praise the bravery and handsomeness of the lover. The mother is simply missing. If by chance she should appear, it is only as one of a series of family members.

[601]

In the Kazakh language, the term of endearment for the mother is not centered on the mother alone; it designates at the same time mother, elder sister, paternal aunt. This could be taken as a symbol of the great force of mother love, so great that it has become generalized to all other closely related elder females. But this possibility must be ruled out in view of the almost complete silence which the Kazakhs maintain regarding the mother and the mother theme.

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The novelist Mukhtar Auezov has written two novels about the 19th century Kazakh poet, Abai Kunanbaev. The general theme concerns the formation of the character of this 19th century Kazakh intellectual who turned to Russia for guidance (Abai is the translator into Kazakh of Pushkin's Eugene Onegin). Abai's life is presented in a literary pattern acceptable to the political line of the Soviet Union: the pattern of the daring youth who breaks with the past, overcoming the tyranny of the traditional life and storming toward the new. This theme is popular with the Soviet leadership, for it contains the notion of the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union—under the aegis of the Great Russians. Abai's father is depicted as a monster of feudal oppression, and Abai is shown in stern revolt against him. Abai's mother appears briefly as part of a dim gallery of forces which are generally passive and favorably disposed toward the hero: the grandmother, the mother, a poetess of the era, Abai's beloved. The beloved is represented as lovable, the poetess as a beautiful singer, and the grandmother as a woman of wisdom—which is in general a male trait. The mother plays a brief, positive role in Abai's youth and then disappears from the novel. She herself is colorless, and the emotion is centered around the grandmother, a figure not of love but of wisdom.[1]

[584]

The absence of the mother role and mother love is true of other domains of Kazakh family life and social life generally. There is nothing that counterbalances the father-son orientation of the family and the society. Woman's status, however high it may rise, is inferior to that of the male. As a young girl, the steppe daughter is a "non-person"; she counts for little. She may be betrothed in infancy, in which case

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[1] Auezov (3), 1949. See also Krader's doctoral dissertation (78), 1953, chapter 6. Winner (128) corroborates this analysis of the literary evidence.

593 she is physically a part of her paternal family but socially, spiritually,
562 she is already on her way to join her husband. Among the Turks of
the eighth century, a man could sell his daughter, provided she was
[584] neither betrothed nor married, if he could not otherwise pay the sum
levied against him for a crime. These ancient Turks could not sell
their wives, but could make seizure in such a case—but only such an
extreme case—on the dowry which the wife had brought with her.

Yet a woman is not without rights among the Kazakhs. There is a
562 considerable progression in her social status and personal rights when
she advances from an unmarried to a married state, a progression
which was true for the ancient Turks as well as for the Kazakhs, their
descendants.[1] The modern unmarried Kazakh girl has no property, but
on betrothal and marriage she obtains certain property rights. The
[583] married woman receives her dowry which she, not her husband, controls.
She may reserve it from her husband's estate and make provision for
[595] its distribution among her own children, to prevent children of her
husband by another wife from falling heir to her property.[2]

The ethnographer Karutz comments that although a woman's family
[583] receives a certain amount of bridewealth from her husband's family on
their marriage, this bridewealth is hardly commensurate with the cost
and care of her upbringing.[3] (For poor Kazakhs bride-service, in which
the youth works for the wife's father for a term, may take the place of
payment of the bridewealth, but this is not the usual pattern.) One gains
the impression that a girl prior to marriage is barely tolerated in her
[593] parental home. She is there on sufferance until the day she marries and
moves to her husband's home. A woman is a temporary resident in her
father's home, a permanent resident in her husband's home. And the
long-established member of the Kazakh community, especially if she is
a woman, has a position which the newcomer does not. The mother-in-
[606] law has superiority over the son's wife.

A woman advances in status when she marries; she advances still
[554] further when she bears a son. The marriage arrangement between two
Kazakh families is in the nature of a contract, the purpose of which is
584 the passage of a woman from one line to bear sons for another.[4] The
terms of the marriage "contract" involve a complex series of exchanges;
562 bridewealth is paid by the boy's family to that of the girl, or bride-
service is performed by the groom for the bride's father, a dowry is
stipulated, and feasts and sumptuous gifts are exchanged between the
families in as many as seven ceremonies. The riches of the exchanges
[554] vary according to the wealth and status of the families. Among rich
families, each tries to outdo the other in outlay; among the families of
moderate wealth, traditionally fixed sums are exchanged; among the
poor, the marriage takes place merely through the exchange of a sheep
or a kid.[5]

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[1] Dichurin, 1950.
[2] Izraztsov, 1897, pp. 67-70.
[3] Karutz (72), 1911, p. 100.
[4] Krader (78), doctoral dissertation, 1953, ch. 6.
[5] Karutz (73), 1910, p. 38.

Kazakh men may take more than one wife for many reasons, perhaps 595
to gain the prestige of numerous wives, or because the first wife has
not borne a son. A barren or sonless wife may be divorced and sent 586
back to her family. The fortunate woman who has borne a son is endowed 593
with property which is hers to hold in trust for her minor children.
Should the mother of a son be widowed, she is a free agent and may
remarry or not, as she pleases and whom she pleases. If a widow has 589
no children or has only daughters, she may be forced into leviratic [587]
marriage (i.e., marriage with the brother of her deceased husband).
If she has only daughters, her family may be broken up at the death of
the husband.

It is in the light of these various changes in rights and statuses 581
that the marriage is seen as pointing to the bearing of sons. There is
great joy at the birth of a son, for thereby is the continuation of the
line assured, and thereby is the marriage fulfilled.

The leviratic marriage is actually a form of social insurance, for 587
thus does the Kazakh society take care of those families without a male 596
head. The position of the conjugal family within the framework of the
extended family is shown by this practice. A woman weds not her husband [581]
but her husband's family; when she marries her husband, she
potentially marries her husband's brother. The marriage arrangements
are made between the families, and the partners involved are not consulted.
The line of the family flows not only through the husband but
through his brother, and through all the close kin in the male line within
the family. In medieval times, the son among both Turks and Mongols
also married the widows of the deceased father other than his own
mother,[1] but this form of marriage is now taboo.[2]

Within the extended family, and among close kinsmen generally, no 596
one has his exact equal in status. The first basis for differentiation is
the generation to which one belongs, the second is the order of birth, [561]
the third is chronological age. The age criterion is the least reliable
and the least used, but it is there. Kazakh brothers and sisters are
ranked according to order of birth, and treat one another with authority [593]
or with respect accordingly. Cousins are likewise ranked according to
the order of birth of their fathers. The second son of the elder brother [606]
does not necessarily take precedence over the elder son of the second
brother, however; here complicating factors come in, such as the chronological
ages of the cousins in question. If there is a wide disparity in
age, then the older cousin takes precedence regardless of birth order.
A Kazakh treats his older brother as he does his father's younger brother,
and his older sisters as he does his father's younger sisters. He calls [593]
them by the same terms and acts toward them in a similar fashion.[3]

Authority and respect tend to follow similar lines outside the family, 642
in the village, clan, and khanate. These latter authority relations are
modeled on the paternal, in a way similar to the Chinese, the Japanese,
the Roman and South Slavic societies. In considering these parallels, 171

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[1] Bichurin, 1950, p. 230.
[2] Grodekov, 1889, p. 20.
[3] [illegible], 1897, p. 11.

171 one should remember that the paternal authority of the Chinese, the Japanese, or the Romans is a model for the imperial authority only by analogy, as a manner of speaking. The Confucian admonition to regard the emperor as a father is not taken literally. The Chinese imperial authority pattern is derived from other sources than the paternal role; [602] so is the Kazakh. But Kazakh society as a whole is more steeped in the kinship relation, and hence authority in general is modeled on the paternal to a greater degree than in the other patrilineal societies mentioned.

642 Age is the underlying basis of authority in the Kazakh social system, since the old men are the fathers. 538 Paradoxically, traditional Kazakh literature, both oral and written, deals mostly with young heroes. These youths are praised for their daring, strength, cleverness; they defy enemies both human and supernatural. But the hero is typically a [428] younger prince who gains a kingdom in defiance of the law of primogeniture by subduing or outwitting his older brother; the young prince never defies the older generation. The father and elders generally support the elder brother, but they do not actively suppress the younger. In contrast, Kazakh literature of the Soviet era depicts youth defying or combatting his elders.

KAZAKH SOCIETY AND THE PARTY LINE

171 565 Throughout the history of western society, the social classes have been distinguished by differences in birth; the nobility carefully separated themselves from the taint of common blood in medieval Europe, in Renaissance societies, and in modern times. The Kazakh society—and the Mongol or Uzbek for that matter—is anomalous because it maintains class distinctions of aristocrat and commoner while affirming [619] a general relatedness through descent from a single ancestor. There are even fictional genealogies which unite all steppe nomads.[1]

554 These relatively simple anomalies have caused a dilemma in Soviet publications on the nature of Kazakh society. There is social differentiation not only by birth and descent, but also by wealth. In Kazakh society, [177] the two bases of social inequality were more or less coordinate until the victory of Sovietization. The clan leader was superior to his fellow [622] clansmen by right of birth; the village leader was superior to his fellow villagers by right of birth; both were also richer than the other clansmen or villagers. By right of precedence they allocated the best pasture lands to themselves and decided all judicial questions in their own favor. Both wealth and social influence were based on the number of kinsmen [602] who would support a man at a council, or before the law, or in a fight, a feud, or a war. A man of eminent birth and of wealth could get more kinsmen to support him than could a Kazakh with neither. This might seem anomalous, since theoretically a Kazakh is related to all other Kazakhs, and kinsmen help each other. But kinsmen help closer kinsmen before they help distant kin; and kinsmen help superior, influential kinsmen before they help inferior kinsmen who are lacking in influence.

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[1] Aristov, 1894, pp. 394-398.

These apparent contradictions arise because Kazakh society is an amalgam of kin and political relationships. 182

Soviet writers in Central Asia find it difficult to explain the inconsistencies in Kazakh society; this difficulty is due in part to the series of readymade categories of evolution which Communism teaches. They are dealing not with abstractions but with living people, whose lives are complex. The Kazakhs have lived on the margins of great empires—Persian, Chinese, Russian—for many centuries. They themselves have participated in great empires, their own and others'. Not only the glory, but some of the institutions, have rubbed off on them; they have developed certain institutions which are normally part of states and empires. At times they have formed states and empires, and at times they have contracted to form smaller units. 177

During the 1920's, a group of Kazakh intellectuals, together with certain romantically disposed Russians, constructed a picture of Kazakh society in which each social unit formed a closely-knit cooperative core. All members of a village helped each other, since all were united by ties of blood and neighborhood. The Kazakh intellectuals included former leaders, such as Baitursunov and Bukeikhanov, of the Alash-Orda, the Kazakh political party of the period 1917-1922. Ryskulov and Sadvokasov, also Kazakhs, propounded the same idea; the Russian scholars Polochanskii, Kushner, and, as late as 1933, Fedorov continued along the same line.[7] 829 [668

With the onset of collectivization, the Soviet government could no longer let these theories continue unopposed. In 1926 Moscow began to denounce the notion of the persistence of primeval communist conditions among the Kazakhs into the era of the Russian Revolution. The Soviet boss of Kazakhstan, Goloshchekin, attacked the concept of the Kazakh nomadic village as a communal, cooperative, undifferentiated whole. Between 1928 and 1930 the government of Kazakhstan handed over each year to the GPU hundreds of Kazakh families classified as enemies of the workers. The campaign to exterminate the rich Kazakhs as exploiters of the poor intensified between 1930 and 1933. The aim of this campaign was to bring the Kazakh herdsman into collective farm life, to settle him down as a tiller of the soil, as well as to find the equivalents among the Kazakhs of the rich peasants of Russia. The aul was equated by Goloshchekin with a peasant village anywhere; the wealthy Kazakh villager was equated with the Kulak, and thus regarded as subject to liquidation.[8] 177 698 [994]

This policy became the official line, and the forces advocating the theory of communal economy and polity were silenced. One theory advanced in support of the new line stated that the Tsarist colonialists supported the village leaders as a counterpoise to the khans and the sultans, and used the local leader as a lever to crush the rule of the khans. According to this theory, the khans were of foreign birth and the village leaders, pictured as allies of the Tsars, were of Kazakh birth.[9]

[7] Tegzhanov, 1934, pp. 6-8, 33.
[8] Goloshchekin, 1931, pp. 177-198, 208.
[9] Tegzhanov, 1934, pp. 38-39.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

177 648 According to the official line, Kazakh society belonged to the feudal stage of development at the time of the Russian conquest. This formulation has survived to the present day. It is supported by a stage theory of history, derived from Karl Marx. According to this theory, all societies prior to the Russian Revolution were either tribal or divided into classes; class societies were either capitalist or feudal. According to this theory the Kazakhs are not tribal because they are divided into classes, but they are not capitalist; therefore they are feudal. Never, however, did the proponents of this theory make a detailed comparison between Kazakh society and the nations of medieval Europe.

The Kazakhs, by this doctrine, were permitted to retain their [668] national heroes, the khans of old, among them the leaders of revolts against the Russian conquest, Batyr Srym, Taimanov, Kenesary, Nurmuhammed. In the Soviet Union of the 1930's, the Tsars were still considered hated oppressors of all men, Russians and non-Russians, in the Russian empire. The Tsars were an absolute and unrelieved evil, and a war for colonial liberation was progressive and good. Yet during the 1930's, writers tended to stay away from the description of these revolts against the Tsars by Kazakhs and other peoples. Most of the writings were concerned with such topics as Kazakh participation in the 1905 revolution, or the revolt of the Kazakhs in 1916. During World [538] War II, however, a number of books and articles were written describing the 19th century revolts as great events, true expressions of anti-Tsarist sentiment, part of the general hatred of Tsarism in which the Bolsheviks shared. Viatkin, Bekmakhanov, Shoinbaev and others—for the most part Kazakhs—wrote in admiration of the Kenesarys and Taimanovs.

Then with the 1950's began a violent purge of these writings. In the current phase, Tsarism is still regarded as an exploiting and oppressive institution, but a new twist has been added to the story. The Tsars by their conquests are now said to have saved the Turks of Central Asia from an even worse fate, conquest by English and the Germans, by Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. Pan-Turkism would bring all Turks together under one government—not that of Moscow—and is subjected to the most bitter denunciations by the Soviet press as bourgeois-nationalist, cosmopolitan, and so forth. Pan-Islamism would bring all Moslems together, Turks, Persians, and Arabs; although it is somewhat less realistic in its appeal to the Kazakhs, it is also sharply denounced in the Soviet press.

Whether England or Germany or the Pan-Turks would have swallowed up Central Asia is a matter of historical speculation which need not detain us here. On the other hand, the denunciation by the modern Soviet writers of the older Kazakh leaders such as Kenesary and Taimanov is of great interest. The Soviet specialists in Central Asia seek to differentiate Kazakh revolts into two types, those which were progressive and those which were not. The revolts of Nurmuhammed, Taimanov, and Kenesary Kasymov are all depicted as reactionary and antihistorical, because they sought to tear the Kazakhs away from the Russian empire and to retain the age-old oppression by the khans. Other figures such [668] as Batyr Srym are treated as progressive historically because they led a revolt not against the Tsars but against the nobility of their own society.

This distinction made between Batyr Srym and Kenesary by Soviet historians reflects the current Soviet attitude toward past leaders. These early khans who are now denounced are the national and cultural heroes of the Kazakhs. They are celebrated in the folk literature, the poetry, and the tales which parents tell their children; they are the basis of common comparisons ("as brave as . . ., as clever as . . ."). For the Kazakhs these figures are symbols of their unity as a people. Moreover, they are the ancestors of those living today, according to the traditional Kazakh ties of descent and blood. In denouncing them, the Soviets are denouncing and insulting the very people most venerated by the Kazakhs, aristocrats and commoners alike. 177 648 538

The hold of the olden khans still continues after more than 30 years of Soviet rule. The Kazakh native writers demonstrate a profound desire to seize upon these old figures for literary and historical themes. They stubbornly resist relinquishment of these themes when the official line changes anew. Despite three years of the sharpest attacks and polemics, adulation of the ancient heroes continues in the literature, in films, in classroom textbooks, in official histories; its eradication is a concern of the Soviet regime today.[1]

KAZAKH LIFE IN 1950

The preceding description of the traditional Kazakh society and culture was included not only as background to the present, but primarily because whole sectors of Kazakhs continue more or less unchanged in that way of life, even though they are now members of a collective farm. Traditional Kazakh culture includes forces which have blocked accommodation to the Soviet pattern and forces which have permitted Sovietization. These forces will be taken up in turn. 177 648

In rural Kazakhstan, Kazakhs live in collective farms either as herders or as combined herders and farmers. They form the greater proportion of the population in the regions which are primarily devoted to herding, western and west-central Kazakhstan. Here they continue the old nomad life, pasturing their herds of sheep, goats, horses, cattle, and camels from winter camp to summer, reversing their path and completing the cycle in the fall. The winter camps are the focal points of community life, the stable centers of the annual round. Here after the summer dispersal the Kazakhs return to large adobe houses, structures which contain not only quarters for the extended family, but also stables, connecting corridors, and rooms for the storage of hay. Some of these house-stable-barn structures are a century old; it was about one hundred years ago that domiciles of this type were introduced into the area.[2] 233 [241] [131] [221] [596] [342]

The extended families and villages have been the basis of Kazakh adaptation to Sovietization. Kazakh herders continue to live in kin units, with the old aul or nomadic village as the core of the herding 621 [177]

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[1] *Pravda*, 26 Dec 50, 19 Apr 51, and 28 Oct 52; *Voprosy Istorii*, 1951, No. 4, pp. 3-15.

[2] Korbe and Makhova, 1952, pp. 42-45.

621 kolkhoz. On the other hand, those Kazakhs who have changed from
herding to farming live in villages which are no longer kin communities.
The background of this differentiation antedates the Revolution, and is
an important part of Kazakh developments during the last hundred years.

In the period from 1850 to 1917 the Russians gradually took over
648 the more fertile sections of the steppe in the north, especially along
177 lake shores and river banks, and in mountain piedmont. This left less
steppe, and less fertile steppe, for the rapidly increasing Kazakh population.
The impoverished Kazakhs were impelled to take up agriculture,
which requires less territory per individual than does herding; in regions
having sufficient annual rainfall to support cultivation, farming is a
more efficient use of the land and hence permits greater density of population.
Where the Kazakhs were thus forced to take up agriculture,
they tended to break up the kinship units. The agricultural villages are
621 larger than the nomadic, and are composed of broken clans, broken
lineages, villages, and families.

Many Kazakh communities survived this impact and managed to
maintain their herding pattern, usually in conjunction with a certain
minimum amount of farming, which was done in the vicinity of the winter
camp by the women and the poor. Communities of this kind comprise
the norm to this day; farming among such villages and kolkhozy is
largely concerned with raising feed for the livestock. These communi-
474 ties have, as a general rule, gone over bodily into the collective farm
621 system. One such collective farm is the Belbasar Kolkhoz in the
Dzhambul region, in the valley of the Chu River. This farm is composed
of 116 households; of these 100 are Kazakh, all of the same lineage, the
Akhsha lineage of the Dulat clan of the Great Horde. Of the remaining
[563] households, 13 are Azerbaijani, two are Russian, and one is a Kazakh
who came to this kolkhoz from the Middle Horde in 1942 as a blacksmith.
The head of one of the Russian families is a carpenter, the other a
kolkhoz leader.[7]

This collective farm in the south appears in striking contrast to
those in the north, in the farming zone of the Semipalatinsk region, for
example, where Kazakh clan and lineage affiliations are mixed and
confused. The Kazakhs of southeast Kazakhstan know their horde and
clan affiliations; they are all of the Great Horde, and of one of four clans.
Korbe compiled a list of 11 collective farms in this area in which the
core population consisted of members of a specific lineage of a specific
clan. It thus seems clear that in this part of Kazakhstan the anvil upon
which the collective farm pattern was hammered out was the descent
group and the kin village. Here, then, is a Kazakh institution which
served as a means of accommodation to the Soviet pattern.[8]

The kin village and lineage were the channels through which the
Kazakh herdsmen passed into the collective farm life. That the passage
was made indicates the force which these institutions have even today.

621 The traditional function of the nomadic village was to organize the
annual movements of the member families as a collective enterprise

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[7] Korbe, 1950, p. 71.
[8] Ibid., pp. 71-72.

under the direction of the village leader. The leader and the elders 621
decided all questions concerning village activities. The administration [622]
of justice was in the hands of the elders, while the enforcement of
decisions was a common village enterprise; thus the village peace was
kept. The raw framework of the village collectivity moved as a unit
into the Soviet era.

The Kazakh lineage supplied the basis for the practice of marrying 582
outside the group. The lineage occupied a common territory, and during 613
the course of the past century the unit of common residence rather than
the unit of descent and kinship has served to regulate marriage. Wives
are sought outside the village; girls leave their native villages to join
their husband's people, although this may not involve moving a great
distance. The lineage is today generally identical with the village, and [621]
under the Soviet regime, with the collective farm. There is today the [474]
practice of kolkhoz exogamy.[4]

The practice of polygamy has likewise proved compatible with 595
Soviet conditions. In former times, the many-wived family was the
family of the well-born, the rich, the influential; today, the many-wived [622]
family is that of the village leader, the kolkhoz president, the brigade
foreman. The leviratic marriage of the widow to the brother of the 596
deceased or to another close kinsman has also accommodated itself to [587]
Soviet conditions, within the framework of the extended family, for
among the peoples of the steppe this practice depends upon and reinforces
the extended family structure. In Kazakhstan, the extended family rests
on the close integration of several fraternal households and the conjugal
families of a father and his sons and at times even grandsons.

The Soviet ideological campaign has directed attention to the practice 595
of polygamy among leading elements in Kazakh collective farms;
similarly, a number of reports indicate that leviratic marriage is still [587]
practiced. Soviet ethnographers do not discuss these institutions from
the standpoint of the functions of the Kazakh extended family and the
Kazakh village community. Instead, they have made a political issue
out of what they are pleased to call the survival of the feudal mores.
But they choose to ignore the fact that the practices which they condemn
are part and parcel of the existing family and village system.

The status of women in Kazakhstan is a serious question to Soviet 665
ideologists. In 1944, in 1949, and again in 1951, the Kazakh Party
leadership was briefed by the Central Committee in Moscow regarding
the participation of Kazakhs, of Kazakh women, and of literate and
educated people in the Kazakh Communist Party (see Chapter 6, which
deals with the Party). That the program has evidently fallen short of
plan is suggested by the repetition of the instructions. The Kazakhs
are not coming forward for training in Party work, despite the fact that
they are periodically encouraged to do so, and despite the prestige and
material advantages of Party membership. And the women lag behind
the men in this respect.

Woman's position in Kazakh society, and the Soviet failure to understand 177
the background of this position, has important consequences in the

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[4] Ibid., p. 86.

K 177 life of the republic. There is reason to doubt the population picture
provided by Soviet figures. Since polygamy is illegal in the Soviet Union,
polygamous marriages are carefully concealed from the Soviet registry.
A recent ethnographic report notes that registration of marriage is far
from general among the Kazakhs. There are cases in which birth
registration has been delayed in order to register children by one wife
in the name of another—another Kazakh device designed to circumvent
the prohibition of polygamy. Similarly, practices such as leviratic
marriage are maintained, concealed as much as possible from the
K Soviet authorities.[7]

114 The source for these data is a series of reports published in the
past five years by the Soviet ethnographer, O.A. Korbe. He and his
177 staff have advanced the thesis that Kazakh society in the Soviet period
includes a number of institutions which have survived from pre-Soviet
K days. A rebuttal has been entered by another Soviet ethnographer, a
[815] Kazakh, Sabitov. Basing his report on field work in the summer of 1952,
Sabitov seeks to show that rural Kazakhs have been transformed entirely
by the process of Sovietization. His conclusions are supported by a
certain amount of illustrative material; for example, he asserts that
kolkhoz houses show Russian influence and that Russian craftsmen are
employed for making stoves. Utensils used in daily life are for the
most part contemporary in both design and production. Clothing, on
the other hand, is in part traditional, in part modern.[8]

Sabitov's data are highly selective, for they concern only material culture—housing, dress, utensils. He merely states, without specific supporting data, that there have been changes in the social relations, the spiritual culture, and other aspects of Kazakh society. That there have been changes is obvious. Korbe stresses the traditional, the "survivals"; Sabitov stresses the new elements. Neither has examined
K the interrelations of Kazakh culture and society with the Russian.

369 Little information is available on Kazakhs living in cities. Those
Kazakhs who have moved into urban areas apparently show little external
KN difference from their Russian neighbors. They live in houses of similar
[341] architecture; photographs of KSSR cities reveal a uniform type of architecture among the apartment houses and public buildings which is an
K amalgam of Central Asiatic and Russian designs. Plans for feeding the
[363] cities of Kazakhstan recognize no cultural differences (see Chapter 5
on Economy). The Russian food pattern predominates: potatoes, vegetables, meat, and milk products. Kazakh dietary customs exclude pork,
KN which is a typical Russian food carried by the Russians into Central
[369] Asia. One infers that segregation according to cultural background
exists at least to a certain degree in the cities. The separation of
Kazakhs from Russians is clearly not a public policy, nor is it a folk
K practice. The best explanation appears to be that the Kazakhs prefer to
[186] keep to themselves, and the Russians likewise.

K This attitude of holding off is shown in the intermarriage pattern,
177 or rather in the absence of one. The evidence is sparse, far from
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[7] Ibid., pp. 85-86.

[8] Sabitov, 1953, pp. 97-99.

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systematic, and subject to a number of qualifications. What data there are, however, suggest that among the people of Kazakhstan Russians marry Russians and Turks marry Turks. Again it appears that the Kazakhs do not wish to mingle with the Russians, just as, in the political domain, they do not join the Party nor engage in other political activities with the Russians. In general, on the basis of what direct evidence there is, this attitude may be summed up as noncompliance, or a kind of passive resistance. Corroborative data are seen in the economic domain, where the Kazakhs are not fulfilling plans.

THE SOVIET THEORY OF CULTURAL CHANGE

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The theory of acculturation in anthropology has been devised to describe the social process which occurs when two different cultures come into close contact with each other. This theory has arisen out of the reflections of western European and American ethnologists on contact between their own culture and others. But there is in western civilization no general theory of culture which deals with total control of the social relations and direction of change resulting from such contact. The Russian policy toward minorities within the Soviet Union is nothing other than a theory of controlled acculturation. In their theory of history and in the formulation of their minority policy the Soviet theoreticians have proclaimed a method whereby they—and they alone—are able to control the processes of social development. They boast control over the direction in which the different peoples of the Soviet Union will change; they claim the power to dictate the manner of the change and the form that the ultimate society will take.

Starting out as a society of pastoral nomads in which membership was based on paternal kinship traced from a common male ancestor (a society also divided into aristocrats and commoners), the Kazakhs joined—or rather, were drafted into—the Soviet world. The Soviet ethnographers depict the Kazakh society as an amalgam of institutions surviving from the past, coupled with Soviet features such as collective farm organization, Party membership, and government by soviets. The survivals include the family as the unit of production and consumption, and the traditional village organization, upon which the collective farm has been superimposed. Another survival is nepotism, which is ever present in Kazakh political life. A society steeped in traditions of kinship thinks of kinship as the means for social cooperation; hence, nepotism is inherent in the very nature of Kazakh society and inevitably finds its way into the political life. But it is incompatible with the Soviet pattern and it is attacked as such.

Soviet criticism of these features, and the constant drive to eradicate them, are essential elements in the theory of controlled social and cultural change. This change originating in the contact between the Russian and the Kazakh cultures becomes a part of the general pattern of controlled acculturation. This, however, is only the theory.

In reality there is little evidence that the grand plan for social change is being carried out, or even that there is a means for carrying

177 it out. The attempts by the Soviet regime to cause the Kazakhs to con-
form to their plan are trial and error procedures which sometimes
succeed, sometimes fail. They work where the Kazakhs accept, they
fail where the Kazakhs are able to reject Soviet culture. Where the
Kazakhs accept, it is because they already possessed cultural institutions
similar to those which the Soviet regime wished them to have. The ease
with which the Kazakh family and village organization moved over into
the collective farm structure illustrates this. Both the traditional
Kazakh and the Soviet village and rural family are based on close inter-
[621] nal cooperation; the core population of both the prerevolutionary and
the modern village are kinsmen.

Alternatively, the Kazakhs accept Soviet culture where their native
institutions have been crushed and the Soviet institution simply imposed
from above. An instance of this is the class structure and the govern-
[565] ment structure related to it. The Kazakh ruling class, the hereditary
nobility, was driven out, and the corresponding form of local government
collapsed. It was replaced by the present regime of Soviet functionaries
and the Soviet state structure within which they take their places. It
seems generally true that the small-scale institutions of the steppe
[182] peoples such as family and kinship are stabler, more constant than the
larger ones, such as state and empire.[1]

The Soviet culture has been rejected by the Kazakhs where no native
customs or institutions existed upon which the new pattern could be
[648] imposed. Thus the Soviet concept of a fraternity of nationalities com-
bined to form the USSR has no place in Kazakh life. The Kazakhs have
had no especially friendly relations with the Russians; on the contrary,
in the 19th century they hated the Russians as colonialists and frequently
rose in revolt against them. At present, relations have not improved;
the Kazakhs have no reason—political, economic, or cultural—to accept
the Russian regime more closely now than they did in the past. If one
finds no evidence today of revolts in Central Asia, it is because Soviet
control over the Kazakhs is far more efficient than that of the Tsars.
And if there were revolts or other expressions of mass unrest, resent-
ment, feelings of injustice, and the like, word of them would not reach
the western world until the Soviet press chose to mention them.

The theory of controlled acculturation remains a theory, the western
formulation of Soviet policy. It is in contrast with the western approach,
[182] which does not conceive of culture in terms of a controlling plan.
Kazakh culture has been disrupted through incorporation into the Soviet
Union; there are gaps in the fabric of their society resulting from the
rapid acculturation. The traditional has not been entirely replaced by
the new. Two reasons may be adduced for this: resistance by the
Kazakhs, and faulty or inadequate planning by the Soviets. The
deficiencies in the planning have tended to increase the degree of
the resistance.

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[1] Krader (77), 1953.

Chapter 4

RELIGION

THE MOSLEM RELIGION AND THE KAZAKHS

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The Turkic peoples of Central Asia—Kazakh, Kirgiz, Uzbek, Kashgarian, Altai-Turk, Taranchi, and Sart—are divided by habitat and occupation regarding their religious practices and beliefs. The city-dwelling Turk and the farming Turk have been under Islamic influence for many centuries; the Turkic cities of Central Asia have been among the great centers of Islamic culture. The herdsmen of the Central Asiatic steppe, on the other hand, are Islamic only in circumscribed aspects of their religious life. There is an interplay between these two divisions, farmers and herders, which deserves careful treatment, for it is of especial significance today.

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No adequate survey of the religion of the Kazakhs has been made. This is unfortunate, for analysis of the various components of Kazakh religion is a complex task and one with profound significance to the purposes of psychological warfare and political understanding. There is a widespread belief among both scholars and laymen that the Kazakhs are Moslems, and should be treated accordingly. The roots of this belief lie in the past, along with certain errors regarding the language of the Kazakhs. About 80 years ago, the Russian Orientalist and political adviser V. Grigoriev, in an article entitled "Russian Policy in Asia," appended to Schuyler's Turkistan, wrote the following:[1]

> "We [Russians] imagined that the Kirghiz [Kazakhs] were the same ethnographically as our Volga Tartars, and therefore for one hundred and twenty years we carried on all our correspondence with them in the Tartar language in the full assurance that we were communicating with them in the native tongue which they fully understood while, in fact, it was exactly the same as writing to Spaniards in Italian. . . . Still worse results followed: another misunderstanding of ours was, that the Kirghiz were Mohammedans, whereas in the last [18th] century they were almost all Shamanists, and a large number of them remain so to this time. At the epoch of their nominal union with Russia only a very few of the Khans and Sultans had a confused idea of the dogmas of Islam and performed some few of its rites. Not a single mosque then existed in the Kirghiz Steppes, not a single mullah performed there the rites of the Mussulman religion, and if since that time the Kirghiz have really become Mussulman to a considerable degree, it is only owing to our taking them for Mussulmans, and to our treating them as such. As incontrovertible proof that the

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[1] Schuyler (110), Vol. 2, 1876, pp. 404-405.

> 177 114 779 Mussulman propaganda in one form or another went into the Kirghiz Steppes from the side of Russia is the circumstance that especially those Kirghiz who live along our lines have become Mussulman, while the old genuine Shamanism is kept up, even at the present time, among those Kirghiz particularly who wander in the neighborhood of Khiva, Bukhara, and what was formerly Khokand, that is, in really Mussulman country."

Grigoriev ascribed too much importance to the weight of Russian intermediation on behalf of Islam, and thus continued the same sort of error he was describing; the Russian authorities greatly overestimated the role of Islam among the Kazakhs, while Grigoriev overestimated the role of the Russians in bringing it to them. Study of the problem of acculturation has made anthropologists today less naive concerning a people's capacity to accept or reject a given element from another culture. However, Grigoriev is correct in recording the error involved in official Russian recognition of Islam as the religion of the Kazakhs. This error is part of a still larger one, that of failing to understand the [171] cultural diversity in Central Asia, a matter which is implied by the error in language mentioned by Grigoriev. The Kazakhs have a different language from the Tartars of European Russia, as well as a different religion, economy, and social organization.

Grigoriev, on the other hand, calls attention to an important distinction regarding the religion of the Kazakhs, or as he calls them, the Kirghiz: [565] Only the ruling strata of Kazakh society had any degree of contact with Islam in the 18th century, when the Russian conquest began. This fact is independently corroborated by A. Bennigsen, who has conducted research among the Kazakh displaced persons of World War II, now living in Paris. Bennigsen writes, "It is only among certain D.P.'s who are descendants of the families of 'feudal bais' that we have observed the survival of the Moslem faith."[1] Only in families of this social class has there been any sort of Moslem tradition or learning.

The Russian empire in the 18th and 19th centuries sought to use the religion of Islam as a bridge into the society and political life of the Kazakhs. A similar tactic has been used repeatedly by the Soviet regime. The results have been negligible. In the words of a modern-day Kazakh [538] poet and novelist, Sabit Mukanov:

> "For many historical reasons, the Kazakh masses took relatively poorly to the religious traditions [of Islam], and the Kazakh woman was not subjected to the yoke of the laws of the Shariat to the same degree that, for instance, the Uzbek women were. The Kazakh women were never veiled; they took part in festivals together with men."[2]

In addition to Mukanov's statement that the Kazakh woman was not put into the harem or otherwise sealed off from the world, as the Moslem [562] woman is supposed to be, other reports indicate that the nomadic woman is notably freer than the woman of the settled villages and cities of Central Asia. This is an important index to the degree of influence which Islam practices have had on the life of the Kazakhs.

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[1] Personal communication.
[2] Mukanov, 1949, p. 5.

Mukanov offers another measure of the impact of Islam in his reference to the Shariat. 177 The Shariat is technically the canonical law of Islam. 114 Unlike the canonical law of western civilization, however, it governs the 779 entire life of the devout Moslem, not merely his relationship to his church. The Shariat governs, in theory, the daily habits of the Moslem, prescribes whom he may or may not marry, and sets forth the entire body of social relations and controls—between master and servant, man and woman, parent and child, ruler and governed. The fact that the very existence of this body of rules of conduct is little known among the nomadic Kazakhs is of great significance. Taken in combination with other less striking bits of evidence, it points to the superficiality of the Kazakhs' adoption of Islam. Although Moslem observance and practice is everywhere more formalized in urban than in rural surroundings, for the nomadic Kazakhs it is not merely less systematic; it is also less important.

KAZAKH FOLK RELIGIONS

At the end of the 19th century a Russian, Poiarkov, traveled among the Kazakhs in the northeast of their domain, in Semirechie in the territory of the Great Horde. [131] He learned that these Kazakhs had not seen a mullah, or Moslem cleric, until some 15 or 20 years before his travels. In the 1890's mullahs were still exceedingly rare among the Kazakhs who lived near the Chinese border. Few Kazakhs knew Moslem prayers, or if they did, only inaccurately; few knew the Koran.

Because he did not overestimate the influence of Islam on the Kazakhs, Poiarkov was able to supply positive details of the religions of these people. [771] He distinguished between two layers, the remains of the old folk religion and an overlay of the new Islamic faith among the literate. The most important of the old beliefs or cults is that centered 769 around the soul of the deceased ancestor, arvak among the Kirgiz, aurak among the Kazakhs. These ancestors represent a strong force among their living descendants and are prayed to and invoked in time of need. The ancestor cult forms an integral part of the traditional social struc- [188] ture of the Kazakhs, built as it is around the genealogy and the preservation of the descent line. However, according to Poiarkov, the cult of [177] ancestors was weakening under the impact of Islam on the one hand and Russian acculturation on the other.

The term shamanism is often mentioned in connection with the 756 Kazakhs. In this religion the leader, or shaman, is ecstatic, hysterical, [158] marked by abnormal behavior (not only according to the standards of western society, but also according to his own); he is considered to be possessed by and have control over the world of the spirits, and by enter- [787] ing into relations with them can use them to his own will. He cures illnesses, has powers of divination, can avert misfortune and the evil eye. For many centuries he has been far in advance of western medicine by recognizing psychosomatic disorders; he concentrates on them, and so

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Poiarkov, 1891, pp. 21-22.

Ibid., pp. 23-28.

756 avoids ailments which his power cannot cure, such as a broken leg. The shaman generally sets himself into a state of trance, in which he projects [774] his soul into the spirit realm and there discovers the secret cause of some human disorder, cattle plague, or whatever problem faces him. The Kazakh shaman, called bagsha, belongs to a hereditary profession. The patrilineal organization of Kazakh society is reflected in this folk religion: "The profession of bagsha is transmitted usually from father to son; this inheritance pattern bears the name of bagshylyk."[1]

756 171 This form of shamanism is widespread among the Turks and the Mongols, where the former have not been absorbed into the world of Islam, or the latter into the world of Buddhism. Kazakh shamanism is connected most intimately with the social organization of the people. [182] The practice of animal sacrifices conducted by the shaman in the case of severe or dangerous disease, the shaman's use of the drum or tambourine (Kazakh dabyl) in his ceremonies, the passing of a shaman's spirits to his son when the shaman dies, are all part of the fabric of Turko-Mongol religion and society, just as is the cult of ancestors. However, the Kazakhs have not lived in a vacuum sealed off from the Moslem [177] world, for they have formed part of ancient empires thoroughly Islamic in faith; the empire of Tamerlane, to which the ancestors of the Kazakhs belonged in the 14th and 15th centuries, was a Moslem empire. The bagsha's spirits are known among the Kazakhs as djinns, a Moslem term for spirits; the bagsha frequently invokes Allah, and the Arabic devil, Shaitan, is accursed and admonished.[2]

177 779 Elements of Islam have thus slipped into the folk religion of the Kazakhs, a process over which the Russians have had no control; Tsarist recognition of Islam was not needed to introduce these elements among the Kazakhs.

For an exact appraisal of the role of Islam among the Kazakhs, another ancient practice must be examined. The Kazakhs have traditionally believed in and made pilgrimages to holy places. [788 778] In Central Asia one finds a vast number of such places, tombs of saints or of other holy men. These tombs, called mazar by the Kazakhs and Kirgiz, stand alone or together with several others within an earthen enclosure which forms a sacred ossuary.[3] Among devout Moslems visits to these places can even replace the pilgrimage to Mecca.

177 In recent years the Soviet regime has been concerned about this practice. The Party Committee of the Pavlodar Region in May 1952 called for strengthening of the natural sciences and of antireligious propaganda, with special reference to a mazar in the Bayan-Aul [778] District, which has existed for many years. The Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan was instructed to put an end to the legends regarding the saint in the tomb. The Academy formed a committee to visit the sepulchre and examine the matter, but the committee limited itself to inscribing certain remarks in the visitor's book beside the tomb. It was denounced by the Party for its lack of effort.[4]

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[1] Castagne (27), 1930, pp. 67-73.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 67-73.
[3] Castagne (29), 1951, pp. 46-50.
[4] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 24 May 52.

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EVALUATION OF ISLAM IN SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN

The folk religion of the Kazakhs has formed a distinct block to the process of Sovietization. This does not mean that Islam among the Kazakhs is regarded as a key threat by the Soviet regime, but it can be said that the folk religion of the Kazakhs, including certain elements which that religion shares with Islam, is dangerous to the Soviets.

One may gain a clearer perspective by contrasting the situation regarding antireligious propaganda in Kazakhstan with that in Uzbekistan. Islam is singled out in the press of Soviet Uzbekistan as a central heresy. When Osman Yusupov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party, reported to the Party's 10th Congress, a large part of his report dealt with the problem of Islam among the Uzbeks. His statement concluded with a resolution to "battle against the Moslem religion."[1] A similar report given to the Fifth Kazakh Party Congress in 1951 by Shaiakhmetov, then first secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Party, made no mention of Islam as a danger in Soviet Kazakhstan.[2] At about the same time Shaiakhmetov, in a report on ideological work presented to the 88th Plenum of the Central Committee in Kazakhstan, devoted himself to the various deviations from the Party line—bourgeois nationalism, xenophobia, autonomism, idealization of the feudal past, and so forth. Again there was no mention of Islam.[3]

On the other hand the sedentary Turkic and Central Asiatic populations of Kazakhstan, such as the Uigurs and the Dungans, are repeatedly attacked for "Islamic survivals." The following attacks on religious heresies in Kazakhstan were printed in Kazakhstankaia Pravda in a little more than a year:

12 March 1952	–Article on the religious survivals (polygamy) in the Kurdai District, Dzhambul Region (a district inhabited by Dungans).
12 March 1952	–Critique of the religious mentality in South Kazakhstan Region.
14 March 1952	–Article on the religious survivals among the Dungans of Dzhambul Region.
25 March 1952	–Article denouncing the survival of the feudal mentality among the Komsomols (Young Communists) of Chimkent.
21 May 1952	–Account of the work of the Congress of Scientific Establishments convoked by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Kazakhstan, in Alma-Ata. This Congress denounced the survival of religious activity in the Kzyl-Orda and Pavlodar regions.
6 July 1952	–Article denouncing the survivals of such Islamic institutions as the harem and the sequestration of women among the Dungans of Kurdai District, Dzhambul Region.
19 September 1952	–Attack on the persistance of the Islamic tradition among the Dungans of the Kurdai District, Dzhambul Region.

[1] *Kizil Uzbekistan*, 2 Mar 49.
[2] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 16 Dec 51.
[3] *Ibid.*, 28 Oct 51.

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4 March 1952	—At the Sixth Congress of the Kazakh Komsomol, the regional committees of South Kazakhstan, Dzhambul, Kzyl-Orda, and Alma-Ata regions, were denounced for failing to combat inequalities in female education.
7 July 1953	—Article of similar tenor on the Kzyl-Orda Region.
2, 3, and 4 April 1953	—Komsomol Congress. Again survivals of traditional religion are denounced with reference to Kzyl-Orda, Dzhambul, and South Kazakhstan regions.

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All the regions cited in which the religious issue has been raised lie in the southern part of Kazakhstan, with the exception of the one case noted for Pavlodar, in the north. The south is the zone of sedentary agricultural tradition, heavily Islamicized for many centuries. Moreover, in many regions of the south there is a large Uzbek population.

Even if Grigoriev's account of the lack of Islamic influence in the southern part of the Kazakh steppe was true for his day, this situation no longer exists. Tsarist and Soviet policies have combined the Uzbeks with the Kazakhs for administrative purposes, and cultural interaction between these two peoples has increased in the past century. As a result, more of Islam has appeared among the Kazakhs in the south than in the center or the north, a reversal of the trend described by Grigoriev.

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The policy of political combination on an ever-increasing scale has also been applied to the Kazakhs in the religious domain. As a consequence, Kazakh representatives have appeared at official Soviet-Moslem congresses sponsored by Moscow, and they occupy a high place in the Moslem religious administration. The world of Islam within the USSR is divided into four regional administrations under the supreme presidency of the grand Mufti-al-Islam, whose seat is in Ufa, the capital of Soviet Bashkiria. The present incumbent is the Grand Mufti Abderrahman Rasulayev. The four regional administrations are:[1]

(1) The Spiritual Directorate of the Sunni Moslems of the RSFSR, at Ufa, Bashkir ASSR.
(2) The Spiritual Directorate of the Sunni Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, at Tashkent, Uzbek SSR.
(3) The Spiritual Directorate of the Sunni Moslems of the North Caucasus, at Bunaisk, Dagestan ASSR.
(4) The Spiritual Directorate of the Shia Moslems and the Moslems of all Transcaucasia, at Baku, Azerbaijan SSR.

The second of the spiritual directorates listed governs the religious community of Islamic Central Asia; its territory comprises Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Tadzkikistan. Its mufti, who ranks together with the three other regional Moslem chiefs directly under the Grand Mufti in Ufa, is Ishan Babakhan, and Uzbek; the second in command in Soviet Central Asia, directly under Mufti Ishan, is the Kadi Abdulgaffar Shemsuddinov, a Kazakh.[2]

The Moslem Administration of the Soviet Union has convoked a series of congresses whose timing is of great interest. A congress of all Islamic peoples of the Soviet Union was convened under the chairmanship

[1] Bennigsen (11), 1952, pp. 12-13.
[2] *L'Oriente Moderno* (87), 1949, p. 11; *Islamic Review* (69), April 1949, pp. 50-51.

of Grand Mufti Abderrahman Rasulayev in June 1942; it called upon the world of Islam to cooperate in the defeat of Nazism.[7] The most recent of the congresses was convoked in May 1952 to denounce American agression in Korea.[8] 648 779

The policy of expediency and opportunism which has motivated the Soviet manipulation of the Islamic peoples within its borders need not be discussed here. Activities of the Islamic hierarchy have been permitted and supported only when they have served the interests of the Soviet regime. Of greater significance is the error of hyperorganization into which the Soviet regime has fallen. It has in effect perpetuated the error of the Tsarist regime, exposed by Grigoriev, with regard to the Kazakhs and the Kirgiz. Congresses are convoked by rubber stamp to denounce that which Moscow denounces. And the membership and representation of these congresses are augmented by rubber stamp to lend the force of greater numbers to their resolutions. Thus age-old errors are carried forward into the second half of the 20th century. 177 648 779

In summary, then, the religion of the Kazakhs is an amalgam of aboriginal shamanism with certain borrowings from Islam among the folk cults. Since Islam in Central Asia is the religion of the sedentary farmers and the urban societies, the Kazakhs have not had very much direct contact with it, except perhaps for those among the ruling strata of Kazakh khans and sultans. Both the Tsarist and the Soviet regimes have mistakenly grouped the Kazakh nomads in the general category of Central Asiatic Moslems. Although this administrative policy may eventually result in the full incorporation of the Kazakhs into the Islamic world of Central Asia, such is far from the case today. The Pan-Islam movement, working toward the unification of all Islamic peoples, has had small visible effect on the Kazakhs. Interviews conducted in Paris, Munich, and Istanbul among Kazakh DP's point clearly to the lack of contact between the Kazakh herdsmen and Islamic influences in the 1940's. The Soviet regime sometimes adds the denunciation of "Pan-Islamicist" in the round of attack on a political heretic, but it does so by mechanical rote, drawing upon the general armament of the propagandist and the agitator. Rarely is a specific charge made against a Kazakh deviationist; never does the Kazakh press consider it necessary to root out the ideology of Pan-Islam among Kazakhs, although such is frequently the Soviet attitude toward other peoples of Soviet Central Asia. [771]

NATIVISM

Nativism, as a religious development among people who have felt the impact of western civilization, has begun to receive considerable attention in recent anthropological literature.[9] In many parts of the world, natives have reacted to contact with the western culture by rejecting it 121 668

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[7] Syrie (83), 23 Jun 42; *L'Oriente Moderno* (87), 1942, p. 372.

[8] Bennigsen (11), 1952.

[9] One of the sharpest formulators and most extensive contributors to the theory was the late Ralph Linton.

121 668 and seeking a revival of their own native culture. They frequently do this by attributing a mystical power to their aboriginal culture and selecting from it elements to serve as a source of strength in their present battle with the western world. These elements then become combined with features of western culture. The general term nativism has been used to describe this pattern of cultural development. The concept is applicable to many contemporary situations; the Celtic revival in Wales and Ireland may be regarded as a revivalistic form of nativism, and certain elements in the foundation of the state of Israel belong under the same heading.

Although the symbols and professed aims of nativistic movements are cultural and political in nature, their primary motivating force is essentially religious. Despite their frequent lack of purposeful organization, nativistic movements can have great strength; they are born of desperation and fed by a fervor much like that which characterizes messianic religions. Frequently, in fact, the leaders become in effect messiahs; in other cases the revered figures of the movement are heroes of the past.

668 Nativism among the Kazakhs has followed the latter course, focusing on the mythical ancestors and later heroes of Kazakh history. During the period 1916-1922, a nativistic political movement arose in what is today Kazakhstan (at that time Kirgizia). This movement—the Alash-Orda—was not a political party in the strict sense of the term, although it undertook a broad range of political activities, within the European frame of meaning; it supplied a leadership and ideology to a movement seeking the cultural as well as the political unification of the Kazakh nomads. The general chaos on the steppes of Asia after the collapse of Tsarism and before the solidification of the Soviet rule provided the opportunity for such a movement. In those years, the nascent era of the Soviet regime, Moscow was involved in revolution and civil war, and had little time or manpower to spare for the integration of Central Asia into Bolshevik-Leninism. In fact, Moscow reacted in a vaguely friendly way to the Alash-Orda since it too was antagonistic to Tsarism. For a brief moment, it appeared to the members of the Kazakh political movement that Moscow would supply the means for the liberation of the Kazakhs.

The Alash-Orda had no specific political program other than urging itself as the representative of the Kazakh people. It made no real effort toward political separatism from the Russian regime; possibly it felt that this would come naturally, or that the time was not yet ripe and the leaders themselves not far enough advanced politically to call for such a move. The general slogan, the name Alash-Orda, under which these Kazakh leaders and intellectuals sought to unify their people, reflects their desire for unity as a people.

The Orda is the horde, the broad organizational unit of Kazakh society, which in recent centuries had known no unity, but only a division into three and later four separate hordes. The name represents the revival of a social and political organization from the distant past of the Kazakhs. Even the smaller hordes had but little meaning for the Kazakhs after the middle of the 19th century. And the unification of all

Kazakhs in one horde under one political government had not been realized since the 15th century, except for a brief adventure in unification by Khan Tiavka at the end of the 17th century. 668

The term Alash recalls even more ancient days, for it refers to the mythical founder of all Kazakhdom, the ancestor of all Kazakhs, Alash, or Alach. [773] The figure of Alash is not a fiction; he lived in the era of the emperor Tamerlane, near the end of the 14th century. According to the tale recorded in the 19th century of the origin of the Kazakh people, the descendants of Alash divided into three hordes, which in turn formed the basis for the social organization which existed on the eve of the Russian conquest.[8] "Alash" became first a Kazakh battle cry, evoking the name [926] of their glorious ancestry, and finally the name of their first political party.

During the 1920's those leaders of the Alash-Orda who were not 648 purged were gradually absorbed into the Soviet Party and civil life; 668 some of them, Tynyshpaev, Baitursunov, and Bukeikhanov, became active [204] journalists and scholars under the Soviets. They continued to "glorify" the Kazakh past, and were roundly denounced for this by Soviet propagandists. The issue which aroused Soviet disapproval was their representation of the Kazakh community as a sort of idyllic, primitive communism, in which each man helped his neighbor, rich and poor sharing alike. This doctrine was inacceptable to the Soviets of the 1930's, for the line had now become that the Kazakh village was torn with class strife between exploiter and exploited. In the course of this controversy, the old Alash-Orda leaders were purged and liquidated, in a severe struggle which was still going on as late as 1934.[9]

There were companion movements to the Alash-Ordists of Kazakhstan among other people of Central Asia. At the time of the Russian Revolution the political development among the Turks of southern Turkestan and the Caucasus bore the name of Basmachi, while that among the Turks of the southern Urals was known as the Bashkurd (the Bashkir name for themselves); among the Tartars of the Volga region the movement was called the Idil-Ural (Idil or Itil or Idel is an old Turkic name for the Volga River), and a similar movement in Uzbekistan and neighboring areas was known as the Djadid. Some of these movements were markedly and avowedly oriented toward foreign sources.

The Basmachi, for example, geographically close to Turkey, had a strong pro-Turkish orientation, or rather, it endorsed Pan-Turanianism more strongly than the other movements, and this brought it closer to the Turks of Turkey. The Pan-Turanian movement advocates the political unification of all Turks under one state and government, which would stretch from China to European Turkey and the Balkans; it involves open propaganda for separation of Turkestan from Russia. This doctrine is therefore a sensitive subject in Moscow, and the cause of some tension. It was and is a far more dangerous threat than was the Alash-Orda; the strongest Soviet denunciation of the Alash-Ordists is that they were connected with Pan-Turanianism through the Basmachi. Actually, there

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[8] Valikhanov, 1904, pp. 299-300.

[9] For a summary, see Togzhanov, 1934, passim.

648 668 is little evidence of contact between the Alash-Orda and the Basmachi, at least at the beginning of the 1920's. But of late the various movements have become combined in the minds of the survivors, and this integration is attributed by them to the past of 30 years ago. Among the most active in this connection is Zeki Walidi Togan, a Turkic historian, now in Turkey, and once a leader in these movements.

The Kazakh revivalists were actively sought out and suppressed by the Soviet regime in the late twenties and early thirties. However, when the USSR was attacked by Germany, Moscow sought to use all tactics at its disposal to encourage the peoples in the Soviet Union to resist Hitler. One such tactic was the encouragement of local cultural traditions among the various peoples, the creation of a native pride which they might fight to preserve. The Kazakhs were encouraged to develop their own history, with the sole proviso that the Soviet era be depicted as the culminating point in their development. This policy was related to the previously cited theory which viewed Tsarism as the lesser evil to Turkestan's being swallowed up by the English, the Germans, or the Chinese. The Soviet policy during World War II produced a great revival of Kazakh in-group feeling, centered around the glorification of Kazakh heroes of the past. Since the Kazakhs had developed their own historical studies [814] during the past century, a process which was accelerated in the Soviet period, the movement to popularize Kazakh heroes and their deeds was turned over to the historians.

Khan Kenesary Kasymov was much written about, discussed, and praised; his name became a popular byword among the Kazakhs in the 1940's, after a century of oblivion. One Kazakh historian, Gabidullah Bekmakhanov, wrote a full-length history of Kenesary's activities against the Russians; this work, prepared as a doctoral dissertation in 1943, was published in 1947 in Alma-Ata. An official history of Kazakhstan written by Abdykalykov, a Kazakh, and the nominal co-author Pankratova (who since has become president of the Historical Section of the All-Union Academy of Sciences) likewise assigned a great and positive historical role to Kenesary. Other pronouncements of the period were less temperate; Sharipov, a Kazakh historian writing in 1949, pictured Kenesary as the prime national liberator. Two professors of history, Ismailov and Djumaliev, took the same line, the latter in a history book written for Kazakh school children.

The movement sought other heroes in the Kazakh past, especially those who had been active against the Russians: Batyr Srym was presented as a heroic figure by his official biographer, Viatkin; the historical significance of Isatai Taimanov, a rebel or liberator of the middle of the 19th century, was advanced by one Shakhmatov; an obscure figure who led a revolt among the Kazakhs of the Syr-Darya against the Russians, Batyr Djankhodji Nurmuhammed, was described by T. Shoinbaev.

The historical tradition which developed was clearly Kazakh, the result of the Kazakhs' search for a native expression of their own, the recreation of a tradition which had lain dormant for several decades.

Kazakh nativism as a broad movement with a politico-religious
668 orientation has taken the form of a many-faceted cultural revival. The

choice of the figure Alash, the founding ancestor of Kazakhdom, reflects 668
the general structure of Kazakh society. In reviving its cultural heritage, a society established on the principle of patrilineal descent and organized according to carefully traced genealogies naturally would seek to re-emphasize those genealogies and to glorify the founding ancestors, whether mythical, fictional, or actual. Mythical Alash was not, at least [113]
not entirely, for he lived in the time of Tamerlane. It is not clear that he is the ancestor of all Kazakhs, or even of all Kazakhs of the "white-bone" or nobility. He is the founding ancestor of all Kazakhs by a convenient fiction, a fiction which includes the descent lines of the nobles, for only a few of the nobility can demonstrate an actual descent from Alash. Nevertheless, he counts as the ancestor of all, and as such he enters the shadowy domain of half-myth, half-history, which suits the temper of the present Kazakh traditionalism admirably.

Descent from a wolf and a doe is no longer an acceptable expression for one's lineage; the world of the steppe has become disenchanted. But [114]
a great historical figure out of the past—distant enough and glorious enough—is a suitable expression of the Kazakh quest for social, political, and cultural unity. The emergence of Alash as a battle cry, the invoking of a distant ancestor in the formation of a modern party, is a Kazakh solution peculiarly their own. The concern of the Kazakh historians of the 1940's with similar figures, in this instance the leaders of resistance to the Russian conquest, emerges from the same cultural theme, with certain additions. The figures of the 19th century Kazakh rebels, Kenesary, Srym, Taimanov, and the others, are ancestors taken from the past. They are the ancestors of many descent lines whose living members are conscious of the relationship; they are symbols of an anti-Russian movement.

Chapter 5

ECONOMY

TRADITIONAL PATTERN OF KAZAKH ECONOMY

233 The traditional economy of the Kazakhs is herding, the raising of
cattle, horses, camels, and, numerically the most important, sheep and
goats. Settled life is despised, farming is despised. Herding is a
nomadic way of life, but this does not mean indiscriminate wandering
over the face of the earth. In the past, when all Kazakhs were nomads,
[221] each herding community had its fixed pattern of grazing, starting in
the spring from the winter quarters, traveling to pastures where they
spent the summer, then returning over the same path to the winter
[221] quarters again. Each community had its own territory for grazing and
camping, and would fight off any intruder. Communities camped in
closer proximity to each other—making for greater density of population—where there was more water and grass for the herds.[1]

The most favorable area for herding, with regard to the availability
233 of plant cover and water, is in the northern part of the Kazakh steppe.
177 Unfortunately, this part of the steppe is precisely the zone which is
able to support a small amount of agriculture, and it was here that the
Russians and Ukrainians settled in the 19th century. As a result the
Kazakhs, in a period when their population was increasing, were thrust
back on a more limited territory, away from the grassy steppe, away
from the river and lake shores favored by the Slavs for agriculture,
away from the water courses in northeastern Kazakhstan where mining,
as well as agriculture, had been instituted. The steppe which remained
to them was of poorer quality, for herding or for any other subsistence economy.

178 Faced with the problem of sustaining a herding economy with more
of their number on less and poorer land, the Kazakhs began to take up
241 agriculture. The first to go over to the new way were the poor, the
565 marginal herders. The rich, of course, continued their pastoralism,
hiring the poor to work for them. Out of this emerged a new pattern of
mixed herding and farming. During the latter part of the 19th century,
crops were planted at the winter quarters, and tended by the poor
Kazakhs and by women, while the wealthier able-bodied men went off
with the herds in the more honored occupation.

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[1] For a detailed description of the Kazakh nomadic pattern, see Rudenko in Baranov, 1927.

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The farming which the Kazakhs now employ was not the typical Central Asiatic Turkic farming, with intensive soil exploitation by artificial irrigation; it was the farming brought to them from Eastern Europe by the Russians and the Tatars (Turks of European Russia). The crops, chiefly grains, and the implements were European.[1]

The Soviets have sought to settle the native populations, and have devised grandiose schemes to transform the steppe desert, such as the Bet-Pak-Dala, into fertile paradises. They have failed to settle the Kazakhs and Kirgiz, and to increase the area under cultivation, despite the perspectives originally held out in the 1930's.[2] They have failed to turn the deserts into ploughlands, despite their plans. The plan to transform the Bet-Pak-Dala has been abandoned, at least temporarily, and the region has been permitted to return to the herding economy.[3] One factor in these reversals is the economic orientation of the Kazakhs, to whom agriculture is a lowly pursuit.

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Such then is the subsistence pattern which the Kazakhs brought with them into the Soviet period. This period begins not with the year 1917 but more accurately in 1928; the intervening decade was an era of transition, to some extent of laissez faire, in which the Kazakhs were left to their own devices. The transitional period came to an abrupt end with the beginning of forced collectivization.

ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN THE SOVIET PERIOD

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The labor force of Kazakhstan is divided into three broad categories, agriculture, herding, and industry.

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In agriculture, the grain crops are raised by all nationalities of the republic. Russians and Ukrainians in the north and northeast grow cereals along rivers and lakes within the black-earth area of agriculture; rice is grown by Uzbeks in the south, and by Uigurs and Dungans close to the Chinese border in the east. Kazakhs raise grains for human consumption as well as for livestock feed in the central areas, sandwiched in between the Slavs to the north and the Uzbeks to the south. The Russians and Ukrainians raise a certain amount of livestock feed for their draft horses and milk cows. The potato and vegetable farming is done largely by Slavs in the vicinities of the larger cities, such as Karaganda, Alma-Ata, and Balkhash-Kounradskiy. Cotton and other nonsubsistence crops are raised largely by Uzbeks who live in the southern districts, and by Uigurs in the Ili River valley.

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Pastoralism is the virtual monoploy of Kazakhs. That they were herders in the past has already been established; more significant for the present is the fact that the areas of highest pastoral productivity in Kazakhstan are also the areas in which the Kazakhs represent the highest proportion of the population. The region of Guryev, for example, is one of the three leading pastoral regions of the republic: its population

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[1] Kaufman, 1908, passim.
[2] Sakharov, 1934.
[3] Beredin, 1946.

KN 233 K [131] KN [161] includes one of the highest Kazakh proportions, more than 68 per cent.[1] Also, the regions where the Kazakhs are in the greatest majority have the lowest density figures—figures which fall in the herding range, below that found in farming areas.

K KN 463 464 In industry, Russians occupy a predominant position, seconded by Ukrainians. The Kazakhs play only a tertiary role in industry and in transport. Examination of honors lists shows that the proportion of Kazakhs among the recipients of honors in industry is far lower than the proportion of Kazakhs in the population of their republic. The Kazakhs are not participating to the extent of their population strength in the industrial and transport development. They are not learning the skilled crafts of industrialization which would possibly recompense them for having had their herding lands taken away from them. This does not necessarily mean that they are being discriminated against, although this is a possible explanation. A second possibility is that the Kazakhs themselves are not coming forward to be trained, that they withdraw from the Soviet scheme of things and wish to have no part of it. They do not have the background in technical culture to develop a skilled labor force on their own.

K 562 464 KN [463] Consideration of the division of labor by sex provides another perspective to this problem. The honors lists and lists of female workers in railroad journals (Turksib, organ of the Railroad workers of Kazakhstan) reveal how few Kazakh women there are in these fields. For instance, during World War II not a single Kazakh women was mentioned in the railroad field, despite the drawing away of men to the war. Rewards for building the Mointy-Chu line went to 46 Russians and Ukrainians, of whom 11 were women, and to 17 Turks, of whom one was a woman.[2] K [463] In the more highly advanced fields, such as the finance and credit system, there is an even more pronounced absence of Turks (Kazakhs) and especially of Turkic women. Medalists in the Alma-Ata region in the finance and credit field in 1953 were distributed as follows by nationality and sex:[3]

	Slavic	Turkic	Germanic	Korean
Men	16	3	1	2
Women	36	2	1	0

There were no Turkic names among the 39 scientific workers of the KSSR who received medals; 38 were Slavic, one Germanic.[4]

K 562 Again one must be careful to distinguish among the several factors which contribute to this state of affairs. On the one hand there is the picture of general nonparticipation by Kazakhs in Soviet developments. The situation of Kazakh women is made worse by their age-old position; women in Kazakh society have always had specified tasks to perform, and have taken their place behind the male leaders. The question of

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[1] *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia*, Vol. 13, 1952.
[2] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 30 Oct and 1 Nov 53.
[3] *Ibid.*, 18 Nov 53.
[4] *Ibid.*, 19 Nov 53.

K 562 KN [563]

female backwardness has not yet been overcome. The Kazakh women are not moving in the direction of Soviet goals at a pace with the rest of society; they are as far behind the men in this matter as the Kazakh men are behind the Slavic peoples of Kazakhstan in accepting the Soviet way of life.

K [474] KN [474]

The place of Kazakh women in the economy is in the farming sector and in specific aspects of herding, primarily as milkmaids. In fact, they are the basic labor force of the collective farms. In the chapter on Kazakh social organization some of the ramifications of this division of labor were examined. The fact in the economic picture remains as one Soviet authority has put it: "The greater proportion of the 233 kolkhoz members capable of work are women. Women are now the basic labor force in the kolkhozy of Kazakhstan generally. This is accounted for first of all by the increasing role of women in kolkhoz production, and also by the greater number of men leaving the kolkhoz for industry, transport, the cities, the Soviet administration, schooling, etc."[1]

KN [369]

A broad conclusion from the survey of urbanization as a worldwide phenomenon indicates that men proceed to the cities first, and are followed by women after a time lag which may extend over years. The Soviet Union's urbanization pattern is no exception. Women are the basic labor force in rural areas in the Soviet Union generally, and there has been a flight of men from the farms. In Kazakh society there is the additional factor of the unwillingness of men to take up farming. Although the women are the basic rural labor force, they are underrepresented in farm leadership, from brigade leaders to collective farm presidents. This same pattern will emerge from study of the figures for literacy, higher education, and Party work: nonparticipation of Kazakh women, or participation at a lower rate than among men.

AGRICULTURE

KN 241

Agriculture in present-day Kazakhstan falls roughly into four categories:

(1) Grain
(2) Truck farming
(3) "Technical crops," including cotton, sugar beets, hemp, olives, tea, and tobacco
(4) Farming in conjunction with herding, with emphasis on livestock feed

Most of the cultivated land is in grain for human and animal consumption, as shown in Table 3.

The total area under cultivation in Kazakhstan increased in the decade 1942-52 by 4,000,000 hectares or 36 per cent. The area in grain increased by only 19 per cent, and the proportion of the total area in grain fell from 93 to 73 per cent. This drop is accounted for by the increase in area devoted to truck farming (largely a wartime development) and to a lesser degree by an increase in "technical crops." The

[1] Kabo, 1950, p. 71.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Kazakhstan RQ1

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Table 3

AGRICULTURE IN KAZAKHSTAN[a]

Area	1942[b]	1952-53[c]
Total rural area[d]	ND	80,000,000
Total area under cultivation	7,000,000	11,000,000
Percentage of total rural area		13.7%
Area in grain	6,500,000	8,000,000
Percentage of total area under cultivation	93%	73%
Area under irrigation	ND	3,000,000[e,f]
Irrigated area under cultivation	ND	1,300,000[f]
Percentage of area under irrigation		43%

[a] All figures are in hectares; one hectare equals 2.47 acres.

[b] Figures from *Kazakhstan v pervyi god . . . ,* 1948.

[c] Figures from *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda,* 9 Sep 52 and 14 Nov 53.

[d] Pastureland, hay meadows, and ploughland.

[e] Compared to 2,600,000 in 1917; *Alimov* in *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda,* 8 Oct 53, and Shakhshin, 1949, page 21.

[f] Based only on 1953 figures.

ND: No data available.

3,000,000 hectares under irrigation in 1953 represented an increase of 400,000 in the Soviet period, according to Shakhshin. However, only 43 per cent of the total irrigated area was in use.

KN 243 The grain is primarily wheat and millet, grown in the northern and northeastern parts of the country, where Slavs (Great-Russians and Ukrainians) are in the majority. Here the black earth and the river valleys enable them to continue their traditional patterns of agriculture. Rice is grown in the irrigated tracts of the southern districts of Kazakhstan (Syr-Darya Valley) by a population largely Uzbek, and in the southeastern districts (Ili River Valley) by a mixed population including Uigurs, Dungans, and Koreans.

KN 244 474 [311] The Soviet policy developed during and since the war regarding truck farming has been to establish a system of state farms (sovkhoz) around the urban centers. The cities of Karaganda, Balkhash, Kounradskiy, Dzhezkazgan, and others are surrounded by belts of farms which produce potatoes and vegetables. In addition, they supply the cities with dairy products, beef, mutton, and pork. K [262] Pork, potatoes, and vegetables are Russian dietary staples; Kazakhs by tradition have never raised and eaten these items.

The truck farming is a feature of farm organization which developed during World War II, when mining and ore-processing centers and industrial plants increased their capacities and manpower. KN [167] Workers were sent to Kazakhstan from European Russia and to these migrants were added people from rural Kazakhstan. To meet the task of feeding these groups, the state-farm system was developed. In addition, urban workers were encouraged to maintain kitchen gardens for themselves. KN 241 369 There are no data on Kazakhstan as a whole in this category; some information is available for the city of Karaganda, however, and there is no reason to think that this city differed from others in Kazakhstan. In Karaganda approximately 8,000 workers maintained kitchen gardens at the beginning of World War II; the number reportedly increased "by several times" by 1943. At the beginning of the war, the proportion of persons making kitchen gardens in Karaganda—4.7 per cent—was two and a half times higher than that for the USSR as a whole. But Karaganda's percentage was soon surpassed by that of the Soviet Union, which by 1944 had mounted to about 10 per cent, five and a half times the prewar rate.[1] KN 241 369

The third category of agricultural products includes fiber crops (cotton and hemp), vegetable oil crops (sunflower and olive—dried sunflower seeds are a favored Russian and Asiatic snack), tea, tobacco, and sugar beets. These crops are collectively called "technical crops" in the Soviet Union, because they are processed by techniques other than milling for the production of flour. Together with rice they are grown mostly in southern and southeastern Kazakhstan, where the original Turkic population has an age-old agricultural tradition, especially in irrigated farming. In 1938 there were 110,200 hectares in cotton and 14,000 hectares in sugar beets.[2] KN 248 249

The final category, that of agriculture in conjunction with herding, has become the typical Kazakh rural occupation. The trend toward a mixed economy of herding and farming which began in the 19th century under the combined influences of land pressure and diffusion of agricultural techniques has culminated in the virtual elimination of pure nomadism among the Kazakhs. KN 241 K [178] K [221]

The principal unit of agriculture in Kazakhstan is the collective farm. The peak years in the period of forced and accelerated collectivization were 1930 and 1931; the number of collective farms rose in those years from 4,212 to 7,800.[3] By 1932, the resistance of the rural population began to make itself felt, and there was a falling off in the number of collectives, coupled with a consolidation of those already organized. But the number gradually mounted during the mid-thirties, again reaching a figure greater than 7,000.[4] Just before World War II, with more purges and a second drive toward consolidation, the number dropped. In 1952 approximately 3,200 were reported[5]; this figure is said to be less than half that of 1950, for which no numerical data are available. This was part of an over-all cut; in 1951, the number of collective farms in the Soviet Union was halved. KN 474

In recent years, collective farms in Kazakhstan have decreased in number and increased in size. The latest figure for the total number of such farms is 3,145. At the same time, the average number of cooperative farming units per farm increased from 91 to 186. The total number of these cooperative units decreased from 5,558 to 2,047 in Kazakhstan, while the average size of the collective farms increased.[6]

To complete the picture, there were roughly 200 state farms at the end of the thirties; 258 were reported in 1952.[7] Five Machine Tractor

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[1] All data from Borodin, 1946, p. 59.
[2] *Kazakhskaia SSR*, pp. 62, 70.
[3] *Kazakhstan v Tsifrakh . . . .* p. 66.
[4] *Kazakhskaia SSR*, p. 18.
[5] *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1952, No. 2, p. 50.
[6] *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1952, No. 2, p. 111.
[7] *Kazakhskaia SSR*, p. 56, and *Kazakhstan v pervyi god . . . ,* p. 158.

8;Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

KN 414 stations (MTS) were listed in 1930; this number had grown to approximately 300 in 1939, and to 376 in 1952.[1]

KN [162] In 1939, when the total population of Kazakhstan was given by the census as 6,146,000 persons, 72.3 per cent (4,440,000) lived in rural areas and 27.7 per cent in urban areas. In the following year, it was reported that 97.5 per cent of the farm population was enrolled in collective farms, and 2.5 per cent in other units.[2] The ratio has since changed, for there has been an increase in the number of state farms, Machine Tractor stations, and Machine Livestock stations. No numerical breakdown of the enrollments in the various agricultural units since 1940 is available.

LIVESTOCK

K KN 231 There have been extreme fluctuations in the total number of livestock in Kazakhstan during the Soviet period (see Tables 4 and 5). The 36,000,000 head of stock reported for 1917 indicates that this was a fairly good year for the Kazakh herders, despite the Kazakh revolution of the preceding year. But by 1924 the total number of stock had dropped by 46 per cent—a loss attributable to the conditions attending the Russian Revolution and civil war. During the next five years the herds gradually recovered until in 1927 and 1929 they exceeded their 1917 strength. This was the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the Soviet Union, which permitted a moderate amount of private economic interest.

With the onset of forced collectivization in 1930, the number of livestock began to drop rapidly; by 1933, it had fallen to approximately 12 per cent of the 1929 high. Throughout the rest of the 1930's the number of livestock slowly rose, but it was still far below the figures for the late twenties. The number of livestock in Kazakhstan today is difficult to assess, since only scattered data are available on developments during and since World War II.

During the Soviet period the number of cattle has increased relative to the over-all stock total. Since the beginning of the herd recovery in 1924, cattle have constituted more than 20 per cent of the total number of livestock; in 1938, the last year for which such figures are available, they formed 33 per cent of the total. Cattle generally form only 10 to 15 per cent of the total herd strength of a purely nomadic economy; sheep are the most important animal to the nomad (Table 6 gives the internal proportions of the herds of three different Kazakh groups in the 19th century).

K [241] This increase in the proportion of cattle among Kazakh livestock reflects an increase in agriculture. By 1938, cattle had recovered to approximately 40 per cent of their 1927 high, a rate of recovery double that shown by horses, sheep, and goats. A second effect of the growth of agriculture and the cities was that the number of camels and steppe horses decreased in proportion to the number of draft horses.

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[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda.*

[2] *Kazakhskaia SSR*, p. 12.

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Table 4

LIVESTOCK TRENDS IN KAZAKHSTAN
(In Thousands)

Year[a]	Total Livestock	Cattle	Sheep	Goats	Horses[b]	Camels	Hogs
1917	36,000	ND	ND	ND	ND	ND	ND
1924	19,400	4,750	11,400		2,500	400	300
1925	26,100	5,400	11,500	1,900	2,800	600	400
1926	30,700	6,400	15,500	2,700	3,400	700	400
1927	38,200	7,850	20,000	5,000	3,700	1,200	500
1928	33-35,000	7,700	20,500		3,900	ND	ND
1929[c]	40,400	7,400	21,900	5,300	4,200	1,200	300
1930[c]	32,000	5,700	18,000	4,400	3,600	1,100	160
1933	5,000	1,600	2,700		460	ND	ND
1934	6,000	1,900	3,300		420	ND	140
1935	7,000	2,300	4,100		460	ND	ND
1938	9,500	3,100	(5,300)[d]		640	100	370
1949	ND	ND	15,000	ND	ND	ND	ND
1953	ND	ND	15,000	ND	ND	ND	ND

[a] 1917–1926: *Voshchinin*, p. 47.
1927–1930: *Padnek and Pavlov*, pp. 37-38.
1933–1935: *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo*, 1936; *Kazakhstan v Tsifrakh . . .*, p. 72.
1938: *Kazakhskaia SSR*, pp. 18, 20, 35, 41, 44.
1949: *Lavrov*, p. 9.
1953: Khrushchev, *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 25 Oct 53.

[b] Figures through 1926 refer to steppe or nomad horses; steppe and nomad horses combined for 1927-1938.

[c] Spring.

[d] Estimated figure.

ND: No data available.

Table 5

STEPPE AND DRAFT HORSES IN KAZAKHSTAN[a]

Year	Steppe Horses	Draft Horses
1924	2,500,000	1,800,000
1925	2,800,000	1,900,000
1926	3,400,000	2,000,000
1928	2,900,000	900,000
1929	3,100,000	1,000,000
1930	2,400,000	850,000
1931	1,500,000	840,000
1932	100,000	600,000
1933	80,000	380,000
1934	70,000	360,000

[a] Voshchinin, 1929, and *Sel'skoe Khoziaistvo USSR*, 1936. Figures do not match totals in Table 4 due to rounding.

Table 6

COMPOSITION OF 19th CENTURY KAZAKH HERDS[a]
(per cent)

Year	Horses	Cattle	Sheep and Goats	Camels
1846[b]	17	11	67	5
1849-1850[c]	13.7	9.5	74	3
1852[c]	10	12	72	6

[a] Figures represent percentage of total livestock.

[b] Obruchev, 1846.

[c] Ivanin, 1864, pp. 11, 40.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2 Kazakhstan RQ1

K KN 231 K [262] The figures for the number of sheep are particularly significant, since this animal is of central importance to the nomad. Mutton is virtually the nomad's only meat; sheep milk is used as much as cow or mare milk. The sheep herds did not recover from the losses of the early 1930's as well as the cattle; by 1949, the number of sheep was 15,000,000, or approximately 68 per cent of the 1929 peak. In 1953, according to a statement made by Khrushchev,[1] secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the number of sheep and goats was significantly less than it had been in 1928, the index year for current Soviet statistics on Kazakh livestock. In 1928, the number of sheep and goats had been 20,500,000, with a ratio of four sheep to one goat; hence there were approximately 16,000,000 sheep. It would appear, then, that the number of sheep has not increased since 1949; it may possibly have decreased.

KN [167] The figures reported for the number of hogs in Kazakhstan provide a useful index of the degree to which Slavic farmers (Russian and Ukrainian) have moved into the republic. The pig is of European origin; it is not native to rural Turkestan and was introduced there only recently. There were 300,000 hogs in Kazakhstan in 1924 and 1929, 500,000 in 1927, and 370,000 in 1938—the only category in which a figure for the 1930's exceeds any of those for the previous decade. K [262] [179] Kazakhs have never eaten pork, partly on religious grounds—it is taboo for Moslems—and partly on traditional grounds. The present-day importance of pork in the KSSR economy is shown by the fact that in 1953 it constituted 53 per cent of the total meat production of the republic.[2]

COLLECTIVIZATION

K 177 648 Of fundamental importance in understanding the Kazakh attitudes toward Sovietization is the impact which collectivization during the late twenties and early thirties had upon these attitudes. During the drive to collectivize the Kazakhs, thousands of families were handed over to the GPU, hundreds of thousands of families starved to death, and further K [167] thousands sought to escape the consequences of being identified as Kazakhs by emigrating or declaring themselves to be Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, or other neighboring peoples. (See Chapter 2.)

During the period of collectivization, the Party leader of the Kazakh republic, F. I. Goloshchekin, made a number of remarkably frank statements. In a series of articles and speeches prepared between 1928 and 1930, he described how collectivization was accomplished. In November 1928, he stated that 657 households were confiscated, and a total of 143,000 cattle units (whereby five sheep equals one head of cattle) were collectivized.[3] In an article two years later he said that a group of 696 households had been confiscated.[4] Another source reveals that some 700 Kazakh households were confiscated in 1929.[5]

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[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 23 Oct 53.
[2] *Ibid.*, 21 Oct 53.
[3] Goloshchekin, 1931, p. 201.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 208.
[5] Kuchkin, 1946.

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The collectivization drive in the 1928-1930 period did not simply confiscate Kazakh households at the rate of 700 a year. In yet another article written during the same period, Goloshchekin summarized the methods used: "Now referring to some of the results of the confiscation, let us look at the methods we used to resolve the question. No doubt the decree [in reconfiscation] was effective here, administrative organs were effective, especially the GPU."[1] If the average per household was no more than five persons, which is a low estimate, there is direct evidence for concluding that in these three years the fates of 10,000 to 12,000 Kazakhs were placed in the hands of the GPU.

Direct evidence stops at this point. One may infer that these people were lost to the Kazakhs, that even if they were not liquidated, they disappeared in the GPU system. One must bear in mind that these are cases which entered into the official record; it is known that a large proportion of cases turned over to the GPU did not become a matter of record. With the year 1930, the era of frankness came to an end. GPU methods intensified, and the period of the mass purge trials began. Trends which had begun in Kazakh family economy now accelerated until the number of livestock began to fall, between 1929 and 1933. The first reports of confiscations and liquidations are given for 1928; the number of livestock fell by three to five million, or about 10 per cent, from the 38,000,000 reported in 1927. In the spring of 1929 there was a recovery to 40,000,000 head of livestock, but from that point the decline was unbroken, to 33,000,000 in 1930, down to 5,000,000 in 1933. [031]

Thus the second phase of the drive to collectivization was immeasurably worse in its human consequences than the initial phase. The first phase was relatively mild, with the arrest of only a few thousand families. The second phase involved an ever-widening circle of resistance to collectivization by the Kazakhs, punishment by the GPU, increased resistance by the Kazakhs, increased activity by the GPU. This struggle is reflected in the livestock picture, for the Kazakhs continued to care for their stock, even in the face of the mass arrests. With increased terror came increased resistance, as the livestock decline reveals. One can safely estimate that liquidations by the GPU during the second phase were many times those of the first phase, which involved 10,000 to 12,000 Kazakhs at the very least.

This period of mass collectivization was accompanied by the elaboration of what Naum Jasny has called "bacchanalian planning," one of the projects being the fertilization of that cruel steppe desert, the Bet-Pak-Dala. In the following decade, the error of investing in agriculture in the Bet-Pak-Dala was finally seen, and its return to use as a marginal herding zone was recommended.[2] The Soviet ecologists and planners had been overly influenced by the number of natural wells and springs in the Bet-Pak-Dala, calculating their utility to agriculture without reference to the water table or to the poverty of the soil in organic matter. The significance of this error during collectivization was that Kazakhs were settled down precisely in these and other such experimental areas. [311]

[1] Goloshchekin, 1931, p. 206.
[2] Borodin 1946, pp. 116-135.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

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The Kazakhs were collectivized more slowly than the Slavs. By 1930, the Pavlodar region, a Slavic farming area since the 19th century, was 76 per cent collectivized while the Guryev region, a Kazakh pastoral region, was only 44 per cent collectivized.[1] Progress on collectivization was slow both because Kazakh herders were among the strongest resisters to collectivization, and because their nomadic existance made the administrative problems in collectivizing them more difficult than for sedentary peoples.

Another indication of the severity of the impact of collectivization on the Kazakhs is seen in the rate of recovery. During the period including World War I, the Revolution, and the civil war, the Kazakhs suffered a number of heavy blows. They had their own revolution in 1916, which resulted in severe reprisals by the Tsarist enforcement agencies, and during 1917-1922 they suffered losses again. But during the 1920's they recovered to a point where the stock total exceeded that of 1917. Such was not the case in the period following collectivization, however; in 1953 the entire herding economy of Kazakhstan had not reached the position which it had attained in any one of the years in the 1927-1930 period. The Kazakhs in the 1920's demonstrated a resiliency and capacity to meet and overcome disasters, a capacity which is part of their very history as herders. Herding is an economy which has few shock absorbers; herders may easily be wiped out by a drought, a blizzard, or disease among their animals. Farmers have an ability to store against future need which the herders do not.

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The Kazakhs showed this resiliency during the first years of the Soviet era, in recovering from the civil war. But they have not recovered, even after 25 years, from collectivization. This loss of capacity to recover in the face of disasters is one indication of the collapse of the traditional Kazakh economy, and is related to a breakdown in the traditional form of the Kazakh society and culture.

THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE RURAL ECONOMY

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In 1952 and 1953, the leadership of the Kazakh Communist Party and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union made a series of statements indicating the grave situation in farming and herding in the republic.

It has already been stated that of three million hectares of land under irrigation, only 1,300,000 hectares, or 43 per cent, were actually in use. Afonov, until recently the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Party, attacked this situation in 1953 as a gross waste of resources.[2] In 1952, the same general criticism had been made in a somewhat different form. The then secretary of the Central Committee, and boss of the Kazakh Party, Shaiakhmetov, attacked the farmers of the southern regions of Kazakhstan, the Uzbeks, Taranchis, Dungans, and others, in Alma-Ata, Taldy-Kurgan, and Dzhambul, the leading agricultural regions of the republic. The principal charge

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[1] Goloshchekin, 1931, p. 211.

[2] Afonov, *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 8 Oct 53.

433 concerned fluctuations in the area sown in sugar beets.[1] Cotton farmers have likewise been criticized for failing to use land available for irrigation, and sunflower and melon growers have come under similar attack.[2] At the end of the 1953 growing season, rice was added to the list of crops whose growers had been reprimanded.[3] The common feature of all these criticisms was the poor use of irrigation techniques— [241] this in a region of peoples who have practiced irrigation agriculture for centuries.

In 1952 Shaiakhmetov announced that the total area in livestock feed crops was below the 1940 level.[4] In 1953, the situation was worse: by November the harvest of livestock feed was 895,000 tons smaller than in 1952.[5]

In the truck farming category, the farmers were warned that they were behind the plan for vegetables,[6] and that they had fallen down entirely in the production of potatoes. The potato harvest in 1953 was one-half the prewar level.[7]

In 1952, Shaiakhmetov summarized the major factors contributing 433 to the steadily deteriorating agricultural situation. He attributed the 242 crisis to poor performance in these areas: utilization of Machine Tractor station technology, development of seed, tillage practices, crop and field rotation, education of agricultural specialists, and development of irrigation.[8]

A survey article of the following year gave further attention to the matter of crop and field rotation. It was disclosed that less than half of the 3,145 collective farms of Kazakhstan practiced rotation techniques; only 74, or one in every 40, seemed to know what they were doing—that is, practiced rotation in accordance with agronomical principles.[9]

Rotation is a technique long known to Russian and Ukrainian peasants. It should not be difficult for them to apply their knowledge of this technique to the soil and growing conditions of Central Asia. They appear not to have done so; in this respect they resemble the native Turkic farmers, who have also failed to cooperate with the Soviet regime. They do not apply their native techniques, nor do they willingly adopt those of the Soviets.

On the other hand, individual accomplishments are often outstanding. For instance, a world's record millet harvest was claimed in 1943 by an agricultural brigade headed by a certain Bersiev in Kazakhstan.[10] But there is a tremendous gap between the achievements of leaders and those of the farmers in general. Moreover, there is a lack of communication between the centers of advancement and the mass of the population.

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[1] Shaiakhmetov, *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 21 Sep 52.

[2] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 30 Apr 53.

[3] *Ibid.*, 10 Oct 53.

[4] *Ibid.*, 21 Sep 52.

[5] *Ibid.*, 14 Nov 53.

[6] *Ibid.*, 30 Apr 53.

[7] *Ibid.*, 10 Oct 53.

[8] *Ibid.*, 21 Sep-53.

[9] *Ibid.*, 10 Oct 53.

[10] *Ibid.*, 25 Apr 51.

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The situation in herding is similar. The leading pastoral regions are in the western parts of Kazakhstan, the Guryev, West Kazakhstan, and Aktyubinsk regions. There has been a steady decline in cattle, sheep, and goats in the Guryev region from 1946 to 1953, which means that Kazakh herding in this region has not participated in the postwar recovery (Kazakhs form over two-thirds of the population of the Guryev region). A similar decline in cattle has been reported for West Kazakhstan and South Kazakhstan. In the regions of East and North Kazakhstan, cattle and sheep are below the prewar figures. Throughout the republic the ratio of cows to the total number of cattle in the kolkhoz herds is disproportionately low (24.3 per cent) and is falling; for instance, in the year 1952 the number of cows dropped by 10.8 per cent. Cattle have been falling in number from year to year in both collective and state farms.[1]

The milk yield per kolkhoz was lower in 1952 than in 1940.[2] This statement is an even graver admission than it seems at first glance, because the individual collective farm is larger in 1952 than it was in 1940 and there are fewer kolkhozy now than then.

In the same period, 1940-1952, the average milk yield per cow dropped 76 liters.[3] The average annual milk yield per cow for 1939 was 650 liters[4]; if it can be assumed that there was little change between 1939 and 1940, a fall of 13 per cent in milk production per cow is indicated for the 1940-1952 period.

Milk production is closely associated with the statistics of gravidity, and there has been a considerable decline in this category in Kazakhstan as well. In 1948, out of 100 cows 88 were with calf, while only 74 out of every 100 were with calf in 1951. Similarly, of every 100 mares, 78 were with foal in 1948; this figure had dropped to 67 in 1951.[5]

The area sown in livestock feed had fallen in 1952 below the prewar (1940) level; this reduction led to the critical situation regarding milk production, and that of meat and wool as well. Despite the tremendous gain in pork, total meat production fulfilled only 60 per cent of plan. The same ratio of 60 per cent holds for wool and cotton.[6] The situation regarding wool is particularly bad; the wool yield per sheep has fallen off even more sharply than the milk yield per cow. In the period 1940-1952 the annual wool yield per sheep fell from 2.4 to 1.9 kilograms, or 4.2 pounds, an over-all drop of 21 per cent.[7]

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On the one hand, the Kazakhs do not cooperate in the Soviet pattern of production; on the other, the Soviet emphases are such as to exclude the Kazakhs. For example, the stress on such alien foods as pork, potatoes, and garden vegetables, in the development of the urban pattern, means that as the Kazakh moves to the city he must give up many of his old food habits. And yet only in the city can one find higher learning.

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[1] *Ibid.*, 10 Oct 53.
[2] *Ibid.*, 10 Oct 53.
[3] *Ibid.*, 14 Nov 53.
[4] *Ibid.*, 4 Oct 52.
[5] *Ibid.*, 21 Sep 52.
[6] *Ibid.*, 14 Nov 53.
[7] *Ibid.*, 10 Oct 53.

Kazakhstan RQ1

the only means by which, in the present context, the literary, artistic, K 369 and scientific expressions of Kazakh culture can develop. Kazakh eco- 177 nomic life and material culture today are best described as reflecting a certain dispiritedness. This dispirited attitude underlies the apathy K which allows skilled herdsmen to let their herds fall apart—failing to [182] ensure that cows continue to calve, neglecting to shear their sheep, not bringing mares to foal.

These various facts bespeak an unwillingness on the Kazakhs' part K 177 to participate in the Soviet life as well as a holding-off policy by Moscow. In the field of native handicrafts a similar situation prevails. Kazakh K craftsmen had until recently a degree of skill in rugmaking and felt- [28] making (largely a woman's occupation), leatherwork, and certain metal [171] crafts such as brassworking. These crafts they shared with other Central Asiatic peoples, both Turkic and Iranian. This has all disappeared. The Kazakhs have lost contact with their own culture; they have been forbidden to express interest in their own past.

The Kazakhs recovered splendidly from the losses of World War I K and the Revolution, rebuilding their herding strength in the next decade. [648] During this period they were left more or less alone by Moscow. During 1929-1933 the Kazakhs again suffered tremendous losses. In the ensuing period they were not left alone, and they have not recovered, even after 25 years. Never in the history of Soviet Kazakhstan has a plan for herding been fulfilled. In 1952 a partial exception did occur—the plan for horses was fulfilled—but only, according to Shaiakhmetov, through huge investments by the state.[1]

INDUSTRY

KN The industrial development of Kazakhstan has proceeded along the 316 line of extraction of natural resources, primarily metals and fuels (see Figure 2). The metal extraction has a history which precedes the Revolution, and is almost exclusively in the field of nonferrous metals; to this day there is very little iron mining and ferrous industry in Kazakhstan.

The chief nonferrous metals are lead and zinc, mined in the Altai KN Mountains and near Taldy-Kurgan; copper, mined north of Lake Balkhash, [135] in the vicinity of Dzhezkazgan, and between Akmolinsk and Pavlodar; and various deposits of manganese, bauxite, nickel, gold, phosphorus, chromite, and mineral salts. Iron is mined near the Sary-Su and at Kustanay.

Kazakhstan has both solid and liquid fuel resources. Large deposits of coal are scattered throughout the central and northern parts of the republic, from the Mangyshlak peninsula in the west to the Chinese border in the east; the most important, ranking third in the Soviet Union, is that at Karaganda. Lignite is found in the extreme south, at Lenger and Chimkent, but in small amounts relative to the solid fuels in the republic. Oil is found along the Caspian shore near the port of Guryev, and in the steppe between the Emba and Ural rivers.[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, 21 Sep 52.

[2] Pal'gov, 1953, pp. 126-135.

MINERAL RESOURCES OF KAZAKH S S R


Karaganda
Guryev
Alma-Ata
● Coal
○ Oil
△ Copper
I Iron
△ Gold
Natural Gas
△ Lead and Zinc
■ Phosphates
Lignite
▨ Bauxite
✚ Manganese
Mineral Salts

Figure 2

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak

Kazakhstan RQ1

Table 7

INDUSTRY IN KAZAKHSTAN[a]

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Year	Oil (Crude Output) (MT)	Coal and Lignite (MT)	Karaganda Coal	Copper (MT)	Electric Power (kwh)
1913	117,000[b]	90,500[b]	ND	5,070[c]	1,300,000[b]
1927-1928	250,000[d]	ND	ND	ND	ND
1934	ND	2,000,000	ND	ND	ND
1940	764,000[e,f]	6,970,000[e]	6,380,000[g,h]	85,500[h]	633,000,000[e]
1950	1,160,000[e]	17,000,000 (planned)[i]	15,750,000[j]	ND	2,500,000,000[e]

[a] All figures rounded.
[b] *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo*, 1936.
[c] *Godoviy Obzor Mineral'nokh Resursov*, 1926, p. 386.
[d] *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo*, 1928.
[e] Derived from ratios of increase over 1913 in *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1952, No. 3, p. 47.
[f] Plotnikov, *Biudzhet*, 1948, p. 229, gives 116,000 tons for oil in 1913, and six-fold increase by 1940, or 700,000 tons. Emba oil, Kazakhstan, amounted to 18% of the all-Union production in 1937; Stepanov, p. 61.
[g] Stepanov, pp. 58-59.
[h] Plotnikov, *loc. cit.* This was 52.3% of all-Union production in 1937; Stepanov, p. 103.
[i] Shimkin (114), 1953, p. 176.
[j] Cherdantsev, p. 285.
ND: No data available.

The primary industrial concern has been the extraction and to a lesser extent the processing of these natural resources. There is a certain amount of hydroelectric power in the republic (see Table 7), but industrial development has taken second place to mining. For example, as of 1949, there was only one oil refinery in Kazakhstan, at Guryev, and there has been no notice of construction of a refinery since that time.[1] The oil industry is a prerevolutionary development; the Emba fields were first exploited in 1899.[2] [376] [382]

The Karaganda coal fields were expanded in the 1930's to support the iron smelting at Magnitogorsk, where there was no coal. First in importance for the working of the iron behind the Urals are the coal fields of the Kuzbass, in southern Siberia, north of Kazakhstan, but second to them are the Karaganda fields. In 1938, Karaganda supplied one-third of the coal used at Magnitogorsk. These Karaganda fields have played an important part in the economy of Kazakhstan; in 1940, they accounted for 90 per cent of the republic's coal production.[3] 316

Ferrous metallurgy was developed at Temir-Tau near Karaganda during World War II, (1944) and has been in operation since. Another iron works was created at Aktyubinsk also during the war, but no other works of this kind exist in Kazakhstan. 327

The lead works are closely linked to the sources of supply, at Ridders (now Leninogorsk), antedating World War I, and at Chimkent, dating from 1934. Leninogorsk is in the Altai Mountains, Chimkent in 328 316

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[1] Kasaev, 1949.
[2] Balzak (6), 1949, chapter on Kazakhstan.
[3] Stepanov, p. 58.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak

Kazakhstan RQ1

328 the extreme south of the republic. These areas also supply wolframite from which tungsten is produced. Kazakhstan supplies 87 per cent of
316 the copper in the USSR. It is mined in the vicinity of Lake Balkhash, near the towns of Balkhash and Kounradskiy to the west and north of the lake, and at Karsakpay, with a copper refinery and smelter at Balkhash. This close relationship between refinery and source of supply is generally true of industry in Kazakhstan.

396 Kazakhstan has progressed considerably in the development of electric power through exploitation of water resources in the east and north-
397 east, as well as through the utilization of thermal sources of electric power. Table 7 traces the development of Kazakhstan's resources in the fuel and power fields, and in copper, a typical nonferrous metal industry.

392 In other branches of industry, including both heavy and light manufacturing, the picture differs markedly from that presented by the exploitation and primary processing of natural resources. Records reveal only one agricultural machinery plant in the Kazakh Republic, at Akmolinsk; this development, like so many others, took place during the war, in 1944. What there is by way of machine tool industry also dates from the war years. Light industry boasts only one leatherworks,
282 at Semipalatinsk, the most important stock-raising center in the Soviet
288 East. And there are just three textile mills in the republic, at Karaganda,
248 Semipalatinsk, and Alma-Ata—despite the fact that Kazakhstan is a
232 major cotton-growing republic, and is one of the most important sources
236 of wool in the entire Soviet Union.[7]

TRANSPORTATION

496 The paucity of river transport systems places railroads in the front line of transportation in Kazakhstan (Figure 3). A railroad line cut across Kazakhstan before the Revolution, connecting the southern Urals with the cotton-producing zone around Tashkent. It ran from Orenburg (now Chkalov), the first capital of Kazakhstan, through Aktyubinsk, past the northeast shore of the Aral Sea and Kzyl-Orda, capital after 1925, along the course of the Syr-Darya, to Tashkent in Uzbekistan. One spur went through southern Kazakhstan to Chimkent and Frunze, capital of Kirgizia. During the Tsarist era, the main task of the transportation system was to bring to Russia the cotton from the
[348] region within the Tashkent-Kzyl-Orda-Frunze triangle.[8]

During the 1920's and 1930's a number of new lines were added, of which the most important were the line cutting north-south through Kazakhstan, from Petropavlovsk through Akmolinsk and Karaganda to Balkhash, and a line from Novosibirsk through Barnaul and Semipalatinsk to the present capital, Alma-Ata. The latter is the much-publicized Turksib (Turkestan-Siberian railroad). An east-west line connects Magnitogorsk with Karaganda through Akmolinsk. Since the war two lines have been added, a north-south line, 438 kilometers (270 miles)

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[7] Kusaev, 1949.

[8] Balzak (6), 1949.

RIVERS AND RAILROADS OF KAZAKH S S R


Chelyabinsk
Magnitogorsk
Chkalov
Orsk
Guryev
Emba River
Tobol
Omsk
Novosibirsk
Barnaul
Biisk
Petropavlovsk
Kokchetav
Akmolinsk
Ishim River
Irtysh
Leninogorsk
Karaganda
Uspenskiy
Ayaguz
Sary-Su
Chu River
Chu
Taldy-Kurgan
Tekeli
Ili River
Alma-Ata
Frunze
Chokh-Tau
Lenger
Tashkent
to Samarkand
CASPIAN SEA
Boundary Lines of Administrative Subdivisions
Rivers
Railroads
Projected Rail Lines
Capital
Regional Capitals

Figure 3

B:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kasak

Kazakhstan RQ 1

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103
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107

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Kazakhstan RQ1

KN 496 long, running west of Lake Balkhash from Mointy to Chu,[1] and an east-west line, 546 kilometers (350 miles) long, connecting Akmolinsk and Pavlodar.[2] There are no railroad lines in southwestern Kazakhstan, presumably because the Caspian Sea is a more economical substitute. This solution may prove unworkable for the Soviets if the falling water level of the Caspian continues to isolate the northern and eastern ports from access to the sea.

Soviet criticism of Tsarist location theory for railroads in Central Asia applies equally to the Soviets themselves.[3] These lines are designed to integrate the sources of raw materials in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, with the manufacturing centers of Russia. They are not primarily designed to aid the local population in meeting internal problems. KN [361] Moreover, the political ties closely follow the railroad network. Thus the capital of Kazakhstan was established at Kzyl-Orda in 1925 largely because it lay on the old Orenburg-Tashkent line, not because it was a great center of culture. On the contrary, it is inconceivable that the Soviet government, even in the 1920's with its modicum of laissez faire, would have supported as capital of the area a potential center of political crystallization. The capital was subsequently moved to Alma-Ata because it was the railhead of the Turksib at the time, and there the capital has remained.

K 463 The trend in the Soviet Union regarding the training of Kazakhs as skilled workers in railroading is parallel to that of the factory systems. The Kazakhs are not being trained in numbers proportionate to their relative strength in the republic. They are being excluded or, alternatively, they are not coming forth to be trained. Of 17 brigades honored for their contributions to the building of the Mointy-Chu line, which runs north-south to the west of Lake Balkhash and along the eastern edge of the Hungry Steppe, only five were led by Turks.[4] K [311] Yet the line runs through country which is marginally suitable for herding, and for little else; it is a region of Kazakhs. On the other hand, for the Akmolinsk-Pavlodar line in the north, which runs through country where the proportion of Kazakh population is relatively low, the recipients of honors bore Slavic (Russian and Ukrainian, one German) names typical of the local populations.[5]

KN 433 439 By way of conclusion, the following may be said of the industry in Kazakhstan: First, the republic is an important producer of raw materials (oil, coal, lignite, copper, lead, meat, wool, cotton, wheat, and tobacco). Second, most of these raw materials flow outside Kazakhstan to industrial centers of the USSR in European Russia and the Urals. (This type of flow—raw materials to manufacturing center, finished goods from center back to source of raw materials—is precisely what Soviet propagandists have always denounced as imperialism.) Third, the uneven commodity flow creates an unbalanced economy. The Kazakh republic is far from becoming economically self-sufficient. Fourth, the key to understanding the industrial picture in the KSSR is the total economic dependence of the Kazakhs on Russia for all consumer commodities. These include clothing, processed foods, furniture, and all electrical and electronic commodities, such as light bulbs and radios; motor supplies, automobiles, and the gas and lubricants necessary to run them; stoves and all other heating devices for using the coal and lignite the Kazakhs themselves produce. KN 433 439

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[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 27 Oct 53.

[2] *Ibid.*, 20 Dec 53.

[3] See unpublished doctoral dissertation by Holland Hunter on railroad systems of the Soviet Union (67).

[4] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 27 Oct 53.

[5] *Ibid.*, 20 Dec 53.

A good example is afforded by the chemical industry. Kazakhstan has long been known for its riches in salts and other chemicals. In the 19th century, shortly after the annexation of the territory by Russia, a small-scale chemical plant was established at Chimkent. To this day, this remains the sole chemical-pharmaceutical plant in the entire republic, although it has been expanded under the Soviets.[7] The bulk of the chemicals are extracted as raw materials, shipped elsewhere for processing, and only then made available to Kazakhstan, within the framework of the general pattern for distribution of these materials. KN [381]

Finally, it is clear that this economic dependence on Russia serves to reinforce Moscow's political control over the peoples of Kazakhstan.[8] KN [648]

The problem of manpower and the training of labor is central here. The industry of Kazakhstan, aside from the prerevolutionary mining centers, was established by means of forced labor camps at Karaganda, which during the 1930's was an NKVD area, and by the transfer of workers from Leningrad in the same period; during the war, workers from Moscow, Leningrad, and the Donbass were brought in for work in industry and mining. The Kazakhs have not participated in this industrial development. Very few industries requiring skilled labor have been established in Kazakhstan, and those few are based on a labor force derived from Russia and the Ukraine. The Kazakhs are not being introduced to the techniques which Russians are learning to master in the process of their industrial growth. The industrial picture confirms the conclusion drawn from the examination of the social and political scenes: The native Kazakhs are being encouraged by the Soviets to enter into industry, but they are not coming forward to be trained; they are holding back from participation in Soviet life. KN 464 K [463] K [177] [668]

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[7] Kunaev, 1949.

[8] Baizak (6), 1949.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Kazakhstan RQ1

Chapter 6

THE PARTY

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If one were to ask what organization gives direction to the development of public affairs and private lives in Kazakhstan, the answer would be simple: it is the Communist Party. This hierarchical body is by its very structure and character totally alien to the Kazakh way of life of a few decades ago. The idea was imported from Russia, the establishment entrusted to Russians. Or, in the more flowery language of Kazakhstanskaia Pravda:

> "During the time of tsarist oppression the Russian Party guided the struggle of the Kazakh toilers. Russian bolshevists living in Kazakhstan carried on propaganda. . . . Russian workers, leading bolshevists, were pioneers and leaders of the Kazakh masses. . . . The best sons of Russia were shining examples for Kazakhstan during those trying times."[1] [When the Revolution and the Civil War came] "the Kazakh Party stood in the vanguard of those fighting Dutov, Kolchak, the counter-revolutionary bourgeois nationalist party 'Alash Orda', and other hirelings of Anglo-American imperialism. . . . Training of Communists was closely linked to the names of Lenin and Stalin. Kirov, Kuibyshev, Kalinin, Frunze, Kaganovich, brothers-in-arms of Lenin and Stalin, played an important role in the creation, development and strengthening of the Kazakh Party organization."[2]

From "about 2,000 Communists" in the villages and auls of Kazakhstan in 1918, the membership increased rapidly with the turn of the civil war, so that the first Provincial Conference of Kazakh Bolsheviks[3] meeting at Orenburg in June 1921 represented about 30,000 members and membership candidates. By now, the Communist Party of the KSSR has close to a quarter of a million members.

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The role of the Party as a leader and teacher of the masses took on a special significance in the national minority areas of the USSR. In Stalin's words, it is the task of the Party "to eliminate the economic, political and cultural backwardness bequeathed to oppressed peoples by

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[1] "The Role of the Russian People in the Socialist Transformation of Kazakhstan," *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 5 Apr 47.

[2] "The First Provincial Conference of Kazakh Bolsheviks," *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 16 Jun 51.

[3] The nomenclature for Communist Party gatherings is confusing. These meetings were called "conferences" until the establishment of Kazakhstan as a union republic (1936); since then they have been called "congresses" and are numbered consecutively. Before the establishment of Kazakhstan as an autonomous republic within the RSFSR (1924), the term "provincial conference" was used.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

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[our] predecessors, and thus enabling backward nations to catch up with Central Russia. The Party must get into the thick of the struggle . . . against chauvinist great-power deviations as well as against native bourgeois nationalism." The first step toward the goal must be taken by "going out among the non-party toilers and bring about a closer relationship between the Party, the working masses and the peasants. . . ."[1]

The programmatic statements of the early days foretold the Party's continuous involvement in the solution of many complex tasks. In that respect the Kazakh Party is, of course, not different from the Communist Party throughout the Soviet Union. Daily events in every phase of life are considered within the legitimate concern and responsibility of the Party. In order to keep up its ubiquitous control, the Communist Party maintains a highly ramified apparatus composed of several kinds of bodies.

ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE KSSR

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Organizationally, the Communist Party varies little from one republic to another (except, of course, for the RSFSR). Here, only a brief outline will be given of its organizational structure in the KSSR. For greater detail the reader is referred to the sources on which this outline is based.[2]

One may, first of all, distinguish four levels at which the various bodies operate (see Figure 4):

(1) Republic (KSSR)
(2) Region (Oblast), 16 in number[3]
(3) District (Raion) or city (Gorod), 239
(4) Primary organization level, 14,416

At each level, one finds a representative organ which convenes at regular intervals. These are called congress (at the central or republic level), conference (region, district, and city), or general meeting (primary). At the three top levels, the representative organs elect committees (Russian terms: TsK, KP (b), KSSR; Obkom; Raikom or Gorkom), executive bodies which carry out Party work while the respective representative organs are not in session. Both the representative and executive bodies are guided by the decisions of the All-Union Party and the directives of the higher echelon. At the sessions of the representative organs, reports by the Committee, the Audit Commission, and others are heard and approved. Here, too, delegates to the representative bodies of the next higher level are elected. At the same occasion the Committee elects a small group of persons[4] (including three secretaries[5]) who form the bureau, the day-to-day executive office of the Party, Committee

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[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 16 Jan 51.

[2] Towster (123), 1951; Meisel and Kozera (97), 1950, esp. pp. 327-345; Gruliow (57), 1953, pp. 29-32; Fainsod (48), 1953, pp. 189-208.

[3] These figures were reported at the Fourth Kazakh Communist Party Congress, 1949.

[4] Eleven at republic and regional level, seven to nine at the district or city level.

[5] Secretaries must have been Party members for at least five years (three years for district or city). The All-Union Communist Party Central Committee must confirm the selection of the first secretaries of the regional bureaus. The secretaries of the district and city need confirmation by the regional and republic committees.

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ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE KAZAKH SSR


DELEGATES TO THE ALL-UNION PARTY CONGRESS
THE ALL-UNION PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
THE ALL-UNION PARTY CONTROL COMMISSION
REPUBLIC PARTY CONGRESS
REPRESENTATIVE ALL-UNION C.C.
CENTRAL COMMITTEE C.P. OF KAZAKHSTAN
FIRST SECRETARY
BUREAU
SECRETARIAT
PLENIPOTENTIARY AND HIS OFFICE
SECTIONS
REPUBLIC AUDITING COMMISSION
REGIONAL PARTY CONGRESS
REGIONAL COMMITTEES
FIRST SECRETARY
BUREAU
SECRETARIAT
PLENIPOTENTIARY AND HIS OFFICE
SECTIONS
REGIONAL AUDITING COMMISSION
DISTRICT (CITY)-PARTY CONFERENCE
DISTRICT (CITY) COMMITTEES
FIRST SECRETARY
BUREAU
SECRETARIAT
SECTIONS
DISTRICT AUDITING COMMISSION
GENERAL PARTY MEETING
PRIMARY ORGANIZATIONS
SECRETARY
BUREAU
ELECTION
CONTROL
BODIES PERMANENTLY IN SESSION

NOTE: AS A RULE THE FIRST AND OTHER SECRETARIES, MEMBERS OF THE BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND CHIEFS OF SECTIONS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE. THE SAME APPLIES TO COMMITTEES, ETC. ON THE REGION AND DISTRICT LEVEL.

SOURCE: COMMUNIST PARTY STATUTES, AS AMENDED, [illegible]; CONSTITUTIONS OF THE USSR AND KAZAKH SSR; OFFICIAL SOVIET PUBLICATIONS; TOWSTER ([illegible]), FAINSOD ([illegible]), AND MEISEL AND KOZERA ([illegible]).

Figure 4

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R:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak

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Kazakhstan RQ1

Committee

functions include appointing and supervising the press of their jurisdictions, 665 watching over the fulfillment of directives and orders from above [204] by government and other bodies, organizing the political education of Party members, and implementing agitation and propaganda among [208] the population.

Primary organizations (previously known as "cells") function in economic, industrial, military, village, office, and educational units; they may be established in shops, sectors, departments, kolkhozes, MTS's, [182] as well as in government ministries. They consist of no less than three Party members. They are in a way the eyes and ears of the Party, in every locality, in every economic or cultural enterprise. The general meeting of the primary organization elects delegates to the appropriate district (or city) conference as well as a bureau[1] with a secretary for the period of one year.

The primary organization has many duties: agitation, propaganda, and supervision over the primary press (wall newspapers, house organs, etc.); enrollment and training of new members, as well as dissemination of Marxism-Leninism beyond the Party membership; cooperation with district and city committees and political sections; utilization of the non-Party manpower for plan fulfillment; encouragement and improvement of criticism and "self-criticism"; in short, active participation in the economic, cultural, and political life of the country. As of 1939, primary [182] organizations were given the right to supervise management operations in industrial and agricultural enterprises. In ministries primary organizations operate in an "atmosphere of special conditions": they cannot really supervise, but are obliged to "signalize defects in work," report shortcomings, and submit their data and views on the ministry and on individuals to the All-Union Party Central Committee and to the ministers.

The technical apparatus specifically charged with control and supervision of each of the manifold fields of the political, economic, cultural, and social life of the republic consists of the so-called "Sections" (Otdely) of the central executive body at every level: the Central Committees in the regions and districts respectively. The Central Committee has a full complement of Sections; their number decreases at lower levels, according to the character and needs of a given administrative unit. Apart from the purely political sections such as Propaganda and Agitation, and Party Education, there are economic sections controlling such [182] areas as heavy and light industry, transport and communications, and agriculture, and social sections on work with women, work with youth, and so forth. Each section is responsible for performance of state and other organs of their sector at a given level.

The description of the formal organizational structure may be supplemented by a few remarks about the reality behind the facade of statutes. At the republic level and downward, the real initiative and actual

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[1] The size of the primary organization determines the size of the bureau, except that the upper limit is 11 persons. When the organization has 15 members or less, it elects only a secretary. In organizations with fewer than 100 members, all Party work is done on a volunteer basis; in larger organizations, a proportional number of the members are put on a part-time job, part-time Party work schedule.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak

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G65 control over Party activities lies in the hands of the secretarial apparatus. To observe the concentration of power, one needs only to look at the republic Party's first secretary.

Approved—more than that, appointed—by the Kremlin, he holds all controls in his hands. He is the boss of the Central Committee Bureau where one finds those persons who, by virtue of their positions, have a decisive voice in the republic's Party governmental affairs: the Party secretaries, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and so forth. He also heads the secretariat, which is responsible for the selection and placement of key Party, Komsomol, trade union, and administrative personnel in all job categories unless they are reserved for all-Union action. Here too is concentrated the supervision of the cultural life of the republic, to ensure ideological orthodoxy and to guard against nationalist deviations. The first secretary also stands at the head of the Party members (in the secretariat, bureau, and lower offices) who are supposed to, and actually do, "take the leadership in solving economic problems instead of confining themselves to a passive reporting role of merely signaling difficulties."[1]

The regional (obkom) bureau and secretariat are organized similarly, allowing, however, for specific economic interests of the particular region. Here again, the first secretary dominates the scene. In areas remote from both Moscow and the republic center, the obkom first secretary retains important residual powers and exercises a large amount of executive initiative. The mass of work required of him is tremendous. The personnel problem is characteristic: some obkoms "are responsible for staffing as many as 2,600 types of positions."[2]

The city (gorkom) and district (raikom) Party organs are composed of secretaries, the chairman of the city or district Soviet executive committee, local MVD representatives, and other top officials. According to the usual pattern, the secretaries (and bureau) are in charge of naming important government officials and filling vacant posts of sovkhoz chairmen, Komsomol and trade union administrators, and other positions of this level. In addition to staffing and the supervision of primary Party organizations, the gorkoms and obkoms

> ". . . function as the basic record offices of the Party. They are obligated to maintain record cards for all members and candidates in their area. The record cards, each of which bears the same number as the membership or candidate's card carried by a holder, provide complete and up-to-date documentation on all Communists, including changes in employment, education, awards, penalties, etc. Transfers of Party members from district to district are carefully regulated by Party instructions. Secretaries of district and city committees are obliged to interview Communists personally when they put them on the rolls or remove them from the records."[3]

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[1] Fainsod (48), 1953, pp. 190-191.

[2] L. Nemzer, "The Kremlin's Professional Staff," *American Political Science Review*, XLIV (March 1950), p. 65. Quoted by Fainsod (48), 1953.

[3] Fainsod (48), 1953, pp. 194-195.

Kazakhstan RQ1

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The chief concern of district and city organizations is the activity of primary Party organizations, over which they have control. According to latest available information, there were over 14,000 such organizations within the KSSR in 1949 (as compared with about 350,000 for the USSR as a whole[4]).

The primary organizations are the "grass roots" of the Party, the broad base of its hierarchical pyramid. From Fainsod's detailed description of their functions one fact emerges clearly: These units play the part of the eyes and ears of the Party—they are not designed to represent the "voice of the people" in the authoritarian organization of the Party.

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For purposes of psychological warfare it would be interesting to speculate about the self-image of the typical member of the primary organization. Does he perceive that his position in the Party does not correspond to the status ascribed to him by the surrounding community? Or does he see himself as an important and influential (or at least potentially influential) citizen, by ignoring the fact that the goals and needs of the individual member and of the primary organization are not respected by the higher authorities? It is easy to infer that in the first case the discrepancy between ascribed status of influence and actual impotence may lead to persistent frustration on the part of the voiceless Party member. And if this situation were typical among the 200,000 primary organization members, they might well be considered as a special target group for psychological warfare.

On the other hand, material gathered in refugee interviews by the Harvard Russian Research Center seems to indicate that the second hypothesis is more plausible, at least for Russian primary organization members.[5] In fact, on the basis of that information, it may be argued that these people are probably the least promising audience for psychological warfare operations. However, the lowly Communist of Kazakh nationality may find himself in a position quite different from his Russian counterpart.

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Unfortunately, no information is available about the state of mind of the Kazakh Communists, as distinct from the problems and actions of the Communist Party of the Kazakh SSR. Nevertheless, it seems pertinent to look at whatever is known about the members and role of the Kazakhs within the Party.

The latter can best be evaluated by analyzing the past and present leadership of the Party in terms of ethnic background and progression of assignments. This task will be undertaken at the end of the next chapter within the discussion of leadership overlap between Party and Government.[3]

Data on ethnic composition are not plentiful, but published figures seem to indicate that the Kazakhs are not underrepresented in the Party, at least not numerically. Table 8 summarizes the information available for certain key years.

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To a certain extent, the proportion of women in the Communist Party reflects the Party's appeal to the women of Kazakhstan. Frequent

[4] Ibid., p. 196.

[5] Personal communication from Raymond A. Bauer.

[3] [See category 116, pp. 105-108 --analyst]

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
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Table 8

PROPORTION OF KAZAKHS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION AND IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Year	Population	Kazakh Proportion of Total Population (%)	Party Members and Candidates	Kazakh Proportion of Total Membership (%)
1926	6,503,000[a]	57[b]	32,000[c]	35[c]
1939	6,146,000[a]	42[b]	109,000[d]	52[d]
1949	6,650,000[e]	41[f]	229,000[g]	40[h]

[a] USSR Census.
[b] *Lorimer and Goldware estimates (89).*
[c] Goloshchekin, 1931.
[d] *Bol'shevik Kazakhstana*, Feb 49.
[e] By interpolation from Goldware estimates for 1948 and 1950 (89).
[f] Based on Goldware's report on KSSR population (89).
[g] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 25 Feb 49.
[h] *Ibid.*, 16 Jan 51.

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Table 9

WOMEN IN THE KSSR COMMUNIST PARTY

Year	All Women (Per Cent of All Members and Candidates)	Kazakh Women (Per Cent of All Members and Candidates)
1927[a]	7.7	1.3
1940[b]	13.9	ND
1945[b]	32.1	ND
1949[c]	19.2	4.0

[a] Goloshchekin, 1931.
[b] *Bol'shevik Kazakhstana*, Feb 49.
[c] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 16 Jan 51.
ND: No data available.

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criticisms by Party leaders indicate that more women would be welcomed into the ranks and that the Kazakh Communist Party has a bad recruiting record; one can therefore assume that the rather low number of women in the Party is not due to any officially stated policy of exclusion. Only during the war years were any significant gains made. Especially poor is Party recruiting performance among women of Kazakh nationality (see Table 9). A set of figures, however, cannot adequately describe the role women play in the Kazakh Communist Party. In recent times women have been placed in responsible positions in increasing numbers. In 1951, for example, 12 out of 85 members of the Central Committee were women, and every regional committee and almost 90 per cent of the districts and cities had one female secretary.[1]

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[1] According to figures in Meissner's book (98) and in *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 20 Mar 47 and 26 Feb 49, women took a considerably more active part in government. From 1947 through 1952, consistently over one-third of all local Soviet delegates were women; out of 400 Supreme Soviet members, 149 were women (37%); *Sovetskaia Zhenshchina*, Sep-Oct, 1952.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak

Kazakhstan RQ1

MAJOR COMMUNIST PARTY PROBLEMS IN KAZAKHSTAN

The Communist Party in a union republic operates as the executive 665 and supervisory agent of Moscow. As such, it must face and solve many problems which fall in the two areas of primary concern to the Party, ideological orthodoxy and economic production.

These areas are not mutually exclusive, so that a given problem may include elements of each—to the increased distress of local Party leaders. Indeed, it would seem customary to include charges of ideological deviation or inadequacy as well as economic concepts in criticizing a lower echelon for failure to fulfill a coal production norm. Similarly, inadequate effort in the indoctrination ("political instruction") of Party members by propagandists may be treated by the authorities somewhat like a case of insufficient oil extraction.

Ideological orthodoxy is an area of grave concern to Party leaders in Kazakhstan. They are chronically caught between the shifting demands [208] of Moscow and the need to rely on local cooperation. It is obvious to these leaders that in a territory where national, religious, and cultural conditions are as complex as they are in Kazakhstan, the authorities cannot rule by police force alone. Support must be enlisted by properly conducted ideological education, and the Party is responsible for this task. Widespread resistance to Sovietization—of which the low number of Kazakh women in politics is a prime example—must be overcome. Even well-educated groups may sometimes be in error, in the eyes of the central powerholders. Historians may propound the wrong interpretation of history, dramatists may portray the wrong kind of heroes, biologists may "wander astray" in their research. (The specific techniques of agitation and propaganda used by the Party are discussed in Chapter 8, and the set of problems arising in the guidance of Kazakh arts and sciences in Chapter 9.)

The chief problem of the Party in Kazakhstan is manpower, another 964 area related to both ideology and production. 665

Linguistic complications make discussion of the manpower problem difficult, as an article in the Central Asian Review pointed out in its Issue No. 2 for 1953:

> "There is no exact equivalent of the English word 'manpower' in modern Soviet language. In Soviet writing on what would be regarded in the West as the subject of manpower, the word 'kadry' (cadres) is generally used. Strictly speaking, this word refers to trained and leading personnel: in the Soviet Encyclopaedia of 1937 it is shown to be an abbreviation of the expression 'cadres of the builders of socialism' and defined as 'people who have mastered the technique of their work.' But its meaning is now extended to all those workers who could be trained for any form of specialised work or organised for specific tasks. In addition to political or Party cadres, one of the most frequent uses, there are references to 'cadres' in every profession, including technical occupations of every description, science, farming and teaching. The expression 'rabochiye kadry', 'labour cadres', is also used."

In the postwar years the Party has often been taken to task for failing in the "preparation of cadres" (podgostovka kadrov), thus taking the blame for inadequacies in the political, educational, and economic spheres. The main reason why cadres are not available in sufficient

Kazakhstan RQ1

KN 4A 665 numbers in the Kazakh SSR (and probably in any minority republic where the non-Russian native population is less well educated than the Russians) is that "qualification for a job" implies not only technical proficiency but also political reliability. For higher-ranking positions political sophistication and active participation may actually be required in addition to professional training and experience.

K [665] [661] Adding to these conditions Moscow's continuous demand that more and more natives be brought into the machinery ("korenizatsiia aparata"), one can see the predicament of the Kazakh bosses. In the past it has often happened that the only candidates qualified in terms of training and political reliability were relatives of those already in administrative positions. The accusation of nepotism is, therefore, fairly frequent. This and other complaints in connection with the cadre system are voiced in some detail in a Central Committee decree of March 1947, "On the selection, training, and placement of Party and Soviet cadres by Kazakh Communist Party organization." The most pertinent clause of this decree, repeated recently in Kazakhstanskaia Pravda (21 September 1952), reads: ". . . selection of cadres [of Party workers] on a basis of friendship, personal devotion, family ties and kinship is incompatible with membership in the Party."[1] The social basis of nepotism in Central Asia has been discussed previously, in regard to family relations.

KN 665 433 464 At present the men in charge in Kazakhstan seem to be counting on an increase in the general level of education to solve this knotty problem. The importance of the economic problem for the Kazakh Party is shown by the fact that its two most powerful first secretaries lost their jobs over manpower and production failures. The energetic Goloshchekin was replaced when too-rapid and brutal collectivization procedures resulted in social and economic disaster. More recently Shaiakhmetov, probably the most skillful politician to dominate Soviet Kazakhstan, was demoted (together with other responsible officials) when agricultural production failed—by a wide margin—to reach the planned level.

It is perhaps surprising that Shaiakhmetov managed to remain in power as long as he did (seven years). Since the end of World War II, Moscow had been applying pressure for better exploitation of Kazakhstan's potential in animal husbandry and grain production. Warnings by the Central Party organs (including Pravda) were numerous and explicit. The historical details are not important here except insofar as they support the argument that the 1954 demise of several Kazakh leaders was primarily an economic rather than a political purge. This interpretation was reinforced recently by the report that Comrade Shaiakhmetov had been "re-elected" by Alma-Ata voters.

The problem of production efficiency and adequately trained manpower arises in industry as well as in agriculture, although less frequently and less violently. It may be that factories and mines by their very nature can be more easily supervised than vast collective enterprises. It may also be that industrial workers, who are better educated politically, and among whom there are proportionately more Russians, offer less resistance to Communist control than the peasants and herders. Whatever the explanation, the only enterprise for whose shortcomings the Kazakh Party has been prominently blamed is that of the Karaganda coal mines. A very specific criticism was directed against the Party (and, of course, against the pertinent administrative organs) for its inability to break down resistance to mechanization. 665 433 464 [316]

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[1] The most dramatic case was that of Nurvaev, former KSSR minister of justice, who was expelled from the Party by the Central Committee of the All-Union Party for "corruption." At that time, other functionaries were ousted with him for "deception of Party organs and unworthy conduct in respect to cadre affairs."

The following statement from Pravda (29 June 1949) is typical:

> "Four years ago mining combines began to be used in the Karaganda Basin. The chief of the Karaganda mines spoke glowingly of the magnificent results achieved in his domain. And then, a year ago, expensive machinery was put out of commission. Party investigation brought to light misuse and disuse of combines, and a return to manual extraction of coal. Local Party organisations had not interfered, and neither the city nor the regional party committee had decided to name the 'anti-mechanizees'."

As recently as 1952 (at the Sixth KSSR Party Congress) resistance to mechanization was described as caused by "disturbing elements" and by people apparently lacking in the true spirit of socialist construction—a clear sign that things were not as the Party would like them in the Karaganda mines.

THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE

In most of its activities, especially those depending on mass action (such as getting in the harvest, and agitation connected with it), the Party often enlists the help of the Komsomol (Young Communist League). This organization of young people (ages 15 to 26) has grown from Lenin's original idea into the largest single corporate body in the Soviet Union. Komsomol membership in October 1945 was reported as 15,000,000. 665 883

Officially, the League is defined in its bylaws as a "mass, non-Party organization," yet it requires that its members "persistently and unremittingly struggle to carry out the decisions of the . . . Party and the Soviet Government." There can be no doubt about Party control over Komsomol affairs. The 19th Party Congress had this to say on the subject: "The League carries on all its work under the immediate direction of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)." The League All-Union Central Committee is "directly subordinated" to the Central Committee of the All-Union Party, and local organizations are guided by their Party counterparts.[a] Organizationally, the Komsomol is patterned after the Party.

The Komsomol must not only master Marxist-Leninist teachings, but also actively aid the Party in implementing directives and programs. The Komsomol is the Party's assistant in matters concerning the education of youth and children "in the spirit of Communism and of organizing youth around Soviet power." [867]

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[a] Meisel and Kozera (97), 1950, p. 427. For complete bylaws of the Komsomols, see pp. 429-437.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak

Kazakhstan RQ1

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883 Thus a major task of the League is its activity as a mass training school which provides young cadres for both Party and other organizations and institutions. In addition, the Komsomoltsi are often called upon to participate in agitation drives and physical labor related to economic production.

Another duty of the Young Communist League should be mentioned. [867] On behalf of the Party and under its control, the Komsomol supervises the younger age brackets of organized Communist youth: the Pioneers (ages 10 to 16) and Octobrists (ages 8 to 11).[1] Thus, as in all totalitarian states, militaristic regimentation and indoctrination starts early in the Soviet Union.

During World War II the Komsomols in Kazakhstan earned reward and glory for their efforts at the front and at home, and recently they have been praised for their contribution to the economic achievements of the republic. In 1946 the Kazakh branch celebrated its 25th anniversary; at that time a laudatory article appeared in the republic press, describing the development of the movement. The postwar growth of the League has been spectacular (see Table 10). One might estimate roughly that at least one-third of all persons in the appropriate age bracket are members of the organization.

Table 10

MEMBERSHIP OF KSSR KOMSOMOL

Year	Membership	Number of Primary Organizations
1938[a]	110,000	ND
1949[b]	291,000	15,600
1951[c]	400,000	14,400
1954	558,000	ND

[a] Reported at Fourth KSSR Communist Party Congress.

[b] Reported at Fifth KSSR Communist Party Congress (in two reports 396,000 and 405,000 were mentioned).

[c] Seventh Komsomol, KSSR, Congress (as reported in *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 3 Mar 54).

ND: No data available.

[563] Some specific criticisms have been voiced concerning the League's work, particularly in the collectives. From the point of view of top powerholders, the main trouble with the Komsomols since the war has been their laxity in fighting traditional social and religious customs. A number of cases have been reported of Komsomols taking part in religious (mostly Moslem) holiday celebrations; the League has been accused of having condoned displays of "nationalistic and chauvinistic moods" among students and teachers in Kazakh schools,[2] of having failed to adequately publicize the Party's views with respect to nationalist deviation

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[1] Towster (123), 1948, pp. 137-144, gives a detailed description of Pioneer and Octobrist organizations.

[2] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 26 Feb 49.

in the interpretation of Kazakh history,[4] and in general of having paid too little attention to ideological education.[5] "Komsomols must be pioneers in the struggle with feudal-bai customs; they must tirelessly unmask the promoters of the old way of life . . . ;" so preached Kazakhstanskaia Pravda on 16 December 1951. 665 883 [563]

The relationship of the Young Communist League to the Party may be summarized as follows:

(1) The League is a preparatory organization in political education.

(2) Because of its size, the League is the most important auxiliary arm in the execution of programs of mass action.

(3) In addition to these assets, the League also presents a liability in that the behavior of its members, and especially of its leaders, may lapse into proscribed ways. Policing the League is a major Party problem.

THE PARTY AND THE TRADE UNIONS

For the sake of completeness a brief discussion is presented here of another problem child of the Party—the trade unions or profsoiuzy. The unions are the largest non-Party organization, numbering in the KSSR about 1,400,000 members;[6] the Party thus is confronted with the problem of policing an organization five times its own size. For an analysis of the organizational structure of the Soviet trade unions, the interested reader is referred to the recent volumes by Schwarts[7] and Bienstock et al.[8] 665 467

The unions underwent a major purge in 1951, in which the influence of the old line leadership was drastically reduced. In the Kazakh SSR, according to Party sources, the chief result was the promotion of many young people, including a number of women, into leading positions. [562]

Although this change was welcomed by the Kazakh Party leaders, many defects in union operations apparently remained. Three main criticisms were voiced again in 1952: (1) The unions had not organized "Socialist competition" well, and this failure had contributed to the agricultural debacle. (2) They had not taken care of workers' needs in regard to cultural and living conditions. (3) Safety measures in factories were still inadequate.

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[4] Fifth Komsomol, KSSR, Congress (July 1951).

[5] Fifth KSSR Communist Party Congress (1951).

[6] At the Fourth Party Congress (1949), they were reported as having 990,571 members in about 15,000 factory groups. (*Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 26 Feb 49.) The Fifth Congress brought out a figure of 1,370,000 members. (*Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 6 Dec 51.)

[7] Schwarts (111), 1950, pp. 474-484.

[8] Bienstock, Schwartz, Yugow (13), pp. 32-38.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955. RQ2 Kazak
Kazakhstan RQ1

Chapter 7

THE GOVERNMENT

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Stalin, in his Problems of Leninism, speaks of the soviets as "mass organizations of all toilers . . . not Party organizations." Through the soviets the vast masses are to be tied to the Party, the vanguard of the proletariat. Constitutionally, the soviets are envisaged as the political foundation of the USSR, and since their inception the regime has taken its name from them.

The Party, after a successful revolution, became the ruling faction. All Party leaders held posts in the Soviet government. But the civil war prevented for the time being a clear definition of the relationship between the Party and the soviet structure. At the 8th Party Congress (March 1919) the Party openly declared that it meant to establish complete dominance in the existing soviets. Party decisions, however, were to be carried out through soviet organs in adherence to the letter of the constitution. Despite this lip service to the separation of powers, the Party leadership expanded the Party's role in soviet affairs. In 1926 Stalin attempted to clarify the situation. As vanguard of the proletariat, the Party takes for itself the task of training and inspiring the leaders who are to govern the country, but the realization of this dictatorship cannot be separated from the state power. The Party remains apart from the soviets, governing through its members within the soviet structure. Therefore it cannot be identified with the soviets. "The Party . . . leads the soviets, with their national and local ramifications . . . but it cannot and should not replace them by itself."[1]

With collectivization and industrialization intensified in the 1930's, a more open fusion of Party and government became apparent. In Party pronouncements the two were increasingly associated. Then the Party began to address itself directly to a number of government bodies, and since 1931 numerous enactments and laws have been published in the joint name of the Council of Peoples' Commissars and the Central Committee of the Party.

The cycle was completed in 1941, when Stalin assumed the chairmanship of the Council of Peoples' Commissars. For a time jointly promulgated enactments bore the signature of Stalin in his dual capacity as Chairman of the Council and Secretary of the Party Central

[1] Stalin (120), 1934, pp. 38-39.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

Committee. Since that time, Party and government have been publicly associated and closely allied in personnel, operation, and performance. KN 665 642

GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION OF KAZAKHSTAN

KN 631 [647]

The administrative structure of Kazakhstan[1] is at present identical to that in other soviet socialist republics in the USSR, and for that reason no detailed description of the structure itself will be given here. (See Figure 5.) There have, however, been a number of changes in the administrative organization of the republic in the past, and these will be briefly noted.

In 1925 there were 6 regions, 2 circuits, and 123 districts. The district (raion) was first formed in 1924 and may be regarded as a "miniature region" whose boundaries are determined primarily by economic factors. During the 1920's a transition took place from territorial to economic divisions. The last province (gubernia) was abolished in 1930, and in the same year the circuit (okrug) went almost completely out of existence. With its disappearance, the districts became directly subordinated to the regions. Autonomous republics were under the direct jurisdiction of a union republic; Kazakhstan was such an autonomous unit until 1936, forming part of the RSFSR.

Each district is administratively subdivided into village, aul, collective farm, and other soviets (councils). Cities and other settlements of an urban nature form another part of the administrative structure. Usually they are directly subordinated to a district, but large and economically important cities come under direct regional or republic jurisdiction.

By 1936 Kazakhstan had nine regions (oblasts). In 1949 the territorial subdivision of Kazakhstan looked like this: 16 regions; 36 cities (the capital, Alma-Ata, of republic jurisdiction, 20 cities of regional jurisdiction, 15 cities of district jurisdiction); 203 rural districts; 9 municipal wards; 2,674 rural (village or aul) soviets; 115 settlements of city type.[2]

KN [162] K [162]

In 1928, out of a total of 3,868 village-aul soviets, 2,199 were Kazakh, 1,209 Russo-Ukrainian, and 115 Russo-Cossack; 140 were "mixed," and there were 225 soviets of unenumerated minor nationalities.[3] By 1931 the total village-aul soviets numbered 3,763; of these, 2,169 were Kazakh, 1,470 "others," and 124 "mixed."[4] No ethnic breakdown is available for the 1949 figure of 2,674 village-aul soviets. Of the 182 districts listed in 1930, 112 were Kazakh;[5] for 1949 no ethnic breakdown exists.

KN 665 647 K 648

Some information is available on the nationality and social composition among the Supreme Soviet representation. At the 1947 Soviet Congress the 300 deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the KSSR included

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[1] See *Constitution of the Kazakh SSR*, as amended through 1951.

[2] SSSR, *Administrativno-Territorial'noe Delenie Soiuznykh Respublik*, May 1949, pp. 272-295.

[3] *TsIK, Materialy k Otchetu . . .*, 1928.

[4] *Ves' Kazakhstan*, 1931.

[5] *Revoliutsiia i Natsional'nosti*, No. 6, 1930, p. 14.

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8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak

Kazakhstan RQ1

SOVIET STRUCTURE OF THE KAZAKH SSR


COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
ALL-UNION UNION REPRESENTATIVES
MINISTRIES
CONTROL BY THE PARTY ORGANIZATIONS OF EVERY LEVEL
CENTRAL COMMITTEE KSSR COMMUNIST PARTY
PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET KSSR
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS KSSR
SUPREME SOVIET OF THE KSSR
SPECIAL COMMITTEES AND BOARDS
REPUBLIC MINISTRIES
UNION-REPUBLIC MINISTRIES
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ALL-UNION MINISTRIES
REGIONAL (CITY) COMMITTEE
REGIONAL (CITY) SOVIET
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
SECTIONS
ADMINISTRATIONS AND SECTIONS
ADMINISTRATIONS AND SECTIONS
ADMINISTRATIONS
DISTRICT (CITY) COMMITTEE
DISTRICT (CITY) SOVIET
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
SECTIONS
SECTIONS
SECTIONS
SECTIONS
VILLAGE (SETTLEMENT) COMMITTEE
VILLAGE (SETTLEMENT) SOVIET
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
SECTIONS
SECTIONS
ELECTION
CONTROL
COORDINATION
ATTACHED BUT NOT SUBORDINATED
BODIES NOT PERMANENTLY IN SESSION

SOURCE: CONSTITUTIONS OF THE USSR AND THE KAZAKH SSR, OFFICIAL SOVIET PUBLICATIONS DEALING WITH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, POSTWAR ISSUES OF PRAVDA, IZVESTIIA, AND KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA; [illegible] (1951)

Figure 5

8;Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Kazakhstan RQ1

KN 665 647 K [648]

168 Kazakhs, 88 Russians, 33 Ukrainians, and 11 "others." More than two-thirds of the deputies (232) were either candidates or members of the Party. Approximately one-third of the deputies were workers, one-third peasants, and one-third "employees and others."[1]

KN [666]

According to official sources, participation in elections approaches 100 per cent of eligible voters: the latest report claims 3,946,109 eligible voters for Kazakhstan in 1951, of whom 99.99 per cent voted.[2]

K [648] KN [563]

The collectivization drive and the various purges greatly influenced the soviet organization of Kazakhstan during the 1930's. The movement to replace Russian personnel by qualified Kazakhs failed for want of trained Kazakh cadres. The Russians in responsible government posts encountered uncooperative natives. There were too many plans, too little fulfillment. "Great power" chauvinism survived, with the Russians in Kazakhstan looking upon the natives as an "odd assortment" and considering them a bothersome "overhead." Undeniably, there were few qualified personnel to be recruited from among the Kazakhs. Those who did enter government service were treated as inferiors by the entrenched Russians.

These conditions forced the Kazakh Central Executive Committee (TsIK) to plan a thorough improvement in the situation, at the same time that the political and administrative units were being reorganized along economic-production lines. Kazakhstan was one of the five autonomous republics in which the soviet apparatus for districts had to be completely revamped to replace the old tsarist territorial unit, the rural district (Uezd').

KN [206] [207] [563]

The planned reorganization of Kazakh administration ran into many difficulties, caused in large part by poor personnel and primitive communication conditions. In 1930, for example, 82 districts had no radio, telegraph, or telephone connections with the center of the republic.[3] The official language was Russian, yet the reorganization was primarily concerned with districts which were predominantly Kazakh.

K [648] KN [562]

Just when the organizational level appeared to be catching up with the demands of the area, there was a further expansion of the bureaucratic machinery of government. Today the councils at the various levels of government employ virtually an army of public officials who need continuous training to carry out their work. The integration of Kazakhs into the apparatus has never been achieved satisfactorily, and feminine participation in governmental affairs on the local and central levels is still woefully inadequate.

The Party constantly directs its attention toward shortcomings of Kazakh governmental departments. Attacks are made on the Council of Ministers, on the planning agencies of the republic, and on the general central governmental hierarchy for its lack of sensitivity to local conditions and for the manifestation of a "formalistic" attitude toward its obligations.[4] When there were serious shortcomings in agriculture, the

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[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 20 Mar 47.
[2] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (26), III, pp. 8, 24.
[3] *Revoliutsiia i Natsional'nosti*, No. 7, 1930, p. 46.
[4] *Pravda*, 2 Mar 49.

8;Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak Kazakhstan RQ1

665 647 Councils concerned were blamed, together with the local Party, by the powers in Moscow for their failure to ensure that harvesting and grain deliveries be conducted according to plan.[4]

Early in 1951, with campaigns for elections to local soviets under way, the failures of past soviets were brought before the republic population in discussions directed and publicized by the local and national press. Major shortcomings aired at that time included the soviets' disregard of voters' suggestions and the poor state of housing in many cities; it was said that socialist competition was "formalistically" carried out, and not as effective as desired.[5] There were also complaints about poor coordination and cooperation between various governmental agencies in Kazakhstan.[6] A controversy involving manifestations of bourgeois nationalism in the republic led to severe criticism of those government organs concerned with artistic and cultural affairs.[7] The agricultural situation in Kazakhstan presents a constant problem, and warnings came from Moscow, addressed to all those concerned in the Kazakh government, to do something about the unsatisfactory conditions.[8]

At the Sixth Kazakh Party Congress (1952) a general survey was made of the work of the soviets in the major economic and cultural fields. After citing various improvements, speakers reiterated the deficiencies of the governmental agencies; weak control over implementation of high-level decisions, poor functioning of permanent commissions, unsatisfactory solution of problems connected with the national economy. Criticism was directed not only at the various lower echelons of government, but also at the Council of Ministers and its leadership. Throughout, the criticism sounded this keynote: Soviet organs must increase and improve their activities and play a still greater part in the accomplishment of economic and cultural tasks.[9]

The Party has thus consolidated its control over all phases of life [182] in the Soviet Union, including the sphere of government operations. The Kazakh SSR, like other union republics, has a rather complex governmental apparatus. The success of this apparatus is closely related to the tasks set by Party leaders in Moscow. The soviets, like the Party, serve only to perpetuate the Communist dictatorship. The Party's control over the government is accentuated by the concentration of Party and government functions in the same hands. This phenomenon of overlapping leadership is documented at the end of this chapter.

THE JUDICIARY

692 No separate study has been made for this report of judicial affairs in Kazakhstan. Formally, they conform to the standard organization

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[4] *Ibid.*, 10 Sep 49.
[5] *Izvestia*, 24 Jan 51.
[6] *Izvestia*, 4 Apr 51.
[7] *Pravda*, 20 Oct 51.
[8] *Izvestia*, 31 Jul 52.
[9] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 21 Sep 52.

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for the USSR as a whole.[1] Various sources indicate, however, that the Prosecutor and the various courts in Kazakhstan have been kept extremely busy with cases concerned with theft of socialist property, particularly on collective farms. In postwar years the republic press has reported numerous trials involving persons accused of appropriating livestock and food in violation of regulations. The press also carries the usual civil and criminal cases, but it is not surprising to find that the punishment meted out for theft of socialist property, when compared with, for example, that for theft of private property, is disproportionately severe.

This question comes to mind: Are there any known instances when courts treated Kazakh offenders more or less severely than nonnative persons? The dismissal of the Minister of Justice, Nurbaev, was based on his "faulty and unfair" handling of cadre affairs. Could the real charge have been that he did not act forcefully in attacking fellow Kazakhs accused of violating the Agricultural Artel Charter?

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The Party has complained repeatedly about the inactivity of the courts and the prosecutors with regard to some basic, recurring problems. These offices were apparently loath to prosecute cases where it had been established that women were kept out of industrial and administrative positions, in violation of existing rules. And, even more seriously, both courts and prosecutors remained inactive regarding the problem of manifestations of cultural and religious "deviations" in certain areas of Kazakhstan.

Some of these phenomena stem from the collision between the long-established Moslem legal conceptions and the relatively recently introduced Soviet legal ideas and needs, a factor related to the religious problems of the area (see Chapter 4).

THE OVERLAPPING LEADERSHIP OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT

KN 665 647

After a period of organizing and strengthening its position, the Party has achieved actual control over administrative affairs, yet the myth of separation between the political Party and the legislative structure in the Soviet Union still is maintained. At the apex of the hierarchy Stalin, by virtue of his posts as Party Secretary-General and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, united in his person both Party and government leadership. His associates and underlings in Party affairs also functioned in responsible posts in the government.

K [648]

Parallel developments took place in the administrative subdivisions of the Soviet Union. The intertwining of Party and government in the Kazakh Republic can be shown conclusively. Following is a list of the names and positions of various individuals in the KSSR government and Party; in most cases the positions of officeholders and functionaries will be given for the period 1945-1952 (through the Sixth

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[1] Constitutional provisions can be found in the *Kazakh Constitution*, Articles 82-87, and in the *USSR Constitution*, Articles 105-109. For additional information, see J. Towster (123), 1948; 1936 USSR Constitution; Constitution of the KSSR; *Novy Zakon o Sudoustroistve, 1938.*

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Kazakh Party Congress in September 1952).[1] Nationalities have been indicated wherever such information was available or, in its absence, wherever names provide an unequivocal clue.

Afonov, I. I. (Russian). From 1949 on, he functioned as second secretary of the Party, and was a member of the Central Committee bureau and the Central Committee. At the same time, he sat in the Presidium of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet.

Baigaliev, K. B. (Probably Tatar). A Central Committee member since 1951, as well as chief of the Central Committee Fiction and Art Section. He was also chairman of the Cultural Education Committee in the Council of Ministers, and became Minister of Culture in April 1953.

Beisenov, A. B. (Moslem). While chairman of the Council of Professional Unions in Kazakhstan, he was a member of the Party Central Committee from 1949 on.

Byzov, A. P. (Russian). Minister of State Security (MGB) in 1946 and 1947, member of the Central Committee and its bureau from 1946 through 1949.

Daulbaev, A. D. (Karakalpak). A Central Committee bureau candidate in 1949, member of the Central Committee from 1949 on, Commissar for Agriculture (Minister in 1946) from 1945 to 1952, and Minister for Water Resources from 1952.

Dosanov, A. (Kazakh). The chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Court from 1947 on. He was a Central Committee candidate from 1949 on.

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Dospanova, Kh. (Kazakh). She was a Central Committee bureau member in 1951, and was a member of the Central Committee from 1951 on; also on the Central Committee Revision Commission in 1949. Since 1951, a secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, and from 1951 until 1952, secretary of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Dykhnov, N. V. (Russian). Central Committee candidate in 1951 and Komsomol Central Committee secretary since 1951.

Dzhangozin, D. (Kazakh). First secretary of the Alma-Ata Regional Party Committee in 1945, member of the Party Central Committee since 1949, Supreme Soviet chairman in 1947. Vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1951 to 1953, and subsequently Trade Minister.

Ermagambetova, Sh. (Kazakh). A vice-chairman of the Supreme Soviet from 1945, and a Central Committee member since 1949.

Fitin, P. M. (Russian). Member of both Central Committee and bureau since 1951, and Minister for State Security (MGB) from 1952 until the absorption of that Ministry by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in April 1953.

Gubin, V. V. (Russian Jew). Minister for Internal Affairs (MVD) since 1953. He was a Central Committee bureau candidate in 1951, full member of the bureau in 1952, and a member of the Central Committee from 1951 on.

Iakovlev, S. Ia. (Russian). Chief of the Cadre Section, Central Committee in 1945. Member of the Central Committee since 1949, bureau member from 1949 through September 1952, and Party secretary for the same time period. A member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium since 1952.

Ivandeev, I. V. (Russian). Member of the Central Committee from 1949 through 1952. Sovkhoz Minister from February through October 1952.

Kanapin, A. K. (Russian). Central Committee member since 1946, bureau candidate in 1946, and full member from 1949 to 1951. First secretary of the Kazakh Komsomol from 1945, and deputy to the Kazakh Supreme Soviet in 1946.

Karibzhanov, F. (Kazakh). Central Committee member since 1951, bureau candidate in 1951, and full member in 1952. Chief of the Central Committee Agriculture Section from 1951 to 1953, at which time he became Minister for Agriculture and Procurements.

Karzhaubaev, G. Sh. (Kazakh). Third secretary of the Party in 1947, Party secretary from 1949 through 1952. Central Committee bureau member from 1947 through 1952, and member of the Central Committee since 1947. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet from 1951 on.

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[1] The following section corresponds, as far as nationality classifications are concerned, with an independent study made by Dr. Demitri Shimkin of The Bureau of the Census (114).

Kerimbaev, D. (Kazakh). Central Committee bureau member since 1947, and member of the Central Committee from 1949 on. Chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet Presidium since 1947. Vice-chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium in 1948.

Kistauov, A. M. (Kazakh). Central Committee member in 1949, and candidate of the Central Committee since 1951. Vice-chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars in 1945. Commissar (Minister since 1946) of Industrial Crops from 1945-47, and Minister of Sovkhoz from 1951.

Kruglov, S. I. (Russian). Party Central Committee member and bureau member from 1946 to 1949, also second secretary during same period, but dismissed from post in January 1952 as "protector of bourgeois nationalist perversions." Member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium from 1947 to 1953, when he left Kazakhstan.

Kunaev, D. A. (Kazakh). Central Committee candidate in 1949 and 1950, full member since 1951. Vice-chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers from 1947 on. President of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences since 1952.

Mambetov, A. I. (Kazakh). Party Central Committee candidate in 1949 and 1952, Central Committee member from 1951 to 1952. Minister for Agriculture from 1952 to 1953 (when Ministry was merged into new body, the Ministry of Agriculture and Procurements). Supreme Soviet Presidium member from date unknown until 1952, then released to take over post of Minister.

Mukanov, S. M. (Kazakh). Central Committee member from 1949 to 1952, chairman of the Presidium of the Kazakh Union of Soviet Writers, 1945 to 1952, and released at the later date because of position in the nationalist controversy.

Nekliudov, A. I. (Russian). Central Committee member since 1951, and Secretary of the Supreme Soviet Presidium since 1952.

Nikitin, I. I. (Russian). Central Committee member since 1949, assistant editor of *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda* until 1948, and chief editor since then.

Nurumbaeva, M. S. (Kazakh). Central Committee candidate and vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers since 1951.

Sembaev, A. I. (Kazakh). Party Central Committee member from 1949 to 1951; since then Central Committee candidate. Commissar (later Minister) for Education through 1945.

Shaiakhmetov, Ah. (Tatar). Central Committee member since 1938. Second secretary from 1939 to 1946, then first secretary until the purge of February 1954. Also a member of the Central Committee Bureau. Member of the All-Union Party Central Committee, and chairman of the USSR Council of Nationalities in 1952. Member of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet Presidium from 1947 on.

Sharipov, I. S. (Kazakh). Central Committee member since 1949. Member of the Kazakh Party Revision Commission in 1949. Vice-chairman of the Sovnarkom (later Council of Ministers) since 1946.

Shaukenbaev, T. Sh. (Kazakh). Central Committee candidate since 1951, became chairman of Kazakh GOSPLAN in 1859.

Taibekov, E. G. (Kazakh). Central Committee member since 1949, member of the Central Committee bureau since 1951, as well as member of the All-Union Party Central Committee. Chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers from 1951 on.

Tulebaev, T. (Kazakh). Central Committee member since 1949, chief of the Central Committee Planning-Finance-Trade Section from 1949 to 1952, and Minister of Finance since 1951.

Undasynov, N. D. (Kazakh). Central Committee and bureau member from 1949 to 1952. Chairman of the Sovnarkom (later Council of Ministers) until 1951, at which time he was relieved from post for "further studies."

Vlasenko, M. D. (Ukrainian). Central Committee candidate since 1952. Deputy Commissar for Sovkhoz until 1946; from then on, Deputy Minister of Agriculture. Became Minister for Sovkhoz late in 1952.

Zagovelev, A. P. Central Committee member from 1949 until 1952, and bureau member until 1951. Vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers through 1947.

Zhukov, L. G. (Russian). Central Committee member since 1952. Chief of the Central Committee Transportation and Communication Section since 1952. Named Minister for Highways and Highway Transportation in 1953.[1]

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[1] Dr. N. N. Poppe of the University of Washington, as consultant to the project, gave the research team special assistance in the identification of names.

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Dates prior to 1945 were not stated in this summary of leader activities, as the primary concern was to show the overlapping functions for the period since World War II. The key dates for Kazakh Party Congresses, at which elections and nominations for Party posts were made, were: Fourth Congress, February 1949; Fifth Congress, December 1951; Sixth Congress, September 1952. Membership in the Central Committee bureau and posts in the technical apparatus are listed from the Party Congress at which election or appointment was made through the year in which, in the current Congress, the appointment or election was not repeated, unless evidence is available that the individual has been purged or transferred somewhere along the line.

KAZAKH PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

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Several infantry divisions were organized on Kazakh territory during World War II; of these, the 238th and 316th are mentioned most prominently. Little is known with respect to their nationality composition. On the other hand, it is reported that 60 per cent of all KSSR Communist Party members had joined the Armed Forces; the Komsomol, too, supplied a large contingent.

The two divisions cited were thrown into combat in the defense of Moscow and in the battle for Tula. Their losses were staggering. The 238th Infantry Division was rewarded for heroism by being renamed the 30th Guards Division. The 316th Division, led by General Panfilov, was later designated the 8th Guards Division. In Kazakh sources it is often called the Panfilov division for its leader, who was posthumously awarded the title "Hero of the Soviet Union"; the few surviving members of the old division are reverently referred to as Panfilovtsy.[1]

Towster[2] gives pertinent information regarding the distribution of Soviet military honors awarded during the period June 1941-October 1944. The title "Hero of the Soviet Union" was awarded to 5,901 soldiers of whom 57 were Kazakhs. Three million soldiers, including 34,000 Kazakhs, received other orders and medals. The Kazakh share of these awards amounted to about one per cent—fewer than, but not too divergent from, the proportion of Kazakhs in the population of the Soviet Union.

Whether the Kazakh nationals in the Red Army had experiences which were radically different from those of their Russian comrades-in-arms cannot be determined with certainty. As one would expect, available Soviet sources provide no indication that Kazakhs were treated as inferiors. The other avenue of information, German documents captured by the United States Army, provides a totally different picture.

Descriptions of interrogations of prisoners of war of Turkestan origin conducted by German investigators appear occasionally within several bulky files held by the Defense Department Records Branch in

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[1] That few seem to have survived is illustrated by the fact that at the celebrations of the 25th anniversary of Kazakhstan as a republic, only 28 were reported as having participated in a parade.

[2] Towster (123), 1948, p. 357.

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Alexandria.[1] These materials suffer from the German interviewers' lack of skill as well as from biases and distortions supplied by both the Germans and their prisoners. Contradictions are frequent. The soldiers interviewed were defectors or deserters, and this factor must be kept in mind. Nevertheless, these men provide the only information available on service conditions, and certainly some of their reports may be taken seriously.

Almost every man interviewed voiced the opinion that minorities were treated badly in mixed units, especially in those units where Russian officers and noncommissioned officers predominated. Mutual distrust prevailed in such units; minority nationals were kept under surveillance because it was feared that they might desert. Morale among those nationals was low, especially when mail from home arrived announcing unfair or brutal treatment of the soldiers' families (requisitions, inhuman work loads, and so forth). The consensus of opinion among prisoners who belonged to several different units gives some credence to such reports. Further corroboration is supplied by some Russian soldiers interviewed at the same time. These men spoke of their Central Asian comrades as "poor soldiers" and "illiterates."

Some units formed in Central Asia had been organized rather hurriedly and shipped out with little or no training. It is small wonder, then, that such outfits did not resist German pressure effectively. When they asked about the reason for desertion, the German interrogators elicited most frequently the response that the man in question did not want to fight for the Russians. Nobody admitted fear as a direct motivating factor; a few volunteered the additional information that they resented fighting for a regime which had forced the free nomads into collectives.[2] According to interrogators' comments, virtually all Kazakh PW's spoke little or no Russian. German propaganda achieved a measure of success only after it began using the minority languages.

The racial doctrine of the Nazis tended to reinforce unfavorable comparisons made between the German and the Turkic soldiers, and almost barred the way to mutual understanding. Nevertheless, with the advice of civilian experts and officers who had lived in Turkestan and spoke the languages of the volunteers, the Germans managed to create the militarily satisfactory 162nd Infantry Division composed of Turkic nationals. This division stayed in the Italian campaign to the end of the war. It was forced to retreat hastily under pressure on several occasions, yet the German-Turkic solidarity was so high that desertions to the Allied side were often remarkably low, and no case was reported of Asiatic soldiers killing any of the German cadre although conditions were favorable for such action.

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[1] Only a preliminary survey of these materials was made in connection with this study. Although useful information was obtained, it soon became evident that full exploitation of the captured German records for this purpose would far exceed the limitations of time and money established for the present research.

[2] Three Kazakh deserters said that they decided to bolt when they found a German propaganda leaflet telling them (in their native language) that there were no kolkhozes in Germany (October 1942).

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Chapter 8

COMMUNICATION

121 One of the assumptions on which this study is based is that the Kazakhs of Soviet Central Asia are a potentially receptive audience for American psychological warfare. Information gained from the study would seem to support this assumption. Such information could be used to infer psychological vulnerability areas of the target population. But one can do little in the area of vulnerability content—vulnerable to what, under what conditions?—without knowledge of the communication process as it takes place within the target population. In practical terms, before determining what is to be said, the problem of how and through what channel it is to be said in order to reach the given target should be considered.

For this reason, a general discussion of communication conditions in Soviet Central Asia seems appropriate.

LINGUISTIC CONDITIONS[1]

197 The languages of Turkestan may be divided into three general groups: Turkic, Slavic (e.g., Russian, Ukrainian), and Iranian (e.g., Tadzhik).

Since the Kazakhs are a Turkic people, attention will be focused on this group. The major Turkic-speaking peoples are (1) the Kazakhs, Kirgiz, and Karakalpaks, (2) the Uzbeks, and (3) the Turkmen. Uzbek and Turkmen are definitely separate languages, but those of the "three K's" are so similar in their spoken form that they may be viewed as dialects of one language. The following comparisons may benefit readers more familiar with European languages: The relationship between Kazakh and Kirgiz or between Kazakh and Karakalpak is roughly similar to that between the Czech and Slovak languages, or between the Danish and Norwegian.

In geographic areas where related languages have existed side by side, transitional strips may be found where the dialect spoken by the population has been clearly influenced by the language of their neighbors. The chief difference between the speech of the Karakalpaks and that of the Kazakhs, for example, is that the former language replaces initial "t" by "d" and "k" by "g". This feature is characteristic of Turkmen,

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115 [1] Much of the material on linguistic conditions is based on a discussion with Dr. N. N. Poppe of the University of Washington.

which borders the Karakalpak. Similarly, Kirgiz is differentiated from 197
Kazakh by minor sound changes. Within Kazakhstan proper two dialects may be found which derive their respective labels from the way the word for "no" is pronounced: (1) jŏk (dzhok), in the eastern parts of the republic, and (2) zŏk (zhok), in the western and northern parts of Kazakhstan.

These are, however, minor differences. The main point is that for purposes of oral communication Kazakh, Kirgiz, and Karakalpak are so mutually intelligible as to form a single language.

In writing and printing, the Turks of Central Asia used the Arabic 212
script until the 20th century. In the 1930's Soviet authorities introduced first the Latin and in 1939-1940 the Cyrillic alphabets, with certain necessary additions for each language. The resultant orthographies present slightly differing appearances for Kazakh and Kirgiz. This difference constitutes a handicap, even for educated readers, to those unaccustomed to reading printed matter in both languages. Nevertheless, after a little initial hesitation, a Kazakh reader will be able to make out the content of an article in an unfamiliar Kirgiz newspaper. The communicator trying to reach both Kirgiz and Kazakhs by means of a written or printed document in one of these languages should therefore be aware that he must provide some incentive to readers of the other language to expend the extra effort.

In delimiting a target group within the Kazakh SSR one should remember that Slavs (Russians and Ukrainians) constitute over half of 191
the total population. Russian is the language of the politically dominant 648
group; the central government in Moscow is determined to make it the lingua franca of the realm. How much bilingualism this effort has produced among the Kazakhs is not known. Communist Party authorities frequently complain about the inadequacy of Russian instruction in Kazakh SSR schools. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the proportion of Kazakhs with knowledge of Russian has increased greatly in the last two decades. No quantitative information in this respect is available, but a few generalizations can be made. In general, more Kazakh men than women, and more young people than old, learn the Russian language.
One finds proportionately more Russian-speaking Kazakhs in urban [369]
areas than in rural (and fewest among the remaining nomadic tribes), and more among those whose socialstatus makes knowledge of Russian a necessity for maintaining that status, such as political and professional leaders and workers in prestige manual occupations such as railroading.

On the other hand, the proportion of Russians in the KSSR who have a good working knowledge of the Kazakh language is probably small. Those who have such knowledge are minor officials, Party functionaries, work foremen, and others who deal with the monolingual Kazakh population in a direct supervisory capacity. 191

Much more would have to be said about bilingualism in a study of the other four union republics in Soviet Central Asia.[3] The fact that

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[3] The Tartars of Turkestan deserve special mention in this context: They owe their important historical position as traders and mediators between the Turks and Russians to their knowledge of languages, high general educational standards (e.g., literacy), and zeal as teachers of Islam. However, it is probable that the influence of this small ethnic group (about 1% in 1926) has declined in the last quarter of a century.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

-Kazakhstan RQ1

K 191 some persons know or understand a second language in addition to their native tongue may be to the advantage of the communicator using mass channels, since such knowledge thus increases the number of people which messages in that language may be expected to reach. But it is essential that the propagandist know the role of the secondary language in the mind of the audience. Emotional opposition of the receiver to the language of the communicator (because it represents to him the language of the oppressor) may counteract the most carefully determined content.

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LITERACY

The usefulness of the various printed media of communication depends on the literacy rate of a given population. According to Lorimer, in 1926 only 7.1 per cent of all Kazakhs "were able to read (in any language)."[1] This proportion placed them, according to the census of that year, ahead (!) of all native Central Asian groups except the Taranchi (8.5%). At that time the over-all proportion of persons aged nine years or older within the Kazakh republic who were able to read was 22.8 per cent (male 32.6%, female 12.5%). The comparable figures from the 1939 census are included in Table 11.

Table 11

LITERACY IN THE KSSR AND RSFSR, 1939*

Republic	Male Population	Female Population	Total Population
KSSR	85.2	66.3	76.3
RSFSR	92.3	73.0	81.9

*Percentage of persons aged nine or older able to read or write. From Lorimer (88), 1946, p. 199.

If one assumes that roughly half the population of the KSSR were Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, Belo-Russians) and half were Turkic nationals (Kazakhs and a small number of Uzbeks and Taranchi), and that the RSFSR literacy rate is representative of the Slavic group, an estimate of 70.7 per cent literacy can be derived for the Turkic group as a whole. However, the Uzbek rate is lower than that of the Kazakhs, and quite probably the Slavs constituted less than half of the population of the KSSR; therefore the best estimate of the literacy rate in 1939 among the Kazakhs in Kazakhstan would appear to be approximately 72 per cent.

These data indicate an apparent tenfold increase between 1926 and 1939 in the literacy rate among Kazakhs in the KSSR. This is misleading, for the censuses were not based on the same definition of literacy; the figures for 1926 included only those able to read, while the 1939 figures include persons able to read or write. Thus the 1939 census may list as literate a number of people who were merely able to sign their

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[1] Lorimer (88), 1946, p. 58.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
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names. This discrepancy should not be overemphasized, however; Lorimer's comment on Tadzhikistan may be pertinent here as well:[4]

> "The change in definition would appear to indicate a relaxation of standards in census procedure, but it would be gratuitous to attribute the phenomenal change mainly to this factor. The apparent trend is supported by an abundance of circumstantial evidence."

No doubt the proportion of Kazakhs able to read and write is on the increase. When the next figures are published, the Soviet authorities may well claim 90 per cent literacy among the Kazakhs. Yet, how many of these people knew the Latin alphabet (still in force in 1939), but have not "converted" to Cyrillic? How great is the "reading ability" of those who learned the art as adults and perhaps against their will? How effective are the literacy programs, as measured by followups and retests? Library research cannot provide adequate answers to such questions. One can only assume that as simple rules of thumb the same generalizations that describe Kazakh knowledge of the Russian language apply to Kazakh literacy as well. These generalizations may be helpful in attempts to pinpoint relatively small target groups.

COMMUNICATION CONDITIONS IN KAZAKHSTAN

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The development of communication systems in Kazakhstan has followed the pattern already noted there in other industrial and technological areas. Many changes have been introduced since Tsarist times—better machines and equipment, more modern techniques—but progress has been slow, and the picture is still one of glaring deficiency.

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First Secretary Shaiakhmetov reported on communication conditions at the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Party Congresses (in 1949, 1951, and 1952). According to Kazakhstanskaia Pravda,[5] he said that a number of new telegraph lines had been built, but that 19 district centers had no direct wire connections with regional capitals.[6] Construction of these lines was anticipated within three or four years (from 1951). Alma-Ata, the capital of the republic, still lacked adequate telegraph connections with the district centers.

In 1949, Shaiakhmetov reported, Alma-Ata had regular telephone connections with 56 cities and 135 districts. In both 1951 and 1952, he complained about the lack of progress and called for (1) construction of lines to all village-aul soviets and sovkhozes, (2) reliable connections between the regional capitals and MTS's, MZh's, and cattle herding centers, (3) construction of automatic telephone exchanges in such cities as Balkhash, Temir-Tau, and Dshezkazgan, (4) reconstruction, expansion, and modernization of exchanges in other population centers, and (5) radio-telephone connections between district centers and remote herding points.[7]

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 199.

[5] 25-26 Feb 49, 16 Dec 51, 21 Sep 52.

[6] This constituted less than 10% of all Kazakh SSR districts.

[7] On 4 Aug 49 *Pravda* reported: "Kazakh herdsmen who graze their herds in steppes hundreds of kilometers from the nearest village maintain contact with the rest of the country through 180 two-way radios and hundreds of receivers."

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Kazakhstan RQ1

K 121 The western observer should keep in mind the following considerations when evaluating contemporary technological conditions in Central Asia:

(1) However backward conditions may seem to the outsider, to the native observer—who possesses no foreign yardstick—the situation appears far advanced over the past. Indeed, local conditions may be greatly superior technologically to neighboring, more primitive republics and countries (Sinkiang, for example).

(2) Although the normal process of cultural diffusion, accelerated by the introduction of mass communication media, results in some technological progress in backward areas (even against strong local opposition), this progress does not necessarily go hand in hand with social advances; it may in some cases be detrimental to the welfare of the native group.

(3) The price paid for technological advances, in terms of sacrifice and suffering, should be considered as a separate problem, and its psychological significance should be seriously investigated.

MASS MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION[1]

KN 20 The communication system of any country is an integral part of that country's culture and society, and should be understood and evaluated in that context. The part played by mass communication media in the Soviet Union differs in several important characteristics from that of the western press, radio, and film. First, all mass media in the USSR are controlled by the central authorities. Secondly, they are used by the authorities as tools which complement and reinforce each other in the achievement of ideologically grounded goals; they form a true system of "mass persuasion." Thirdly, certain physical and technological conditions have called for solutions which differ from western practices. And finally, news is presented in a manner consonant with the over-all goals; entertainment is secondary to the education of the public.

The Press

KN 204 665 208 The press in the Soviet Union is viewed as a major social force that must be harnessed and adapted to facilitate attainment of the society's defined goals. And since the Communist Party determines the goals of Soviet society, the Party controls the press. The press is expected to operate according to the principle of partiinost'—militant loyalty to the Party. In this sense Stalin has spoken of the press as a transmission belt between the masses and the Party.[2] (However, studies by the Russian Research Center at Harvard indicate that the role of the press was overestimated by Stalin.)

It is not surprising, therefore, that the press is given the assignment of eradicating from the minds of the people ideas of capitalism, psychological remnants of feudalism, and aspirations of nationalism. By providing a forum for the public expression of criticism and *samokritika* ("self-criticism," in reality more like public confession of sins), the press serves as an organ of enforcement and frequently of terror. For these reasons, then, a detailed and sophisticated study of Soviet press content is probably the best avenue toward understanding contemporary Soviet history. As an illustration of this, the reader will have noted that the single most important source for this report is the official newspaper of the Kazakh Communist Party, *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*.

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[1] This section is based largely on Inkeles (68), 1950.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136.

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This republic daily sets the tenor for the other Kazakh SSR papers by calling attention to the prescribed topics of the day. These topics, which may have originated locally or may be reprints of an all-Union paper such as *Pravda*, are then picked up and repeated by the local press. This indication of hierarchical organization in the KSSR press is substantiated by an analysis of the number of papers published at various administrative levels (see Table 12).

Table 12

NUMBER OF KAZAKHSTAN NEWSPAPERS
BY ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL,
1937 AND 1952

Level	1937[a]	1952[b]
Republic	10	5
Region	21	32
District and city	162	220[c]
"Lower-level" (farm and factory)	153	([d])

[a] *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo*, 1939 (Table 26); *Pechat' SSSR v 1937 godu*, 1938.

[b] *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, Vol. 19, 1953, p. 348. (The same figures reported by *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 21 Sep 52)

[c] Of which seven are city papers.

[d] Not mentioned in the enumeration.

This hierarchical pyramid is similar to the configuration shown by Inkeles for the USSR as a whole.[9] The number of papers increases and the circulation per paper decreases as one goes from higher to lower levels. The figure shown for the lowest category (*Nizovye gazety*—"lower-level" papers) would be increased considerably if one were to include all those "newspapers" which are produced by non-typographic means, such as wall newspapers made in single copies by typing or handwriting, or factory papers prepared by such methods as hectographing. The total number of papers and their combined circulation is shown in Table 13 for those years for which data are available.

The ratio of number of newspapers to population in Kazakhstan is similar to that in the USSR as a whole—one newspaper per 27,000-28,000 inhabitants (the exact ratio depending upon the specific population

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 148, Table 3.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

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Table 13

NUMBER AND CIRCULATION OF NEWSPAPERS IN KAZAKHSTAN

Year	Number	Total Circulation
1937[a]	345	ND
1940 (Jan)[b]	220	940,000
1947[c]	266	ND
1949 (Feb)	238[b]	758,000[d]
1951 (Nov)[d]	246	865,000
1952 (Sep)[e]	257	882,000

[a] *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo.*
[b] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 26 Feb 49.
[c] *Sovetskaia pechat' v tsifrakh.*
[d] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 16 Dec 51.
[e] *Ibid.*, 21 Sep 52.
ND: No data available.

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estimate).[1] The estimated population of the KSSR in 1952 was 7,000,000 and the total newspaper circulation 882,000; hence for every 1,000 persons there were 126 newspaper copies. The corresponding figure for the USSR in the late 1940's was 118 copies per 1,000 individuals (based on a total circulation of 23,600,000, and an estimated population of 200,000,000). On the basis of this crude comparison, it would appear that access to newspapers is at least as great in the KSSR as it is in the Soviet Union as a whole.[2] Unfortunately, no pertinent data were found on newspaper circulation in the USSR according to language of publication. However, information on numbers of papers at given times permits the compilation of Table 14, showing the proportion of Kazakh-language papers in the republic.

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The proportion of the Kazakh language papers has remained remarkably stable, if the available figures can be taken at face value. Since the 1939 census the number of Kazakh papers seems to have remained at slightly more than one-half of the total; it is conceivable that this proportion has been dictated from above, to strengthen the pretense that the KSSR is entitled to the name Kazakh, for the Kazakhs certainly form less than one-half of the republic's population.

It is very probable that the combined daily circulation of the Russian-language newspapers is greater than that of the Kazakh-language press.[3]

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[1] *Pravda*, 5 May 49, reported 7,200 newspapers for the USSR. The total of 257 newspapers in the KSSR (Table 13) was divided into a rounded population figure of 7,000,000 inhabitants.

[2] Including the circulation of the all-Union press, the USSR ratio would be 155 copies per 1,000 inhabitants. The comparable figures for the United States (English-language dailies only) as of September 1952: circulation 54 million, population 160 million, or 337 copies per 1,000 inhabitants. These ratios come closer together when only the population aged 15 and older is considered: USSR 340, United States 470 per 1,000 inhabitants.

[3] The above figures first appeared (for the year 1947) in *Sovetskaia pechat' v tsifrakh*, 1948. Older information corroborates the hypothesis that Russian-language papers have a much higher average circulation than the Kazakh ones. For example, *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo Kazakhskoi ASSR*, p. 305, lists as of 1 Jan 35 a total of 163 newspapers with a circulation of 351,000. The Russian papers (55) had a mean circulation of *3,470*, whereas the 84 Kazakh-language papers had an average circulation of exactly *half* that number. (There were 24 papers of unspecified languages with an average circulation of 610 each.)

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

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Table 14

PROPORTION OF KAZAKH-LANGUAGE PAPERS

Year	Total Number of Papers	Kazakh-Language Papers	Kazakh-Language Proportion of Total (%)
1937[a]	345	163	47
1940[b]	220	126	57
1947[c]	266	139	52
1952[d]	257	135[e]	53

[a] *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo.*

[b] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 26 Feb 49.

[c] *Sovetskaia pechat' v tsifrakh.*

[d] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 16 Dec 51.

[e] An estimate based on a language distribution in the *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, for district-level papers. Of 213 such papers, 117 were Kazakh, 91 Russian, 3 Uigur, and 2 Uzbek. It was assumed that each of the 16 regions publishes a Kazakh paper as well as a Russian, and that there is at least one city-level and one republic Kazakh-language paper.

Whereas quantitative information on the circulation of Kazakh-language papers is conveniently omitted from the 1952 edition of the standard Soviet encyclopedia (*Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*), the same source cites as an achievement the figures for the largest Kazakh monthlies: *Pioneer*, 10,000; *Kommunist*, 7,000; and *The People's Teacher* (*Narodnyi uchitel'*), 5,000. All of these periodicals as well as 90 per cent of all books produced in the Kazakh Republic are printed in Alma-Ata.

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In 1937, according to a specialized Soviet source, more than 85 per cent of the books published in Kazakhstan were printed in the capital, Alma-Ata.[5] In that year 5,300,000 volumes were published in the republic, of which almost 90 per cent were written in the Kazakh language;[6] most of the non-Kazakh books were in Russian. The 4,700,000 volumes in the Kazakh language included 252 titles,[7] which represents a mean edition figure of 18,600, surprisingly high for a minority language. By subject matter, most KSSR books fell into one of these four categories:[8] (1) belles-lettres (26%), (2) politics, law, and "socialist construction" (18%), (3) mathematics and physical sciences (14%), and (4) linguistics and philology (12%).

The war had a devastating effect on the book publishing trade in the Soviet Union. The total number of volumes published was 20 per cent smaller in 1947 than in 1937 (see Table 15). Within the Kazakh republic, however, the number of volumes published actually increased by 20 per cent during that period. Accompanying this increase in production was a significant change in the ratio of native- to nonnative-language publications (see Table 16). The number of books published in the Kazakh language was cut almost in half, while the number of publications in

[5] *Pechat' SSSR v 1937 godu*, 1938.

[6] *Sovetskaia pechat' v tsifrakh.*

[7] *Pechat' SSSR v 1937 godu*, 1938.

[8] *Ibid.*

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2 Kazakhstan RQ1

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219 other languages (chiefly Russian) increased by five times the 1937 figure. The same change in the relative numbers of native-language and Russian-language titles occurred in Uzbekistan, although not to such an extreme degree.[1]

Table 15

BOOKS PUBLISHED IN THE USSR AND SELECTED REPUBLICS, 1937 AND 1947*

Area	1937	1947
USSR	674,000,000	541,000,000
RSFSR	549,000,000	439,000,000
UzSSR	11,600,000	6,800,000
KSSR	5,300,000	6,400,000

*Compiled from Tables 3 and 4 of the standard volume, *The Soviet Press in Figures (Sovetskaia pechat' v tsifrakh)*.

Table 16

BOOKS PUBLISHED IN KSSR AND UzSSR BY LANGUAGE OF PUBLICATION

Year	Kazakhstan		Uzbekistan	
	Kazakh Language	Other Languages	Uzbek Language	Other Languages
1937[a]	4,700,000	600,000	9,900,000	1,700,000
1938[b]	6,200,000	1,400,000	ND	ND
1947[a]	3,400,000	3,000,000	4,700,000	2,100,000

[a] Figures from Tables 4 and 5 of *Sovetskaia pechat' v tsifrakh*.
[b] Figures from *Tsifry o pechati SSSR*.
ND: No data available.

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[538] The literary production of Kazakhstan in 1937 was given as 322 titles, of which 182 were original works and 140 were translations. (The parallel figures for Uzbekistan were 498 titles, 310 originals and 188 translations.)[2] It may be assumed that again most titles fell into the belles-lettres category. In some Soviet statistics this category is further subdivided into prose, drama, and poetry. No detailed data are available for the postwar period, but in 1937 Kazakh literary production was similar in respect to these subcategories to the total USSR "non-Russian language" production.

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[1] These data lend themselves to a dual interpretation. One might say that although the native population had probably grown in size and certainly in relative literacy in those 10 years, it was being given less reading material than before the war. The Kazakhs could not turn to any books published in their language elsewhere in the USSR, since such production (if any) would be negligible. On the other hand, the 1947 ratio of native to nonnative publications corresponds more closely to the actual ethnic composition of the population.

[2] Table 6 in *Sovetskaia pechat' v tsifrakh*.

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Of the belles-lettres publications in the USSR during the 1938-1947 decade, 16,400,000 titles were in the Russian language and 9,000,000 titles were in non-Russian languages. Prose works constituted almost 60 per cent of the Russian titles, only 36 per cent of the non-Russian. Corresponding figures for drama were 11 per cent and 8 per cent, for poetry 23 per cent and 46 per cent, and for other works 7 and 10 per cent, respectively.[1]

Almost half of the belles-lettres publications in the minority languages were poetry; the corresponding proportion of the Russian works was less than a fourth. The popularity among these people of poetry as an art form, and the significance of this finding for psychological warfare against Soviet minorities, seem fairly evident.

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Radio

Despite the claims of Party leaders, many people within the Soviet Union read very poorly. In a target audience where such is the case, the spoken word is a more effective means of communication. The standard medium of mass communication by the less-demanding spoken word is radio.

To the American observer it may seem that radio in the USSR plays but a minor role in comparison to the position this medium has achieved in the United States. Such a situation is certainly not due to official Soviet policy. The Russians are keenly aware of their need for more widespread utilization of the radio; this need is reflected in the Soviet term radiofikatsiia ("radiofication").

Organizationally, the Soviet radio system differs from the networks found in the United States or from the internal operation of the BBC in Great Britain in two major ways: (1) the extensive use of short waves in internal broadcasting (from roughly 75 meters or 40 KC down) and (2) the networks of wired speakers.

Short-wave broadcasting in local and relatively short-range traffic is popular in Latin America. If one may judge from the specifications of new Soviet receivers (published regularly in the periodical Radio[2]), the short-wave bands will play an even larger role in the Soviet Union in the future. Some indication of the relative importance of such broadcasts for the Kazakh SSR may be inferred from the distribution of transmitters. The CIA list of "Broadcasting Stations of the World" shows as of September 1952 a total of 12 transmitters operating in the KSSR, of which 10 are in the short-wave bands.[3]

A more strikingly Soviet phenomenon is the radio-diffusion exchange, radio-transliatsionnii uzel,[4] with its wired speakers, radiotochki. These speakers are found in homes of subscribers as well as in public places

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[1] Table 33 in *Sovetskaia pechat' v tsifrakh*, 1948.

[2] Particularly interesting in this respect is the article "Standards for Radio Receivers," *Radio*, 1951, No. 9, pp. 11-13.

[3] The other two transmitters operated out of Alma-Ata (1103 meters, 10 kw) and Karaganda (412 meters, 20 kw). Eight of the short wave transmitters were based at Alma-Ata, the others at Guryev and Taldy-Kurgan.

[4] Also called *radiouzel or transliatsionnii uzel.*

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307 (clubs, dormitories, houses of culture) and even in town squares. The exchange itself acts sometimes as a relay station for a distantly produced program (which comes to it by air waves or intercity telephone line), sometimes like our local radio station with live and transcribed programs, and at other times as a public address system for important announcements. The closest American equivalent to such a system would be a combination of the well-known subscription outfit "Music by Muzak" and the hotel radio system. (From the point of view of the USSR listener, the latter would be considered the height of luxury, since it usually permits a choice of several stations. The owner of a wired speaker usually has only the choice of turning the thing on, up, or off, and often—because of social pressure in his environment—not even that.[5]) The exchange and wired-speaker system has two virtues in the eyes of the authorities: Control is easily exercised, and, secondly, since one [308] exchange may run several hundred or even several thousand speakers, the saving in the production of amplifiers and tuners is considerable.

In 1947 wired speakers composed more than 80 per cent of all equipment capable of carrying radio programs to the home, dormitory, club, or elsewhere. For the entire USSR, the absolute figures for 1947 included approximately 6,500,000 speakers and fewer than 1,500,000 radio sets (including crystal receivers not equipped for long-distance reception).[6]

Information regarding radiofikatsiia in the Kazakh SSR is scarce, and what there is takes the usual form of exhortation or complaint. Party Secretary Shaiakhmetov stated in February 1949 that radio exchanges and wired speakers had greatly increased since 1940. On the basis of his speech before the Fourth Party Congress, one can estimate that in 1940 the receiving network included 230 exchanges with 94,000 speakers, and in 1949, 283 exchanges with 172,000 speakers.

From these figures it is clear that the networks of exchanges have grown in size (from an average of approximately 410 speakers per exchange to a mean of 610), probably as a concomitant of increased urbanization; taking these numbers at face value and comparing them with parallel figures for the Soviet Union as a whole, one can see that the Kazakh republic was limping behind the rest of the Union.[7]

In 1940 there were 66 people in the KSSR for every radio speaker; in the USSR, there was one speaker for every 36 persons. In 1949 the figures were 40 persons per speaker in the KSSR, 25 per speaker in the USSR. These figures are not surprising, since rural areas generally have fewer radios even in European Russia. The Secretary of the KSSR Komsomols in 1950 complained in a letter to Radio[8] that although the Ministry of Communications was running several hundred exchanges, with as many as 200,000 speakers, the rural territory was badly neglected. Radio conditions among herders, especially in North and East Kazakhstan, are very bad.

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[5] Some networks are now being built which will be able to carry two or more programs.

[6] Iakeles (68), 1950, p. 248, Table 5, and p. 250.

[7] *Ibid.*, and p. 246.

883 [8] Kasapin, "Komsomol'tsi pomogaiut radiofitsirovat' sela i auly" ("The Komsomols help to introduce radio into the villages and auls"), *Radio*, 1950, No. 7, p. 16.

The available information indicates that corrective measures in these deficient areas may take these forms: (1) subsidiary exchange hookups with existing exchanges and (2) the introduction of a number of crystal sets. However, the proportion of tube receivers among the rural population of Kazakhstan probably will not increase in the near future. Similarly, it is safe to say that since tube receivers have to be imported from the western part of the USSR, the proportion of such sets in the KSSR will remain, even in urban areas, lower than that in the western republics.

The latest available information about radio in the Kazakh SSR may be found in an article on the republic in the 1953 volume of the Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia. This article claims 300,000 speakers (without clarifying whether this number includes regular sets or not). Assuming a population of 7,200,000 for the republic, one arrives at a mean of 24 inhabitants per unit of listening equipment.

As an afterthought to this discussion on radio facilities, it might be mentioned that as of this writing television had not penetrated into Kazakhstan.

Film

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During World War II the film studios of Moscow and Leningrad transferred their operation to Alma-Ata. Because of the favorable climate of the city and its environs, the area became, temporarily, the "Hollywood of the Soviet Union." However, when Mosfilm and Lenfilm removed their equipment, full-length film production in the Alma-Atinsk studios came to a standstill. It was reported that in 1947 they were not working at all; later they concentrated on dubbing films in the Kazakh language.[1] Several documentary films were made there in the postwar period. The needs of the film audience were served by exhibiting older Soviet films and, in the latest period, perhaps by the showing of films made in the satellite countries. But solutions worked out by the film authorities did not satisfy Party officials.

Again it was Shaiakhmetov who voiced sharp criticism. After quoting Stalin as saying that the movies are an "important means of mass agitation" he attacked the Ministry of Cinematography for not having produced a single art film about Kazakhstan in three years (as of December 1951) and not enough documentaries. Qualitatively, the films were unsatisfactory because they made little use of "contemporary themes and issues" (1949), and because they did not bring out clearly enough the friendship of the Russian and Kazakh peoples (1952). Distribution of films and of projecting equipment was also found wanting (1949, 1951).

The Soviets have developed a unique system concerning the location and use of film projectors. The Soviet Union had in 1938 a total of 31,000 projectors of standard 35mm type, but only 55 per cent of these were mounted in stationary locations.[2] The other 45 per cent were

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[1] According to the *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, 80 films were dubbed in Kazakh in 1945-1952. The same source also cites the Alma-Atinsk studios as publishers of a weekly film magazine, *Sovetskii Kazakhstan*.

[2] Inkeles (68), p. 303, Table 7.

546 peredvizhki (mobile or portable installations), most of which operated in rural locations. Of the almost 17,000 stationary installations, only 17 per cent were located in motion picture theaters; more than 60 per cent were to be found in clubs.

No such detailed information is available for the KSSR. However, the strong relationship between mobile installation and rural location appears to be true here also (see Table 17).

Table 17

PROJECTION UNITS IN THE KAZAKH ASSR, 1935[a]

Type of Unit	Urban	Rural	Total
Stationary	195	114	309
Mobile	64	422	486
Not specified	0	39	39
Total	259	575	834

[a] From Table 22, *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo Kazakhskoi ASSR*, 1936.

Since 1935 the number of projection units has risen to 1,283 in 1952, according to the Soviet encyclopedia,[1] an increase similar in proportion to that of the entire USSR.[2] One should bear in mind that not all of these projectors contained sound equipment, that many mobile units were not mounted on trucks and were therefore unwieldy, and that some of these units had no generator and were dependent on local electric power.

On the other hand, Shaiakhmetov pointed out in 1951 that 90 per cent of all government movie houses (number unknown) had new equipment.[3] Also, lest the reader despair over the cinematic progress of the Kazakh SSR, let it be said that in 1939 another Central Asian republic, the Tadzhik SSR, had but 122 projectors to serve a population of 1,500,000.[4]

OTHER FORMS OF COMMUNICATION

30 Considerable attention has been devoted to the formal channels of mass communication because detailed information was available and because in a population which is being rapidly sedentarized and urbanized, the formal media assume increased importance. More and more people of Kazakhstan will be reached by press, radio, and film. Communication conditions in the sparsely populated rural areas are less favorable, however, and the situation is worst among the nomadic shepherds.

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[1] *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, Vol. 19, p. 358. A total of 846 with 279 sound projectors is given for 1938 in *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo*, 1933-1938 (Table 15).

[2] Inkeles (68), gives data for 1936 and a five-year plan estimate for the end of 1950, in Table 6, p. 301. The comparison yields an increase of 60%—perhaps a little overoptimistic, since it is based on plan estimate. The Kazakh increase was 54% over a somewhat longer period.

[3] As reported in *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 16 Dec 51.

[4] Inkeles (68), p. 305.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

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Nevertheless, among primitive peoples news often travels with amazing alacrity. One example of a technologically primitive but effective medium is the "jungle telegraph" of relayed tom-tom beats. The people of the steppe also developed an institution for the rapid transmission of news and rumor: the uzun kulak (the "long ear"). As soon as a given item of news reached an aul, a man mounted his horse and sped to the nearest encampment to inform its inhabitants of imminent danger or the presence of the tax collector. This form of rumor-through-cavalry still achieves some surprising results. During the collectivization drive, it frequently happened that by the time the grain-collecting party arrived in an area, all Kazakhs had disappeared—men, women, children, animals, tents, grain, and all. Soviet sources testify to many instances of the effectiveness of the uzun kulak. In view of its institutionalized character, "the long ear" qualifies for mention as an established means of communication in Kazakhstan.

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The "long ear" is a peculiarly Kazakh form of communication. Another communication phenomenon of typically Soviet origin is that of mass agitation. Inkeles devotes a goodly part of his book to the topic of agitation and the agitator. From the point of view of the audience (kolkhoz or factory workers, miners, students, or the public at large), the agitators are transmitters of the current Party line regarding theoretical orthodoxy, persuaders who must induce their listeners to fulfill given economic goals. According to official figures 60 per cent of all agitators were KSSR Party members. The rest came mostly from the Komsomol organization.[1]

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In 1949, there were 12,580 propagandists (of whom only 400 were full-time propaganda workers) and 122,000 agitators in the KSSR;[2] in 1951, the figures reported were 15,810 and 158,652.[3]

A particularly interesting form of agitation is the Red Yurt. The use of Red Yurts in Kazakhstan is comparable to that of Red Tents in other critical Soviet areas. Red Yurts travel across the country, stopping in areas where the Party wants to intensify its drive for bigger and better production. In 1948, for example, a Red Yurt was set up in Western Kazakhstan; it served the livestock breeders of a large collective. Among them it organized 300 veterinary, literary, agitation brigade, and dramatic circles. Its library contained more than 500 books on art, politics, and technical subjects.[4]

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The activities of the Red Yurt illustrate a major truth about the Soviet Union: It is extremely difficult to delineate within any area of the Soviet Union what falls under the heading of communication, or agitation and propaganda, or perhaps information and education.

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[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 26 Feb 49.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*, 16 Dec 51.

[4] *Kul'turno-Prosvetitel'naia Rabota*, Vol. 13, No. 7, July 1952, p. 47.

8;Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Chapter 9

CULTURAL AFFAIRS: THE POLITICS OF "CULTURE" AND EDUCATION

SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY

177 Much has been written on the subject of Soviet nationality policy; one calls to mind the ironic promise of full national self-determination asserted by Lenin and by Stalin. In keeping with this, the grandiose, term "union republic" is applied to Kazakhstan and other divisions of the Soviet Union. Lesser areas, such as the Karakalpak region, are called autonomous republics. The lower the political unit in the Soviet hierarchy, the greater the Soviet insistence on this facade of independence and autonomy.

Soviet doctrine states that nationalism is only a formal concern, not a contentual nor substantive one. On the contrary, they say, the substance and reality of Soviet culture is socialism, however much the doctrine of nationalism is preached. "Nationalist in form, socialist in content" is a formula once frequently cited to characterize Soviet nationality policy.

From an anthropological point of view, the Soviet nationality policy is a problem of contact between cultures, or acculturation. But it is based on a special sort of cultural impact. In most of the world, cultures or civilizations have been in continuing contact with one another; the Russian contact with the peoples of Siberia and Central Asia from the 17th century to 1917 was typical in many ways. But the present Soviet pattern is like none of the others. In the past the impact of western civilization on the rest of the world occurred with no thought to the eventual outcome of the impact. The Soviets, on the contrary, have a definite plan. The leaders have determined the path along which the minor peoples must develop toward Sovietization, and they have fixed the image of the final goal. This is controlled acculturation.

Whether the goal will be achieved is questionable; too little is yet known by social scientists about the total nature of culture, and the problems involved in changing the relation of a part to the whole, to permit the effective and predictable realization of such minutely planned change. In the Soviet Union such problems have not been explored at all, if one may judge by the anthropological literature of the USSR.

Thus the professed aims of Sovietization exist only on paper; they have little more value than other items of political propaganda. But one cannot escape the fact that the various societies and peoples of the 177 Soviet Union are being reshaped and remolded with the image of Soviet culture as the target. The political life is that of Moscow's creation, as is the economic; the religious is that which is permitted by the central regime. The language of each nationality—as it is taught in the schools, or written in the newspapers—is the one which Moscow has decided upon. The various nationalities themselves have been regrouped, often arbitrarily, for the purpose of greater convenience of administration by Moscow.

The grandiose and sweeping nature of the changes planned under Soviet nationality policy is sufficient to assure that major change is in fact taking place. A question exists only in regard to the direction such change will take and how far it will deviate from the plan. Whatever the direction of change, the cost in dislocation and suffering among the minority peoples will remain enormous.

KAZAKH ART AND LETTERS

In the chapter dealing with Kazakh religion and religious develop- 668 ments, a discussion of current trends in history writing in Central Asia was included to illustrate the rise of nativism, the idealization of native culture. While the connection between historiography and religion is not immediately apparent, there is an underlying relationship. This relationship may be more easily traced when one is applying the methods of cultural anthropology, as was the case in the discussion of religion. If one starts with the premise that the various aspects of a people's life are an interrelated whole, it follows that the religious life bears upon the economic, the economic on the religious, the political on the artistic. The concept of nativism has been used as a means of synthesizing the different cultural trends in Kazakhstan. The sig- [814] nificance of the glorification of their past by native Kazakh historians during the Soviet era is clear. The historical traditions of the Kazakhs are important to them; around those traditions they were building in the 1940's the nucleus of an independent revival of Kazakh culture. The Soviets regarded this as dangerous, and the participants were either purged or warned away from the theme.

This sort of cultural revival is a type of nativism known in many parts of the world; the common feature such revivals share is a distinctive religious tone. But it is not the old religion which is being revived among the Kazakhs; rather, the old traditions are being treated in a religious fashion. These traditions become a religion, and the renewed interest in them a religious revival. The movement among the Kazakhs to revive the traditions of the past immediately became involved in politics. The Russian term kultura usually implies such political ramifications. In this sense there is a cultural politics in the Soviet Union. 53

The cultural taste of the regime in Moscow serves as a model for the rest of the empire. This cultural taste includes in part that which 177 is pleasing to the political leaders of the Soviet Union. It includes

53 177 [341] also what Moscow deems proper to see developing in the provinces. The architecture which is encouraged in Moscow is only part of the climate of cultural taste. Public buildings in Alma-Ata reflect both Russian 19th century Baroque and Central Asiatic architectural themes: Russian columns and massiveness, Central Asiatic arches and blue tile ornament. Soviet architects have taken basic ideas from Russian contemporary architecture and to them added local ideas. Whether these hybrids are suited to local conditions of weather, availability of materials, and so forth, is another matter.

"Nationalist in form, socialist in content" was a much-publicized slogan 20 years ago; but it is seldom mentioned today. One can easily discuss Soviet art or architecture without reference to this formula; it no longer has even a covert role to play. The modern slogan might read "Soviet in basic form, local style in ornament."

668 This trend is evident in other forms of expression as well. Let us consider the topic of heroes. In the historical tradition, the Kazakh revival was centered around heroes of the past such as Kenesary Kasymov. This is not in keeping with the sense of heroism which the Kremlin seeks to instill in the Kazakhs. During the 1920's and 1930's, Moscow permitted only such heroes as Frunze and Chapayev, who fought the civil war in the steppes of Central Asia. To these has been added the figure of Amangeldy, a Kazakh who was an early member of the Bolshevik party. The revival of 19th century Kazakh heroes in the 1940's took place under conditions of wartime desperation. Moscow was anxious to sound any note that might awaken the feelings of the Kazakhs, to let any theme be pursued. The Soviets sought to show that the Russian revolutionaries in fighting the Tsars had advanced the same cause as had Kenesary, and that the Kazakhs and the Bolsheviks should therefore make common cause.

During World War II the possible selection of heroes expanded to include not only military and political leaders of the past, but literary [538] and scientific figures as well. Abai Kunanbaev, a 19th century Kazakh poet, has been much publicized in novels, plays, movies, and literary essays. He is acceptable to the Russians, for he was the translator into Kazakh of Russian poetry. Moreover, he was a friend of anti-Tsarist Russians, among them Chernyshevsky, a novelist and revolutionary exile. Chokan Valikhanov, although a Kazakh, was an officer of the Tsars, educated in St. Petersburg University, a member of [814] leading artistic and intellectual circles, and author of historical and ethnographic notes on the Kazakh past. He has been no less honored than Abai or Kenesary. Altynsarin, perhaps the greatest Kazakh intellectual, an educator, publicist, editor, ethnographer, and creator of a Kazakh alphabet, was likewise given a pre-eminent place in the Kazakh revival.

In the 1940's a Kazakh literary and artistic journal Adabiet zhane [214] Iskusstvo ("Literature and Art") was started. Adabiet is a Kazakh word meaning literature, iskusstvo a Russian word meaning art; the title [538] thus expresses the mixed character of contemporary Kazakh arts and literature. It can hardly be said that the journal is a success. It has been attacked for deviations from the political line, as might have been expected. In addition to being ideologically weak, from Moscow's viewpoint, 668 it has been criticized for appearing irregularly. And above all, 538 thousands of copies are left unsold.[1] In a word, it does not suit the aims [214] of the Soviet regime, nor does it satisfy the needs of the Kazakhs.

At the beginning of the revival, in the early 1940's, an attempt was made to purify the Kazakh language of Russianisms, or failing that, to apply Kazakh orthographic rules to borrowed Russian words. The leading Kazakh novelist, Mukhtar Auezov, wrote a novel on the life of Abai Kunanbaev, in which he attempted to adapt the spelling of Russian words to the Kazakh language. [194] This adaptation is most important in poetry, because the stress or accent in Kazakh falls only on the last syllable, while in Russian, as in English, it may fall on any syllable. Auezov was severely criticized for this "error" by a philologist who asserted that Abai himself retained Russian words in their original form when there was no Kazakh equivalent. Auezov admitted his errors and agreed to purge from his language Kazakh treatment of Russian words.[2] The whole controversy is specious, for Kazakh orthography [104] had not been standardized in the 19th century, when Abai was composing, and is not standardized today. Abai had no standard orthography to impose upon the Russian, and therefore retained the original. Auezov's Kazakhization of the Russian is not so much a scientific achievement as a cultural expression, an attempt to formulate a Kazakh spelling style as part of a literary program in the context of a revival of traditional Kazakh culture.

Auezov himself presided over one Kazakh attack on another expression of their culture. In an article, "Considerations on the Novel," Auezov criticized a novel by another Kazakh, Mustafin, for its lack of local dialect terms and colloquialisms, its failure to reflect the folklore and the speech of Kazakh village life. But then he added, "In Mustafin's novel, the new president of the collective farm . . . accomplishes miracles in ten months. All goes as though by the flash of a magic wand . . . One detects here the influence of outmoded traditions of folklore whose heroes easily and carelessly cross over seas of fire, find a way through impassable forests and fly across immeasurable spaces upon the magical bird Zemurg."[3] Auezov cannot have it both ways. He criticizes Mustafin for lack of contact with the people and then attacks him for coming under the influence of "outmoded" folklore traditions.

Soviet influence has been responsible for several changes in Kazakh 538 literature. 197 The traditional Kazakh mode of literary expression was poetry. The novel did not exist in Kazakhstan until the advent of the Russians. Today there are a number of novelists, such as Mukhtar Auezov and Sabit Mukanov. Both of them started out as poets, and only later adopted the novel as a literary form.

The aim of Soviet writing, in theory, is to achieve "socialist realism." There should be no romanticizing, no formalism or the quest of form for

[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 30 Oct and 12 Nov 53.
[2] *Ibid.*, 3 Sep 52.
[3] Auezov (4), 1951.

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form's sake, and above all, no subjectivism or nonobjectivism, so characteristic of recent western European art. And literature is to pursue socialist realism, that is, the objective expression of Soviet themes. In a word, art in the service of the state. The themes of Kazakh novels are typical Soviet themes: industrialization, as in the novel Life and Death by Mustafin; youth and the Soviet innovator or new Soviet man, as in Abishev's Young Generation and Mustafin's Shiganak; the Sovietization of rural life, as in Mukanov's Syr Darya and Mustafin's Millionaire. Mustafin and Mukanov have been officially praised for depicting the educative force of collective labor.[1] And Mukanov, Auezov, and Mustafin have been jointly praised for achieving professional stature as novelists, disclosing "their fruitful instruction by the Russian and Soviet literary classics in the method of Socialist realism in Kazakh prose."[2]

But the best works are those which deal with the past, such as Auezov's fictional biography of Abai and Mukanov's memoirs of his own prerevolutionary days, "My Schooling." These have been condemned because they contain glorifications of the past; they insist that all was not wrong in those times. The heroes of the new novels see their personal happiness in the weal of the Soviet fatherland; they think not only of immediate issues, such as their own collective farms, but of Moscow, Stalin, Leningrad, the Volga, and Stalingrad. They celebrate the Volga, Mother River of Russia.[3] But artistically, the new novels are less satisfying.

Auezov's novels about Abai are rich in their description of the Kazakh landscape, rich in language, but they are criticized for glorifying the "feudal-patriarchal" life of the past; they exalt past leaders and overlook Abai's fight against Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism.[4]

546 During the war, the Kazakh film industry received a tremendous lift when the Moscow studios moved to Alma-Ata. This growth was short-lived, however, for the studios were moved back to Moscow after the war. A Soviet controversy arose about one of the few films made in Alma-Ata, a film on the life of Chokan Valikhanov. While the idea of filming the life of this historic figure was praised in the Party press, the film itself was sharply criticized. The reasons given for the criticism are highly instructive: The film does not show the influence on Valikhanov of Russian revolutionaries; it idealizes Pan-Islamists of the 1860's and 1870's; it revives the ideals of the Alash-Orda (free nomads as of yore—no cities, no schools, no science); it praises Kenesary; it fails to show how Valikhanov's father supported the union of Kazakhstan with Russia; it distorts the latter's role by claiming that he sought to disaffect from Russia.[5]

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Kazakh literature and art are not nationalist in form and socialist in content. In the design of public buildings, in the various fields of writing, in the making of films, the content is designated by Moscow.

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[1] Malinovskii, 1949, p. 43.
[2] Ibid., p. 41.
[3] Ibid., p. 48
[4] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 6 Sep 53.
[5] Ibid., 23 Oct 52.

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The form is also imposed by Moscow, whether it concerns the introduction of the novel form in literature or the imitation of the massive architectural style in public buildings. Only the ornament and embellishment are locally derived.

HISTORY

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The same lines of criticism which the Soviets have directed at Kazakh literature and art have been applied to the writing of Kazakh history. The revival of Kazakh historical traditions during World War II developed into a great movement involving many Kazakh historians and writers. In 1950, Pravda published an editorial denouncing the entire movement, choosing for its main target the luckless Bekmakhanov, for his history of the Kenesary movement.[1] The Kazakh Party and press were slow in following the line laid down in Pravda. Only after a four-month delay did Kazakhstanskaia Pravda take up the attack, printing a policy statement from the Central Committee of the Kazakh Party, which commented on the Pravda editorial of the previous December and called for a formal Party hearing on the subject. This hearing took place in April and was reported in Kazakhstanskaia Pravda of 24 April 1951, in an article giving the general Party findings and those of the Party primary organization of the Kazakh Pedagogic Institute. Kenesary was denounced at one meeting as "an enemy of the Kazakh toiling masses" by 11 speakers representing the Party leaders and the academic world. The attack was directed at others: school textbook authors Ismailov and Dzhumaliev, both professors of history; Sauranbaev, director of the Social Science Section of the Academy of Sciences; and one Adilgireev, all in addition to Bekmakhanov. But this was only the beginning.

The attack on Kazakh revivalism continued, centered around the figure of Kenesary, with a different series of authors subjected to the sternest criticism. The line now advanced by Pravda, the Party press of Kazakhstan, and the History Section of the Academy of Sciences, was that there were two kinds of leaders in Central Asia in the 18th and 19th centuries—good leaders and bad. The Kazakh leader Kenesary was bad; he was called a class enemy, a reactionary feudal lord. Other Kazakh leaders were classified as good, for they sought to lead their peoples into an alliance with the oppressed Russian masses, seeking a common solution for their jointly shared troubles. The Kazakh leader Isatai Taimanov, for example, revolted not against the Tsar but against Russian capitalists who were exploiting his people.[2] This indicates, the Soviets conclude, that the Tsars had parallel interests with the poor Russians, while the enemies of both the poor Russians and the poor Kazakhs were the Russian capitalists.

The central Soviet historical journal, Voprosy Istorii ("Questions of History"), published in April 1951 a lead editorial, "On Certain

[1] *Pravda*, 26 Dec 50.

[2] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 19 Apr 51.

668 Questions of the History of the Peoples of Central Asia." According to this source, the Turks and Iranians of Central Asia must not look beyond the borders of Russia for the highest expression of their own culture. The editorial asserts: "The investigations of Soviet scholars have shown that the ancient populations of Central Asia were not only eastern Iranians, but also Turkic tribes, that the culture built by them had its indigenous traits. The modern peoples of Central Asia are not immigrants from abroad: they are in the process of historical development from local tribes." Nor was Central Asia only a peripheral area to regions in the south. "To the contrary, the latter must be regarded as peripheral to the ancient cultures of Central Asia."[1]

Shortly thereafter, the attack went beyond all bounds. The Uzbek newspaper Pravda Vostoka censured the great Russian historian Barthold for speaking of Iranian influences on Uzbek civilization.[2] In the late 1940's the famous Arabist Krachkovsky had been accused of mentioning Arab contributions to the civilizations of the North Caucasus.[3] Similar criticisms were aimed at 19th century anti-Tsarist leaders of the Caucasus, such as the Iman Shamil of Ossetia. In Kazakhstan the denunciations of the Kazakh revival included the issues of Pan-Turkism, cosmopolitanism, and finally, the fostering of anti-Russian sentiments. Thus the true dangers to Moscow inherent in the movement were finally expressed.

The Soviet denunciation of revivalism also touched on the dangerous myth of racism. Movements parallel to that in Kazakhstan occurred among the Bashkirs, the Azerbaijani, the Uzbeks, and other Turkic peoples of the Russian empire, both in the 1918 period and during the 1940's. The 1951 Voprosy Istorii editorial proclaimed that the modern peoples of Central Asia are descendants of local tribes. This stressing of purity of descent and lack of admixture with foreign elements is not only untrue, it is totally irrelevant from any scientific standpoint. Culture is transmitted not only by immigration and emigration, but many other means as well. The obvious mixture of descent lines and genes from time immemorial among the peoples, nations, tribes, and states of Central Asia need scarcely be mentioned. Central Asia is possibly the one area of the world where race mixture can be unequivocally demonstrated.

The statement on racism in Voprosy Istorii was tendered cautiously. The local press of the USSR was not so bounded, however. In Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan and the oil capital of the Soviet Union, the newspaper Bakinskii Rabochii sought to "save" the Azerbaijani from Pan-Turkism by asserting that the Azerbaijani were not at all Turkic, but were descendants of the ancient Medes.[4] A statement of similar intent regarding the Bashkirs appeared in a popular book on Bashkiria published in 1950.[5]

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[1] *Voprosy Istorii*, 1951, No. 1, pp. 1-5.

[2] *Pravda Vostoka*, 17 Aug 51.

[3] *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 12 Jan, 26 Jan, and 5 Feb 49.

[4] *Bakinskii Rabochii*, 20 Jul 52.

[5] Tokhaev, 1950, p. 120.

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The Soviet leaders have not attempted to block the national revivalism, but have sought instead to divert it to their own ends. The chief premises of the current Soviet thinking on the question of nationalities are as follows. First, the national culture of the peoples of the USSR evolved independently of all foreign influences; it is a purely autonomous and original development. Secondly, this national culture is superior to that of the peoples dwelling beyond the frontiers. Thirdly, the peoples occupying the present territory of the Soviet Union have long formed a great family, united and solidary, of which the Russian people have been the senior members; this united group has always opposed invaders from beyond the present-day borders. Finally, all citizens of the USSR are ethnically, culturally, and racially distinct from the Turkic and Iranian peoples living beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

KN 815 [189]

One sees, then, that in matters of literature and history, art is made to serve the state. The same may be said of science. A Soviet declaration states that the main task of the Academy of Sciences is to assist the great current projects of the Soviet regime. The Academy of Sciences of the KSSR was established shortly after World War II. It consists today of 20 institutes and many other separate scientific centers. It is active in nearly all fields, and is the body which establishes the official policy in the arts and sciences. The Academy has been severely criticized for diverging from the official line in the fields of history, literature, and linguistics. On the other hand, it has been praised by the regime for its record in such fields as engineering, technology, and agronomy, where liaison with industry, transport, and experimental agricultural stations has been satisfactory.[1]

KN [814]

K [815]

One source of trouble in the organization of scientific work in Kazakhstan has been the relatively small number of Kazakhs on the scientific staffs of their native republic. Of 102 degrees of Doctor of Science awarded in Kazakhstan, only 17 have been earned by Kazakhs. Out of a total of 811 other advanced degrees, about 160 were awarded to Kazakhs. Thus, of these 913 actual and potential leaders in science, 20 per cent are Kazakhs—about half of the proportion of Kazakhs in the total population of Kazakhstan.[2]

KN 812

The educational system of Kazakhstan is identical with that found throughout the USSR. Primary education is compulsory for all children aged eight or older. A decree of 10 August 1930 made education through the first four school years compulsory; in 1950 attendance was made compulsory through the seventh grade.

compulsory through the seventh grade.

The schools are divided as follows: Primary school comprises the first four years, incomplete middle school covers the fifth through seventh years, and middle school covers the eighth through tenth years.

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[1] *Central Asian Review* (30), 1953, No. 1, pp. 75-77.

[2] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 16 Dec 51.

KN 874 [130]
There are trade schools whose courses include on-the-job training; these run through the seventh year. In addition there are schools for the physically handicapped. Beyond the middle schools there is a system of technicums, or technical schools, which supply training in such fields as agronomy, zoological technology, medical knowledge (or advanced practical nursing), and pedagogy. More advanced education is given in the higher educational institutions, called VUZ, which are the equivalents of colleges and universities. There is, however, only one university proper in Kazakhstan, in Alma-Ata; it gives training through the doctorate in many fields.

KN 873

KN 874
Beside these formal educational establishments, there are many correspondence courses run by the schools. Some extension work is done among farmers, but this is one of the weakest points in the entire Soviet system of education and agriculture. The Party schools prepare leaders and agitators (see Chapters 6 and 8).

KN [665]

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

KN 872 [873]
The pattern observed in the higher scientific and educational fields is also found at the lower school levels. The number of Kazakhs attending school is smaller than their ratio to the population as a whole would warrant. The percentage of Kazakh children in the primary and secondary schools is, however, somewhat higher than the 20 per cent of Kazakhs in the advanced educational establishments. This means that the proportion of Kazakhs receiving education, which is low to begin with, decreases as one goes up the educational ladder.

K 872 [873]

In 1927, when the Kazakhs composed about 57 per cent of the population of Kazakhstan, 30 per cent of the children in school were Kazakh (see Table 18); apparently the Kazakhs were underrepresented in the schools at the beginning of Sovietization. In 1939, the Kazakhs constituted approximately 43 per cent of the total population of their republic; this ratio probably has decreased since 1939 to about 38 per cent. In 1946, however, only 30 per cent of the children in primary school were Kazakh.

The 1930 law making school attendance compulsory through the first four years accounts for the great increase in the number of children in school between 1930 and 1933. The increase between 1949 and 1951 reflects the extension of compulsory schooling through the seventh year of school. A slight decline followed the initial advance after the passing of each of these laws. The 1930 law had the immediate effect of increasing the number of Kazakh children in school to 40 per cent of the total school population. This proportion was not maintained; in the following decade the proportion of Kazakhs dropped to the 1927 figure of 30 per cent. Similarly, after the 1950 law the total number of children in school increased to 1,346,000 in 1952; by 1954 this total had dropped to 1,200,000.

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The Soviet regime seems to have adopted a policy whereby it will make provision for no more than 30 Kazakh children out of every 100 children in school in Kazakhstan. This is inferred from the proportion

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Table 18

PRIMARY EDUCATION IN KAZAKHSTAN[a]

Year	Number of Schools	Total Number of Children in School	Kazakh Children in School[b]	Kazakh Proportion of Total Number of Children (%)
1914	ND	105,000	8,400	8
1920-21	2,410	144,000	ND	
1927	3,944	274,000	82,000	30
1929-30	ND	352,000	ND	
1932-33	ND	576,000	230,000	40
1935	ND	797,000	ND	
1939	8,381	1,130,000	ND	
1945-46	7,899	797,000	244,000	30.5
1948-49	ND	1,000,000	ND	
1951-52	ND	1,346,000	ND	
1954	ND	1,200,000	ND	

[a] Tashlev 1947, pp. 67-68; Abdykalykov and Pankratova; *Kul'turnoie Stroitel'stvo*, 1940, pp. 58, 251; *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, 1st and 2nd eds.; *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 19 Feb 54.

[b] Includes all children instructed in the Kazakh language.

ND: No data available.

of Kazakh school children and from the proportion of Kazakh school teachers (see Table 19). Unfortunately, no data are available on the proportion of Kazakh teachers after 1946, which was the first full school year after the war. Nevertheless, the 1946 percentage of almost 32 per cent is consistent with the last published figures on the proportion of Kazakh school children in the schools of Kazakhstan.

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Table 19

TEACHERS IN KAZAKHSTAN SCHOOLS[a]

Year	All Teachers	Kazakh Teachers[b]	Kazakh Proportion of all Teachers (%)
1914	3,725	ND	ND
1939	42,500	13,500	30.1
1942	30,000	12,900	40.3
1946	37,835	12,000	31.7

[a] Includes primary and middle schools (through the 10th grade). Tashlev, pp. 67-68; Abdykalykov and Pankratova; *Kul'turnoie Stroitel'stvo*, 1940, pp. 58, 251; *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, 1st and 2nd eds.; *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 19 Feb 54.

[b] Includes all those teaching in the Kazakh language.

ND: No data available.

KN 872 Certain other available data add some evidence on this matter. In 1950-1951 the proportions of school children in the total populations of five regions of Kazakhstan were as follows (expressed in percentages): Aktyubinsk, 15.0; Dzhambul, 20.2; East Kazakhstan, 18.3; Guryev, 17.6; and West Kazakhstan, 21.6.[1] K [872] Aktyubinsk and Guryev, the regions in which the school children formed the lowest proportion of the population, are primarily herding regions, populated largely by Kazakhs. Hence these incomplete data tend to support the conclusion that Kazakh children are underrepresented in the schools.

Today the number of people with more education is increasing, but there is no increase in the percentage of children starting school. The base of the education pyramid has not been enlarged. . . .

K 177 Kazakhs resist Soviet education in those areas where education means giving up the traditional Kazakh culture. Even at best the Kazakh children are not being educated in numbers proportional to the total strength of the Kazakhs. This may mean that the Kazakh children are not going to school, or it may mean that some of those who go to school are going to Russian schools. Probably both factors are involved. K [369] The Kazakhs in the cities and in the industrial parts of Kazakhstan are accommodating to Soviet life more quickly than the rural, pastoral Kazakhs. Among the rural Kazakhs the traditional views of Russians, K [562] of schooling, of Sovietization, of the place of women in school and in life are still maintained. In rural regions the Kazakhs would be most reluctant to give their daughters to be trained in ways alien to their own. Their reluctance would be even greater if, for some of them, education meant giving up their native tongue for the Russian language. The literacy figures lend support to this, since literacy and mass education are closely related. In 1939, the last year for which a breakdown of literacy by sex is available, the literacy rate for the entire population of Kazakhstan was 76.3 per cent. The rate for males was 85.2 per cent, and that for females, 65.6 per cent. The traditional Kazakh view that women should be kept in the home and out of public life has not entirely yielded before the plans of the Soviet regime.

K KN 872 KN 563 Few data exist on the quality of instruction and the degree to which education in Kazakhstan is comparable to western standards. Certain conclusions are justified regarding the comparability of language instruction in Russian and Kazakh schools, however. The rate of failures in the higher educational institutions may be used as an index of the quality of the instruction offered in the Kazakh and Russian languages in the lower schools, since the graduates of these institutions become the teachers in the lower schools. In 1952 in Alma-Ata, the rate of failure was almost twice as high among the examinees in the Kazakh language as among those taking the Russian language. The rate of failure was 14.8 per cent in Russian, 27.8 per cent in Kazakh.[2]

The inference that the quality of education offered in the Kazakh language is lower than that given in Russian in Kazakhstan is borne out

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[1] *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, Second edition.

[2] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 26 Sep 52.

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by a number of details. In the city of Balkhash the proportion of teachers who have had higher pedagogic education is lower in the Kazakh school than in the Russian schools. As of November 1953, there had been no school inspector in the Kazakh school system of Balkhash for several years; mathematics, physics, and chemistry were not taught in the Kazakh middle school, and the Kazakh textbooks were generally condemned as inadequate.[7] The situation of minorities within Kazakhstan, such as the Uigurs, is even worse. In 1953, 18 out of 20 Uigurs failed in their language examinations in Alma-Ata; the quality of language instruction was specifically condemned.[8]

It is a matter of record, therefore, that Kazakhs are second-class citizens in the school system of their native republic. A smaller proportion of them attend school, and those who go to the Kazakh schools receive poorer instruction than that offered in the Russian language.

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[7] *Ibid.*, 13 Nov 53.
[8] *Ibid.*, 17 Oct 53.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
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APPENDIX

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Notes to the User:

This bibliography does not claim to be complete. Rather than accumulate thousands of titles dealing with Kazakhstan or the Kazakhs, the investigators have selected those items which they have found valuable in the course of the project. In view of the focus of the project on the Soviet period, only the standard works of the 19th century were included for background purposes. An effort was made to present as complete a review as possible of recent (World War II and postwar) sources. The apparent preponderance of prewar items among Russian sources is explained by relative unavailability of recent material.

Items considered especially useful or significant, or items typical of a whole group of similar items, are followed by annotations. To some extent the size of the annotation is a visual indication of the item's importance. Some comments are evaluative rather than content-oriented, and direction of bias is pointed out.

For the convenience of the reader the bibliography is divided into two parts, non-Russian sources and Russian-language sources. Only the non-Russian items are included with this report. The Russian-language bibliography has been reproduced separately and is available on request from the Human Resources Research Office. Citations for Russian-language sources are transliterated according to the system of the Library of Congress (with the omission of diacritic marks), and followed by a translation of the title in parentheses.

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Appendix A

PROBLEMS AND METHODS OF RESEARCH[1]

The Bureau of Social Science Research, in agreeing to compose a 121 background report on the Kazakhs for the Human Resources Research Office, regarded the report as a pilot study. The participants in the project had no guidelines other than broadly conceived research techniques such as are generally used in Soviet studies. The application of the results to the purposes of psychological warfare was in fact worked out in the course of the study. The Kazakhs presented additional difficulties because less is known in the United States about them than about, say, the Ukrainians, the Great-Russians, or other nationalities of the European parts of the Soviet Union. An interdisciplinary team was put together to meet these problems.

The primary function of the study was to provide a rounded picture of the Kazakhs and of the changes they were undergoing under the Soviets. Since these people live in an area ordinarily inaccessible, problems in information gathering had to be solved, as well as the more usual problems concerning interpretation and evaluation of data. The source materials to be drawn upon were scattered and had never previously been surveyed. The problem of sources will be described in the last part of this methodological survey, for it is a matter closely connected to the nature of the report and bears upon its value. 127

It is generally agreed that Soviet information may be used to compose a picture of life in the Soviet Union. Where Soviet information is not propaganda it is as reliable as similar information anywhere else, and where it is propaganda it is readily identifiable as such. The quantitative information is not as complete as it might be, but there is 121 enough of it to permit evaluation and cross-checking.

The present statement on methods concerns itself with two problems: one, the contributions of various disciplines and their integration into a meaningful picture of Kazakh life; and the other, the sources of information, their scope and content.

DEMOGRAPHY

Attention had been drawn to the Kazakhs because of a striking demo- 121 graphic fact about them: They had suffered a severe population loss 128 between 1926 and 1939. The techniques of demographic analysis would have been applied to them in any case but only as a secondary line of 161 inquiry. In the Kazakh research, however, demography came to have a central place. This study had as its target the demarcation of vulnerabilities to psychological warfare, and common sense alone would suggest that a large population loss might well leave lasting vulnerabilities.

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[1] By Lawrence Krader, Bureau of Social Science Research.

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128 161 The official Soviet explanation of the Kazakh population loss serves to call attention to the problems of demographic method as applied in this case. The only known reference by the Soviets to the matter of Kazakh losses is related to the development of industry in Soviet Asia. The loss of Kazakhs is laid to the growth of industry in areas neighboring on Kazakhstan, primarily the growth of industrial towns and cities in the southern Urals (Magnitogorsk, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk) and in southern Siberia (Novosibirsk, the Kuzbass, etc.). This statement implies a movement of Kazakhs from their native steppes to the cities to join in industry, thereby giving up their Kazakhdom. By shifting from the steppes to the factories and mines they became Russified and were, so the implication runs, listed as Russians in the 1939 census.

This simple explanation of a seemingly complex matter immediately arouses suspicion. The official Soviet explanation addresses itself only to the growth of industry, which is a positive merit in the Soviet scheme. Hence, one wonders whether a negative fact, a possible source of embarrassment to the Soviet propagandist, is being counterbalanced by a positive fact, the growth of industry.

Investigation of the population loss revealed a complex problem which no single explanation could resolve. The Kazakhs numbered 3,968,289 in the census of December 1926, and 3,098,764 in the census of January 1939. The loss in the 13-year period was thus almost 900,000, or 22 per cent. This figure, moreover, refers only to the physical or absolute loss, and the problem is broader than that. The Kazakhs would have been reproducing themselves during that period. For an understanding of the dynamics of possible population growth, an insight may be gained from comparison with a neighboring people. The Kirgiz are Turks just as the Kazakhs are. The traditional occupation of both is the raising of herds; both are natives of Central Asia, and have been for many centuries. The Kirgiz, living under different conditions in the Soviet period, increased by some 16 per cent during the 1926-1939 period while the Kazakhs were decreasing. The Kirgiz rate of increase was about the average for the entire Soviet Union. With a similar population increase, there would have been 4,600,000 Kazakhs by 1939, instead of 3,100,000. Thus one is faced with a projected loss of about 1,500,000. It is this projected population figure which we must deal with, rather than the actual. Of this, no mention is made in the Soviet literature.

129 A fuller understanding of the Kazakh population loss was gained by an intensive examination of Kazakh history, especially in the 19th century. In the light of their past record, the reactions of the Kazakhs to the process of Sovietization became comprehensible. In this process the Kazakhs, traditionally herdsmen, were forced into collective farms and were required to perform tasks contrary to their traditions and beliefs. The population loss was traced to resistance to collectivization, with attendant mass arrests, flight across the borders, mass starvation, and death; to poor organization of collectives; and finally, to industrialization and Russification.

ANTHROPOLOGY: THE PROBLEM OF ACCULTURATION

121 177 The interpretation of what Sovietization means involves a broader methodological problem than the Kazakh question alone. One of the writers of the report had advanced the theory that in Sovietizing a people, the leaders of the USSR were performing what may be referred to as controlled acculturation. Acculturation in anthropology refers to

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the changes in one group of people which result from their coming into contact with another. This has been covered generally in the anthropological literature. However, contact between peoples, or the establishment of some kind of relationship by government, trade, or religious conversion, usually has been a matter of progressive development, not one of systematic planning based on a detailed preconceived notion of the new form the changing society will assume. The new idea in the Soviet scheme was that of the uniform transformation of all minority peoples in the Soviet Union to the new way of life. The use of force in this context has two purposes; it is used to maintain control; at the same time it is used to bring about change and control the direction of change.

The acculturation process may be described in terms of accommodation and conflict. What institutions do the people undergoing change possess to meet the change readily and accept it? On the other hand, what institutions do they have to oppose the change, to block off the culture contact? A balance sheet of the potential sources of accommodation and of conflict can be drawn up.

An example of this procedure may be taken from the process of forced collectivization of the Kazakhs. Herdsmen by tradition, the Kazakhs regard farming as a task for women and for those too poor to maintain themselves by herding. When the Soviets forced them to settle down on farms in the early 1930's, the Kazakhs resisted strongly. Their reactions might be compared to those of an American told to do something which questioned at once his manhood and his ability to support his family. But the response of the Kazakhs would be even stronger, because traditionally they have maintained a sharp separation between tasks which men perform, such as care of the herds, and tasks which women perform, such as farming. Further intensifying the response was the contempt of the Kazakh herdsman for the farmer.

The Soviet plan to settle the Kazakhs down on farms was motivated partly by economic considerations—to get the Kazakhs to raise farm produce in addition to herd produce. There was also a political factor; it is easier to control a population that is fixed in a definite place, as farmers are, than a group of nomads who might be anywhere within an area of a thousand square miles with their herds. But traditional Kazakh patterns of culture opposed and blocked Sovietization, partly due to the feelings of the people, partly due to their institutions.

On the other hand, certain aspects of the Kazakh way of life helped along the process of Sovietization. When the collective farms were set up, groups of Kazakhs who were blood kin were moved into them. The Kazakhs have traditionally lived and worked together in groups composed of such blood kin. Today, the typical collective farm is composed of closely related families, all descended from a common ancestor, who have been living in close contact with each other for hundreds of years. The Soviets, far from breaking up these groups, simply moved them bodily into the new farms. Thus there existed certain institutions which accommodated to and were readily adopted by the Soviet order.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

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Anyone engaged in Soviet studies faces the constant problem of the changing historical record: History is at times rewritten by Soviet writers. The comparison of the new version with the old presents two aspects. The first concerns the facts themselves: How have they been changed, that is, what facts have been suppressed and what new facts have now been made available? The second is a matter of the interpretation: What does the change in the historical record mean with regard to Soviet attitudes?

The general methodological problem is one of historiography—the recording of the changes in the historical record by the Soviets. The historiographic approach is a fruitful one for the development of background data for psychological warfare. The comparison of what has been said in the past with what is said at present is an obvious line of inquiry. But more than that—by this confrontation, the outside observer comes to understand something of the mind of the Soviet leader. The change in the writing of history means that something is being suppressed or played down and something else is being given greater prominence.

A good example of this is to be seen in the change in historical writings regarding the old Kazakh leaders, especially those in the 19th century. Until after World War II, these old-time leaders were regarded as forces working in a good cause; they were positive historical forces. The background for this attitude, one officially adopted by the Soviet leadership, is of great interest. During the 19th century, the Tsarist empire had established itself in Central Asia and had colonized the area so that, with minor changes, the then existing boundaries are the same as those which exist today. But Tsarism and colonialism were both regarded as absolute evils by the leaders of the Russian Revolution. Therefore, so the argument of Soviet historians ran until recently, those who opposed them, the native leaders, were good.

The Kazakhs had produced leaders who fought long and bitter wars against the Russians and were sent down to bloody defeat a hundred years ago. The names of these leaders, Kenesary Kasymov, Isatai Taimanov, Nurmuhammed, and others, have great significance and honor to the Kazakhs. Part of their initial accommodation to the Soviet scheme lay in the fact that they were permitted to venerate their leaders as before the Revolution.

During World War II, when Moscow wanted to play on every stop which would call forth pro-Soviet feeling on the part of the local nationalities, the rulers in Moscow particularly encouraged the writing of accounts of the old leaders. However, the wave of writings which resulted from this encouragement went far beyond the expectations of the Soviet leaders. It appeared that a veritable cult of the old Kazakh heroes had long lain dormant, presumably for fear of reprisals from Moscow, and the merest hint of lifting the ban called forth the deepest veneration of their heroes by the Kazakhs.

The Moscow leaders soon realized the potentialities for disaffection in this and similar movements. It may be added that an exactly parallel development has taken place in the Caucasus and among neighboring peoples of southern Siberia, as well as throughout Central Asia. In the early 1950's, the interpretation of the absolute evil inherent in Tsarism and its colonialist policies was retracted. There was substituted for this interpretation the doctrine of a lesser evil. The argument now ran that Tsarism was a force for the good because the local leaders were even more reactionary than the Tsars of Russia were. Kenesary and the other Kazakh leaders were now branded as antiprogressive feudalists who in their wars (now termed illegal rebellions) against Tsarism were serving reactionary forces. It is even suggested that they were in the pay of foreign countries, primarily England.

The change in the Soviet line was not readily accepted by the Kazakhs. On the contrary, many Kazakh intellectuals had to be purged before the current line was accepted. And the political leaders of Central Asia, just as in other parts of Asia (notably India), are the intellectuals. Thus, from a problem in the writing and rewriting of history in the

Soviet Union, that is, from a problem of historiography, important themes of psychological warfare have emerged. 127

The problem of the old native leaders has another important aspect. The leaders of the Kazakh wars of a century ago were more than princes and generals. The Kazakhs are a people who are bound together by ties of blood as well as by common political traditions. Like other peoples of this part of the world—notably the Uzbeks, the Kirgis, and the Mongols—they all trace descent from a single ancestor. From this ancestor, by painstaking genealogies over dozens of generations, the family trees are drawn, and every Kazakh knows his place on them. Thus, another anthropological approach, the method of kinship analysis, further illuminates the results of historiography.

Scorn of the old leaders is to the Kazakhs more than scorn of the national heroes. Contempt shown for George Washington to an American or for Richard the Lionhearted to an Englishman may cut deeply. But the Kazakh leaders of old are at the same time the ancestors or blood kinsmen of the present-day Kazakhs. Thus an attack on those leaders is a double insult.

AN EXAMPLE OF THE INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH: THE ANALYSIS OF NATIVISM AND NATIONALITY

Reaction to conquest among subject peoples frequently takes the form of nativism. 128 By nativism is meant a cult venerating the way of life which existed before or at the time of the conquest. The present conditions are rejected, the old way of life—however unpleasant it may have been—is glorified. The concept of nativism has been worked out in recent anthropological thinking in many parts of the world. Most recently it has been applied to Asiatic Russia, to the peoples of Siberia and Central Asia. The Kazakhs, too, have had their cult of the past, the glorification of their older way of life as a means of protest against conditions of the present. Thus investigation of nativism is intimately bound up with the historiographic problem, side by side with kinship analysis. The blood-ties with the past are of a piece with current problems of collective farm composition, which are likewise based on blood relationships. The kin-group was noted as a means of accommodation to Sovietization, but at the same time it is a great reservoir of anti-Soviet sentiment and potential disaffection.

The reaction to conquest is always a two-way stream. The problem of gauging the form and intensity of the Russian reaction, that of the conqueror, as well as that of the Kazakhs, had to be explored. The imposition of Soviet planning on the Kazakhs is part of a more general problem, applicable everywhere in the Soviet Union. In the course of the investigation the methods of labor-force analysis were brought to bear on the question of current relations between Russians and Kazakhs. The various occupations, such as farm laborer, transport worker, industrial technician, bookkeeper and accountant, manager and farm director, were rated as to degree of specialization of training required. These were then broken down into nationality composition within Kazakhstan. It was found that the Kazakhs were proportionately most heavily represented in occupations requiring little specialized training, and most poorly represented farther up the scale. This is especially true of Kazakh women.

The findings in the analysis of occupations by nationality were [127] corroborated by the analysis of membership in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan; it was found that Moscow was especially concerned with the low proportion of local nationals in the Party and had repeatedly notified the local Party leadership to that effect. Again this was especially true in the women's cadres. This pattern was borne out in examination of marriage rates by nationality: The rate of Kazakh intermarriage with Russians was found to be virtually zero. Linguistics contributed also to this aspect of the investigation.

Methodologically, the inquiry into nationality proved to be most interesting inasmuch as three separate problem areas were involved, each with its own technique. Analyses of the labor force, of Party membership, and of the intermarriage rate all led to the same general conclusion that the degree of contact between the Russian and Kazakh peoples was low, and in certain places nonexistent. Again, the reluctance of either group to associate with the other was postulated; neither was more willing to do so than the other. Analysis of the urban pattern, while it did not present findings so clear-cut as those above, tended to support them. That is, there is some evidence that the different nationals live in distinct and separate sections of the various cities. All this points to a situation of poor intergroup and race relations.

DISCUSSION OF METHODS USED

To sum up the problems and methods thus far: The attention of the investigating team was focused on the Kazakhs because of a known demographic problem, a people who underwent a loss in population while the Soviet Union as a whole was gaining. The official Soviet explanation was regarded as unsatisfactory. What methods would best afford a fuller understanding of the problem, and at the same time supply background material for a general picture of the life of the Kazakhs and their accommodations and blocks to Sovietization? A number of approaches and disciplines were brought to bear on the subject: demography, economics, anthropology, sociology, and social psychology.

An interplay between all these disciplines was drawn upon. Problems posed in one discipline, such as demography, found an answer in sociology or anthropology, for instance, in the question of the population loss. A problem in sociology or anthropology concerning the nature of intergroup relations could be solved by applying the methods of labor-force analysis, and by drawing upon the findings of political science and economics. Historiography called attention to a problem in attitudes toward older heroes which could be subjected most readily to anthropological analysis. For drawing the general picture of Kazakh life, all disciplines had to be called upon.

There are inherent limitations in the methods of each of the separate disciplines. The demographic analysis could not afford insight into social tensions, although it could call attention to an area where social tensions might be found. Moreover, the data of demography supplied the basis for important measurements of relations between Slavs and Kazakhs. Possibly the most important of these measurements or indices was the marriage rate between the two peoples. A question was posed, one frequently asked by anthropologists and sociologists, regarding the composition of the family: Were there many mixed marriages? The demographic analysis made possible an answer to this question. The interpretation of the findings revealed a potential in the field of group relations for the formation of psychological warfare themes. Similarly, the historiographic method had certain limitations. Behind the question of the rewriting of history lay the changes in Soviet line, a political matter, and the changes in the Kazakh social order, an anthropological one. It is clear that each of the disciplines employed was needed to help the other; the limitations of each method demanded this kind of cooperation. 128

From one point of view, all these methods exemplify the functional approach in anthropology, which starts from the idea that every people, nation, or society is formed of parts which combine into a closely interrelated whole. The parts are determined by asking questions about political behavior, economic activity, marriage relations, and so forth, in order to establish the form of the political, economic, or family institutions. A change or a trouble spot in one of these has repercussions in all the others, just as a man who is deeply concerned with matters in his office might bring them home with him and disturb the family peace by scolding his child with unaccustomed loudness.

Sovietization has changed the political, economic, legal, and religious insitutions of the Kazakhs. These changes are presumably in accordance with a master plan of the leadership in Moscow. Of course this plan has not worked out completely, since man and his institutions are far too complicated to be mastered thoroughly, or for social behavior to be predicted except in the grossest terms. The Soviet leaders believe they have objective control because they alone have mastered the laws of history, and know in advance the direction in which societies necessarily must move. However, common sense tells us that man's culture is not so easily decreed, that the science of culture is far from perfect. Soviet leaders must fill the gap between their aims and their achievements, between collectivization in theory and in actuality, for example, by the systematic application of force to bring the resisting peasants into line. Functional analysis can show how a breakdown in one part of the whole, say a failure in the plan for collectivization, has repercussions in the rate of marriage or in Party membership. For this kind of inquiry Soviet theory is not well equipped, just as it is not equipped to answer the question of why a Kazakh herder will not take to farming.

THE LOCAL PRESS AND OTHER SOURCES

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Closely related to the considerations of methods employed in the Kazakh report is the matter of sources used. Local sources, which meant first and foremost the newspapers, were systematically explored. The local press of Kazakhstan, just as for all other parts of Central Asia and for many parts of the Soviet Union, is available in this country, with very few gaps in the various series. These newspaper files exist most fully in the Library of Congress, thus making all other cities in the country secondary to Washington as a center for this kind of investigation.

The local press, just as everywhere in the Soviet Union, has two levels of writing. On the top level, in the reports which first strike the eye, there are the articles expounding Party doctrine. These may be quickly scanned and set aside; their information content is low, and is of interest only to those who follow the evolutions of the Party line. Since this is uniform for the entire Soviet Union, little in it is relevant to the local scene.

The level below the doctrinary one has proved to be a rich source of information, for the entire life of the Kazakh republic is spread out before the investigator. With utmost frankness, the shortcomings in various fields of activity are discussed, whether in politics, economics, or elsewhere. The local press records the entire system of rewards and punishments, praise and blame, what is being built and what has failed of expectation.

127 A case in point is the matter of the honors list. Periodically, lists of people singled out for various kinds of honors are published in full. These lists permit insight into the nationalities of the various groups of people in the different republics and regions. The representativeness of the sample may be determined independently in certain instances. For instance, it may be determined from the honors list that Kazakhs, especially Kazakh women, are underrepresented in the upper Party echelons; a decree from Moscow deploring the very situation may be found. Similarly, lines of inquiry have been opened up by the lists of mothers honored for bearing many children, workers and managers in industry for overfulfilling their norms, and so forth.

Whether the samples are representative may not always be checked, but they have been verified as reliable in a sufficient number of cases to permit placing confidence in the whole procedure. At the same time insight is gained into the approved pattern for Soviet life as advocated by the leadership and, parallel to this, into the areas of disapproval where the pattern is in danger of breaking down.

The exploration of the local press was first thought of as a technique in the gathering of information, along with other possible sources. However, this approach quickly proved its superiority over all others. A number of lines of inquiry were opened up which had not at first been contemplated. Among these was the establishment of a number of indices or measures of basic attitudes and tensions. For instance, if it can be shown numerically that there is no, or very little, intermarriage between Kazakhs and Russians, this alone is one of the most significant indicators of underlying attitudes between the two peoples now living side by side in Kazakhstan. Data on this point were derived from a compilation of social notices in the local papers.

The examination of the local press thus developed from a simple technique to a method of systematically gathering information. Out of this emerged a number of problems to be met and solved regarding the Kazakhs which could not otherwise have been approached. The local press made greater depth possible, a broader range of study, and above all, systematic coverage. It may be added that the methods developed in the Kazakh study were further applied in a subsequent study of the Kirgiz republic, and are now in the process of being applied to the whole of Central Asia.

In addition to historical materials, demographic and other data issued by the Soviet government, and the local newspapers, this research has drawn upon all available studies of the Kazakhs, both Soviet and foreign. The non-Russian sources are listed in the bibliography of this report; the Slavic references are available on application to the Human Resources Research Office. Although the discussion in this appendix has been concerned primarily with what the researchers have learned from the use of new approaches and from the special problems encountered in studying the Kazakhs, neither this nor any other study of peoples within the USSR can afford to overlook any source of information.

By way of conclusion it should be added that use of local sources of information is not a universal solution for all problems of obtaining data regarding the Soviet Union. There are many matters, above all in the technical and military fields, on which they give no information. They do, however, permit insight into areas where there is otherwise none. A major result of the Kazakh research lies in the development of means for the study of the Soviet Union from a distance through its local press.

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Kazak RQ2

[Information on the Moslem Religion among the Kazaks will be found in category 779.]